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Abstract
The theory of path dependence provides important claims to explain institutional 
development, relating to the roles of self-reinforcing process called ‘increasing returns’ since 
the theory is based on insights from economics. Countries remain locked-in onto a given 
trajectory. Reversals are possible only due to exogenous shocks.
Path dependence has been criticized because it provides an overly static view of the world 
and for its poor treatment of institutional change. The thesis seeks to remedy these 
shortcomings and presents a case study based on increasing returns and institutional change. 
It asks whether increasing returns affect institutional reform and, if so, how and why. The 
case study proposed concerns the trajectory of Italian telecommunications institutions 
between 1979 and 2007. The trajectory of British telecommunications institutions is used as 
a benchmark to offer a structured comparison. ,
In answer to the research question, the thesis argues that, between 1979 and 1992, there were 
increasing returns arising out of the relationships between telecommunications providers and 
elected politicians. These increasing returns contributed to the failure of proposals for 
reform, thus confirming that increasing returns keep countries on a steady trajectory. But, 
between 1992 and 1997 remarkable reforms took place. The thesis shows that new 
institutions were designed with a view to ‘cut o ff the opportunities for increasing returns to 
arise, thus indicating that increasing returns can contribute to institutional reform too. The 
new institutional trajectory of Italian telecommunications since 1997 continues to be shaped 
by increasing returns through a complex pattern of reactions and counter reactions by elected 
politicians.
Thus, the thesis makes a contribution to path dependence insofar as it demonstrates that 
increasing returns can also bring institutional change. New paths can arise without 
exogenous shocks. In addition, the thesis’ findings illustrate that path dependence needs to 
specify the relationships between increasing returns and actors.
Introduction
There is a paradox about Italian telecommunications. The same factors that were 
responsible for lack of institutional change in the period between 1979 and 1992, were then 
responsible for radical institutional change in the years thereafter. The paradox lies at the 
heart of the theory that is used to explain the evolution of Italy’s trajectory, namely path 
dependence, and concerns the complex relationships between continuity and change in 
institutional development.
The paradox can be explained by filling a gap in the theory, which is the main task of 
the thesis. Path dependence focuses on the reinforcing effects that processes of increasing 
returns have on institutions. However, there has been little empirical research on what 
increasing returns mean in the world of politics. It is not surprising, therefore, that there has 
been equally little attempt to explain that increasing returns accrue to somebody and that the 
process of appropriation of increasing returns by actors can provide a much richer 
explanatory tool for the study of institutions.
The thesis shows that increasing returns in telecommunications in the period between 
1979 and 1992 accrued to elected politicians. Thus, they had no interest in approving 
reforms that would have deprived them of such increasing returns. However, the process of 
appropriation of increasing returns, which consisted in the use of telecommunications 
providers’ resources, created a split within elected politicians. When conditions for reform 
were ripe in 1992, some elected politicians proposed to overthrow the institutions that were 
responsible for enabling appropriation of increasing returns and designed institutions inspired 
by a logic of rejection of appropriation of increasing returns.
This was not a process without conflicts. Other elected politicians, while sharing 
rejection of appropriation of increasing returns, conceived the new institutions in a different 
way. The new Italian telecommunications institutions that were borne between 1992 and 
1997 are inspired by the tension between these two logics and reflect a contested path of 
change. But change nevertheless happened and the thesis shows that Italy after 1992 indeed 
embarked on a new trajectory.
The period between 1997 and 2007 is further analyzed to resolve the ambiguity as to 
which of the two new logics prevailed. Through analysis of legislative measures passed in 
this period to make some adjustment in the institutional design, it shows that a logic of 
limited separation between elected politicians and suppliers has gained the upper hand.
Compared with the UK logic of complete separation between suppliers and elected 
politicians, Italy’s new logic of limited separation provides both a refinement and a 
confirmation to path dependence for increasing returns can be responsible for radical change, 
but, even so, in the choices about new institutional trajectories, countries seem to be 
responding to a voice from their past and, between two alternatives, prefer the one that bear 
more resemblance with their history.
The theory of path dependence in political science seeks to explain institutional 
development. One of its fundamental claims is that often nations follow different 
institutional paths even if faced by similar pressures. In order to explain institutional 
divergence across countries, path dependence argues that small initial events that differ 
across nations can be magnified and result in diverse institutional paths. Divergence across 
countries cannot be corrected over time. Even if its path is not the most economically
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efficient, a country will find itself locked-in onto a given institutional trajectory, with 
alternative paths becoming progressively out of reach/
The causal mechanism that is responsible for this effect is ‘increasing returns’. 
Increasing returns is a key concept of the theory of path dependence. It is borrowed from 
economics where it was originally developed to explain the power of standards in modem 
economic systems. Contrary to 19* century neo-classic economics, which was based on 
decreasing returns, the concept of increasing returns makes reference to the fact that the sale 
of one additional unit of a good incorporating a standard makes it more valuable and attracts 
new sales, thus generating increasing returns. There are two aspects that are worth noting 
and that are crucial to export this concept to political science: self-reinforcing and repeated 
interactions. Path dependence in political science builds on the parallelism between the way 
in which standards operate on the market and the role of institutions. It argues that repeated 
interactions between actors and institutions and between institutions themselves can lead to a 
self-reinforcing pattern that is similar to increasing returns in economics. As with standards, 
this can bring about a lock-in effect, i.e. institutional choices become very hard to reverse. 
Increasing returns thus provide an explanatory mechanism for institutional lock-in and 
divergence across countries over time.
D. C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990). See also the contributions of path dependence leading 
scholar, Paul Pierson, ‘When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change’, 
World Politics, 45 (1993), 595-628; ‘The Path to European Integration: A Historical 
Institutionalist Analysis’, Comparative Political Studies, 29 (1996), 123-63; ‘Not Just What, 
but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes’, Studies in American Political 
Development, 14 (2000), 72-92; ‘The Limits of Design’, Governance, 13(4) (2000), 475-99; 
‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence and the Study of Politics’, The American Political 
Science Review, 94 (2000), 251-67; ‘Big, Slow-Moving and ... Invisible: Macrosocial 
Processes in the Study of Comparative Politics’, in J. Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer (eds.). 
Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 177-207. Parts of these works have been collected in a book. Politics in Time- 
History, Institutions and Social Analysis (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
2004).
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Path dependence is gaining importance in current debates about comparative political 
economy and national institutions. Its claims go to the heart of the issues that concern 
students of these disciplines. Why do countries fail to convergence on the most efficient 
institutions? Why are patently sub-optimal institutional choices so hard to reverse? Path 
dependence and its key concept of increasing returns can help to provide an answer to these 
questions. In addition, path dependence also encourages students to focus on the time 
dimension of institutional choices. Repeated interactions generating a positive feedback are 
not instantaneous. They take place through time. Path dependence remedies what is often 
called the ‘snap-shot’ approach to the study of institutions, i.e. a tendency to focus on the 
period immediately before a major institutional development, to unearth its causes. Path 
dependence suggests that institutional resilience and change can be linked to small events that 
were magnified through time. Tracing the origins of the institutions and exploring the 
reinforcing mechanisms that have enabled them to become embedded helps to obtain a more 
balanced and complete view, sometimes even providing a completely different perspective on 
the causes of institutional development in a country’s history.
Path dependence has its critics too. Some argue that path dependence has a natural 
bias towards explaining institutional stability, rather than change. In fact, it is argued that the 
lock-in effect that is associated with increasing returns portrays an overly static view of the 
political world and could result in a new form of determinism.^ Others argue that path
C. Crouch and H. Farrell, ‘Breaking the Path of Institutional Development? Alternatives to 
the New Determinism’, MPIfG Discussion Paper (2002), available at www.mpi-fg- 
koeln.mpg.de. For a later version of this article, see Rationality and Society, 16(1) (2004), 5- 
43. For fiirther criticism of path dependence, see also H. Schwartz, ‘Down the Wrong Path: 
Path Dependence, Markets, and Increasing Returns’, available at www.people.virginia.edu. 
For recent discussions of path dependence and institutional change, see T. Boas, 
‘Conceptualizing Continuity and Change -  The Composite-Standard Model Path 
Dependence’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 19(1) 2007, 33-54; I. Greener, ‘Path 
Dependence, Realism and the NHS’, British Politics, 1(3) 2006, 319-343; F. Ross, ‘An 
Alternative Institutional Theory to Path Dependence: Evaluating the Greener Model, British 
Politics, 2 (2007), 91-99.
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dependence’s treatment of institutional change is too limiting, because it only allows for 
exogenous shocks as the cause to explain the end of a path.^ Thus, exogenous shocks play 
the role of deus ex machina in the ancient Greek tragedies.
In a first attempt to overcome these shortcomings, Richard Deeg proposes to 
introduce a definition of ‘path’ within the theory of path dependence."^ He suggests that a 
path is defined by the set of institution-based constraints experienced by actors, which he 
calls the ‘logic’ of a path. Thus, the logic of the post-war German financial system is, 
according to Deeg, a ‘bank-based logic’. Further, Deeg suggests to study interactions 
between different levels, such as an industrial sector and political parties, as a source of 
increasing returns. Another refinement of path dependence brought by Deeg is the distinction 
between ‘on-path’ and ‘off-path’ change and its relation with the ‘logic’ of a path. Given that 
institutions are far from being petrified entities, one is confronted with the issue of 
characterization of change that takes place continuously. Deeg argues that ‘on-path’ change 
designates alterations that take place in compliance with an existing logic, whereas ‘off-path’ 
change is the product of a new logic.
The thesis builds on this research to make a contribution to path dependence as a 
theory to study institutional change. It asks whether increasing returns affect institutional 
reform and, if so, how and why. The salience of this question for path dependence is two-
R. Deeg, ‘Path dependency, Institutional Complementarity, and Change in National Business 
Systems’, in G. Morgan, R. Whitley and E. Moen (eds.). Changing Capitalisms? 
Internationalization, Institutional Change, and Systems of Economic Organization (Oxford: 
GUP, 2004), 21-51, at 23.
R. Deeg, ‘Institutional Change and Path Dependency: The Transformation of German and 
Italian Finance’, paper presented at the 14*'’ International Conference of Europeanists, 
Chicago, March 11-13, 2004; ‘Institutional Change and the Uses and Limits of Path 
Dependency: The Case of German Finance’, MPIfG Discussion Paper 01/6, available at 
www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de: ‘Change from Within: German and Italian Finance in the 1990s’, 
in W. Streeck and K. Thelen (eds.). Beyond Continuity: Explorations in the Dynamics of 
Advanced Political Economies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 169-202; and ‘Path 
dependency. Institutional Complementarity, and Change in National Business Systems’.
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fold. First, the thesis seeks to provide an empirically based study of path dependence and 
institutions. Indeed, due to its relative novelty, few have attempted to apply path dependence 
to study real cases of institutional development. Second, the thesis seeks to overcome path 
dependence’s current weakness insofar as increasing returns appear ill-suited to explain 
institutional change.
The central argument that is put forward in answer to the research question is that 
increasing returns bring also institutional change because of the reactions of actors to 
increasing returns. Actors within a path may be spurred to design new institutions in 
deliberate opposition to increasing returns and give rise to a new institutional trajectory that is 
shaped by increasing returns.
This has important implications for path dependence. It broadens the theory’s 
explanatory power insofar as it reconciles increasing returns with institutional change without 
the need to call on deus ex machina explanations. In addition, it contributes to refining the 
concept of increasing returns. Sometimes path dependence seems to assume that increasing 
returns are faceless processes that, once set in motion, take a life of their own and do not need 
actors. The thesis shows that there are complex relationships between actors and increasing 
returns that play a central role in the institutional development. Path dependence can 
significantly benefit from paying a more sustained attention to these relationships since they 
enrich the notion of increasing returns and make it better equipped to cope with the 
challenges of explaining institutional change in a country’s history.
Overview o f the thesis
The key concepts of path dependence, the research question and the methodology
used are set out in chapter 1. Chapter 2 provides a short history of telecommunications
institutions in the two countries. It shows that the starting points of the institutional
14
trajectories in 1979 were very different. In Britain, provision of telecommunication services 
had been entrusted from the early days to a single, state-owned supplier, the Post Office. The 
Post Office enjoyed a complete monopoly ^''throughout the British islands^’ and it had the 
power to set tariffs. However, Post Office finances were part of the central government 
budget. In contrast, provision of telecommunications services in Italy was entrusted to a 
multiplicity of private companies operating under a licence. One provider, Azienda di Stato 
per i Servizi Telefonici (ASST), was a ministerial body. Through time, the number of private 
companies decreased to three: SIP, Telespazio and Italcable. Although limited liability 
companies, they were controlled by the state through Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale 
(IRI), a state-controlled holding entity. Their finances fell outside the government budget. 
Chapter two shows that pressures for changing the organization of the sector began already 
before 1979. Services provided by ASST and SIP largely overlapped, which caused 
inefficiency and acted as a hindrance to development at a time of fast growth and innovation. 
The inflationary pressures of the 1970s encumbered SIP with a precarious financial position 
as its tariffs were set by ministerial decrees, but the government did not allow SIP tariffs to 
reflect inflation and so the company found itself unable to provide services in a satisfactory 
manner. In addition, SIP lacked the resources to meet a surge in demand and to adequately 
invest in the network. Thus, the chapter underlines the considerable institutional differences 
between the two countries in 1979 and the pressure for institutional change in Italy pre-dating 
1979, i.e. the period from which the thesis undertakes a detailed study of the Italian 
trajectory.
Chapter 3 sets out the British trajectory after 1979 and until 2007, which represents 
the benchmark trajectory. The chapter sets out how supply of telecommunications was given 
to a separate entity, British Telecommunications (BT) in 1981. The 1984 
Telecommunications Act paved the way for BT’s privatization, opened the sector gradually
15
to competition and established an independent regulatory agency. The logic underlying these 
changes was one of separation between elected politicians and suppliers. First, elected 
politicians had little ability to influence pricing decisions by the suppliers. Second, they did 
not own the suppliers. Third, there were clear rules as to the independent regulator’s tasks 
and those of elected politicians. This logic remained unchanged in the following years and 
represents the benchmark against which one can assess Italy’s trajectory.
Chapter 4 plays a central role in the thesis, providing empirical evidence as to the 
existence of increasing returns in Italian telecommunications and how they affected the 
institutional trajectory. It shows how, after the crisis of 1979, SIP became highly dependent 
on political parties to obtain state funds needed to continue to provide services and expand 
the network in compliance with the terms of its licence. Political parties requested that SIP 
acted according to certain directions given by them. They appointed ‘loyal’ management in 
proportion to their electoral weight {Hottizzazione^) and then expected management to carry 
out their instructions. Tariff increases, another vital component of SIP’s viability given that 
its revenues were entirely based on tariffs, were also in the hands of political parties, which 
used their power of approval to further condition SIP’s behaviour according to their needs. In 
particular, SIP’s resources were used to hire staff, to make investments in depressed areas, to 
buy equipment from ‘friendly’ firms and in a variety of other ways that could boost power 
and influence of political parties and, ultimately, bring votes. A similar, if even more 
pronounced, relationship bound political parties and ASST. Being a part of the central 
government as a unit within a department, ASST was even more subject to political control 
and it was in fact the preferred vehicle to carry out politically oriented manoeuvres as its 
accounting rules allowed for little outside oversight.
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But investment decisions made in the name of political patronage dissipated 
resources. SIP and ASST were burdened with inefficient expenses and so were permanently 
in need of fresh funds to continue to operate. Telecommunications providers thus had to go 
back, cap in hand, to the political parties to obtain new resources. The process then restarted 
and a new round of financing carried with it new conditions. Therefore, this process had a 
crucial self-reinforcing aspect which made the relationship between suppliers and elected 
politicians extremely strong. Given its self-reinforcing character, this relationship embodies 
a case of increasing returns.
By tracing the attempts to reform the organization of the sector that took place 
between 1979 and 1992, the chapter shows how such increasing returns played a role in 
shaping the institutional trajectory of Italian telecommunications. The fragmented 
architecture of the telecommunications sector matched very well the multiple centres of 
power that governed Italy during the period studied. The several parties that formed the 
coalition governments and factions within the Christian Democratic Party could each control 
a sphere of power within telecommunications. Increasing returns fostered an institutional 
trajectory based on the continued fragmentation of the telecommunications sector. Until 
1987, when EU legislation imposed change, there was no legislative measure to reform the 
split-supplier system. Yet, even when a law was passed to comply in 1992 with EU 
requirements, it still permitted the perpetuation of a split-supplier system.
The chapter shows that, as suggested by path dependence theory, increasing returns 
acted to keep Italy on a bounded trajectory of change. This can also be appreciated by 
benchmarking Italy’s trajectory. Whereas in Britain supply of telecommunications services 
was opened to competition, BT was in private hands and there was an independent regulator, 
in Italy there was a tight monopoly, a split between different suppliers, all of which were in
17
State hands and regulatory powers were held by elected politicians. The overall logic of the 
Italian path was indeed based on elected politicians’ control over suppliers, so much so that 
the two were bound together by a self-reinforcing relationship which ensured that 
institutional development followed a well-defined, continuous path, profoundly different 
from the one followed by Britain, whose logic was based on the opposite concept of 
independence of suppliers from elected politicians.
Based on the findings of Chapter 4, one should have expected that, in the years 
following 1992, Italy would have continued along a path of split-suppliers, state control and 
monopoly, according to a logic of control by elected politicians. However, chapter 5 
demonstrates that the fundamental reforms which took place between 1992 and 1997 changed 
Italian telecommunications in an unexpected way. This is because, in 1994, all providers 
were merged into Telecom Italia. In 1995, a framework law was passed to set up 
independent regulators and in 1997 the creation of a telecommunications regulator, Autorità 
per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni (“AGCOM”), was approved. Finally, the rules on 
competition were also substantially changed in 1997.
These developments challenge the ability of path dependence to explain institutional 
development and raise the question of the role of increasing returns (as described in chapter 
4) for institutional reform in Italy. In its current state of development, path dependence often 
invokes deus ex machina explanations that ‘break’ existing paths. Indeed, in 1992 very 
significant changes took place on the national political level that make 1992 a watershed in 
Italian history so that it is common to hold that 1992 marked the end of what was called ‘First 
Republic’. Following such approaches, the end of the First Republic would be seen by 
current interpretations of path dependence as an ‘exogenous shock’ that ended increasing
18
returns, which therefore would play no further role in institutional change, which would 
therefore follow a new path.
The findings of chapter 5 reject this contention and show that past increasing returns 
contributed to shaping institutional choices and so affected institutional reform at the sector 
specific level. The chapter argues that, due to the end of the First Republic, increasing 
returns ended in 1992-1993. But policy makers charged with the task of designing new 
institutions looked at past increasing returns, i.e. increasing returns observed in the period 
between 1979 and 1992, and some of them opted to design institutions in a spirit of deliberate 
opposition to such past increasing returns. The government held by Giuliano Amato, which 
took office in 1992-1993, pursued a policy of economic reform that interpreted privatization, 
independent regulation and a single supplier as a way to ‘cut o ff mechanisms that had been 
instrumental to increasing returns. Others, though, drew a different lesson. Although 
inspired by the same rejection for increasing returns, they opposed the adoption of a UK-style 
logic of full separation and the loss of power that this would mean. This produced a conflict 
between the two logics, both of which, notably, took as their point of departure past 
increasing returns. The conflict surfaced prominently in the passage of the law of 1995 and 
the AGCOM law in 1997 and it shaped the way in which the rules on appointment of 
AGCOM Commissioners and Presidents were set out. These rules ensured that AGCOM 
Commissioners represented political parties’ relative weight in Parliament, whereas the 
President was appointed by the Prime Minister, thus giving a slight premium to the ruling 
coalition.
The findings of chapter 5 are of great importance for the thesis. They show that 
increasing returns were at the origin of institutional reform. This is a so far unnoticed aspect 
of increasing returns and, in fact, responds to criticism that the theory can only explain
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bounded change. In contrast, chapter 5 shows that increasing returns can also contrihute to 
institutional reform. What is relevant for the theory is that an analysis of the beneficiaries of 
increasing returns and the way in which increasing returns are appropriated is crucial to inject 
a higher degree of dynamics in path dependence. These aspects may uncover a complex 
pattern of reactions and counter-reactions that in turn sets in motion a process of institutional 
reform. Provided they are incorporated into path dependence analyses, they can greatly 
expand increasing returns’ explanatory power.
In 1997, Italy and Britain shared important formal institutional features. In both 
countries the leading supplier was privatized and there was full competition. Nevertheless, 
the rules on appointment of the regulator differed to a significant extent. More importantly, it 
was not clear whether the logic of the Italian path was consistent with that of the British path. 
In fact, some elected politicians in Italy had opposed the adoption of a UK-style logic and 
pushed for a lower degree of separation between suppliers and elected politicians. They had 
already obtained a significant result in 1997 in the way in which the appointment rules of 
AGCOM were crafted. Thus, in 1997 the logic of Italy’s path was ambiguous and contested. 
This warrants a separate chapter to study the period after 1997 and assess the direction of the 
institutional trajectory.
The task of chapter 6 is indeed to continue the analysis of Italy’s trajectory after the 
creation of new institutions in 1997, when a state of conflict between two possible logics of 
development made the direction towards which Italy was going ambiguous. The chapter 
shows that, between 1997 and 2007, legislative measures were passed under the second 
Amato government in 2001 and later in 2003 (under the Berlusconi government) to transfer 
licensing powers from AGCOM to the Ministry and entrust the latter with new, not well- 
defined, regulatory powers. In addition, there was a general climate of hostility against
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independent regulators. Moreover, between 2006 and 2007, the government led by Romano 
Prodi, while putting forward a bill whose purpose was to strengthen the independence of 
regulators, became very actively involved in matters concerning ownership and market 
structure, by forcing Telecom Italia to abandon plans to sell its mobile telephony business 
and seriously discouraging a takeover of the company by foreign carriers.
This evidence shows that, after 1997, Italy embarked on a distinctive path compared 
to Britain’s. Some of its formal institutions are similar to Britain’s, such as full competition 
and private ownership. However, regulatory powers in Italy are divided between AGCOM 
and the Ministry, whereas in Britain most are clearly in the hands of the regulator. Moreover, 
the logic of the two paths appears different. Whereas the British logic is based on separation 
between suppliers and elected politicians, in Italy opponents of a UK-style logic emerged as 
strong contestants from the earlier conflict of the 1990s. The Italian logic is based on limited 
separation between elected politicians and suppliers.
The thesis’ main contribution to path dependence relates to the role of increasing 
returns in processes of institutional change The findings of chapter 4 buttress path 
dependence’s current claims concerning increasing returns and bounded change. Chapter 5 
provides new insights. Increasing returns were at the heart of a process that led Italy onto a 
new trajectory. This was made possible by the relationships between increasing returns and 
elected politicians whereby the latter staged a reaction against increasing returns and sought 
to design new institutions to prevent increasing returns to arise.
Thus, the thesis refines the current understanding of institutional change under path 
dependence since it shows that increasing returns and institutional change can be reconciled, 
provided that an increased attention is paid to the role of actors. Increasing returns processes
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are not automatic. Path dependence can significantly expand its explanatory power if the 
relationships between increasing returns and actors are adequately taken into account.
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1. INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AT THE SECTOR-SPECIFIC 
LEVEL AND PATH DEPENDENCE: A CASE STUDY ON 
ITALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this first chapter is to set out the research question, its relevance for 
path dependence, and how the thesis plans to address this question. Since the ground­
breaking study of North appeared in 1990,^ “path dependence” is often used in studies 
discussing institutional change and continuity. Yet, there is still little empirical evidence to 
support the claim made by path dependence’s leading scholar Paul Pierson that “// is the role 
o f path dependence in explaining patterns o f  institutional emergence, persistence, and 
change that may be o f  greatest significance fo r  the social science^\^ Moreover, some 
contend that the theory is in fact ill equipped to explain institutional change. As Deeg has 
argued, ''''strong versions o f path dependency (such as Pierson's) imply that only an 
exogenous shock ... can lead to the end o f the path. Short o f  this, change is incremental or 
on-patK'^ adding that such strong versions of path dependence are “/oo limiting to cover the 
fu ll extent o f real institutional change''.^
The thesis’s question concerning the role of path dependence in processes of 
institutional reform is therefore designed to address the theory’s current shortcomings as 
identified by its critics. More specifically, the thesis asks whether increasing returns, the 
core-concept of path dependence, affect institutional reform and, if so, how and why. This
North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.
Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence and the Study of Politics’, 256. Other path 
dependence scholars are also referenced in the thesis, but all build on Pierson, whose work is 
recognized by them as the most accomplished attempt so far to fashion path dependence into 
a full bodied theory applicable to institutions.
Deeg, ‘Path dependency. Institutional Complementarity, and Change in National Business 
Systems’, 23.
Ibidem.
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question is discussed through a case-study of a selected institutional trajectory, namely 
telecommunications institutions in Italy because the changes that took place between 1992 
and 1997 “rw« counter to decades ofhistorÿ'^ and are thus an exceptional laboratory to study 
claims of path dependence about institutional stability and change. At the same time, there is 
a paucity of contributions on the legal history of Italian telecommunications and none uses 
historical causes to shed light on institutional reforms occurred in or after 1997. As a 
consequence, it can be expected that a study of the Italian case based on path dependence can 
provide new i n s i g h t s . A  benchmark type comparison with the trajectory followed by 
British telecommunications institutions is used to enable a systematic assessment of Italy’s 
direction of change.
In the sections that follow below the chapter first presents an overview of the thesis of 
path dependence and its central claims, and then discusses current criticisms about the 
theory’s limited explanatory power with respect to institutional change. This explains the 
salience of the research question in view of making a contribution to path dependence as a 
theory to study institutions. The following sections are devoted to methodological issues, 
including a discussion of the research design, the rationale for the choice of a case study on
10
See M. Thatcher, Internationalisation and Economic Institutions - Comparing European 
Experiences (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2007), 192.
See G. Ponti, Storia delle telecomunicazioni (Novara: 1st. geografico De Agostini, 1967); P. 
Bianucci, II telefono la tua voce: storia, aspetti e problemi della telefonia in Italia (Firenze: 
Vallecchi, 1978); E. Pucci (ed.), L' industria della comunicazione in Italia 1994-1995: nuove 
tecnologie, nuovi attori, nuove regole (Torino: La Rosa, 1996); D. Giacalone, Uscire dal 
monopolio: le telecomunicazioni italiane e il caso Telemar (Milano: Sperling & Kupfer, 
1992); F. Sabatucci (ed.). Le privatizzazioni in Italia: il caso Enel, il caso Stet (Roma: 
Ediesse, 1994); D. Gallino, II libro delle telecomunicazioni: le nuove regole del gioco: rischi 
e opportunità del mercato aperto (Roma: Adnkronos lihri, 1998); R. Spagnuolo Vigorita, La 
liberalizzazione delle telecomunicazioni: dal monopolio alia concorrenza regolata (Napoli: 
Editoriale scientifica, 1998); A. Maccanico, II grande cambiamento: gli anni della 
liberalizzazione delle comunicazioni visti da un protagonista (Milano: Sperling & Kupfer, 
2001); Perez (ed.), II nuovo ordinamento delle comunicazioni elettroniche (Milano: Giuffré, 
2004); and P. Brezzi, Economia e politico delle telecomunicazioni: imprese, strategic e 
mercati (Milano: F. Angeli, 2004).
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Italian telecommunications institutions with Britain as a benchmark, clarifications on the 
units of observations (institutions, increasing returns, institutional reform and actors) and on 
the fit between path dependence and the Italian case. The final section presents a summary of 
the central argument.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE THEORY OF PATH DEPENDENCE
Pierson argues that '’'"there are ... compelling reasons to believe that political life will 
often be marked by dynamics o f  increasing r e t u r n s . . where “increasing returns” 
designates a key concept of path dependence, i.e. a self-reinforcing process generated by 
repeated interactions (positive feedback or reinforcing mechanisms are also synonyms of 
increasing returns). The way in which increasing returns can affect institutions can be 
illustrated as follows. When present, increasing returns eliminate choices that were available 
earlier. In other words, at the beginning of a sequence, two or more institutional options are 
available and the situation is subject to a certain degree of uncertainty and fluidity. One 
option is then chosen. This stage is also sometimes termed a “critical juncture” because of its 
momentous consequences for the rest of the sequence. After the critical juncture, 
increasing returns take place, which embed the choice made and set the sequence onto an 
irreversible course (lock-in effect). The institutional path not chosen at the critical juncture 
is no longer available. Path dependence therefore proposes a very distinct interpretation of 
institutional development. A country on a path-dependent trajectory experiences continuity 
across time and finds itself locked onto a given path, with each choice reinforcing the overall
12
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Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence and the Study of Politics’, 256.
For studies based on path dependence and critical junctures see R. B. Collier and D. Collier, 
Shaping the Political Arena (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991) and J. 
Mahoney, The Legacies o f Liberalism-Path Dependence and Political Regimes in Central 
America (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 2001).
See J. Mahoney, ‘Path Dependence in Historical Sociology’, Theory and Society, 29(4) 
(2000), 507-48.
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direction of the path and options to ‘branch out’ or to move onto another path progressively 
diminishing. The presence of increasing returns or positive feedback is the core concept that 
explains this result.
Prior to Pierson, these views on how and why countries do not experience 
convergence and often remain trapped on sub-optimal paths in spite of pressures for change 
were espoused by North in a path-breaking study on the application of path dependence to 
institutions.^'* North, in turn, relied on earlier findings by economist Brian Arthur.*^ Indeed, 
path dependence theory is originally an economics theory. Because path dependence’s 
usefulness in political life rests on the premise that the same mechanisms that are present in 
the economy, namely increasing returns, also apply in politics, it is worth summarizing some 
of the key aspects of the theory from the economics’ point of view. In particular, reference to 
the economists’ work on the notion of increasing returns is of great value to understand how 
and to what extent this concept can be translated into political life.
According to Arthur, increasing returns occur when the sale of one unit triggers a 
mechanism that generates more sales and so forth. The reinforcing mechanism was termed 
“increasing returns” to signal a shift away from neo-classic standard concept of decreasing 
returns. A classic illustration of increasing returns at work is the story behind the adoption of 
the QWERTY standard for keyboards. As economic historian Paul David showed, the 
initial sales were corroborated by the fact that typists were trained to use this new keyboard. 
This, in turn, made it very difficult for anybody else to sell a rival keyboard since this would 
have required new investment in training and, at the same time, lost the investment already
16
North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.
See W. B. Arthur, ‘Positive Feedbacks in the Economy’, Scientific American, 262 (1990), 92- 
99, later collected in the volume Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994).
P. A. David, ‘Clio and the Economics of QWERTY’, American Economic Review, 75 (1985), 
332-37.
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made to train typists on the QWERTY keyboard. This example shows the power of self­
reinforcing mechanisms, or mechanisms of increasing returns, in the economy. Other notable 
examples of increasing returns mechanisms at work in the economy are the success of video 
recorder VHS over rival standard Betamax and, more recently, the success of windows’ 
operating system over Apple. In all these cases, an initial advantage has been reinforced by 
increasing returns.
Sources of increasing returns in the economy include large set-up or fixed costs (e.g., 
a high investment in a given technology creates the condition for a reinforcing sequence 
whereby the investor has an incentive to continue using the same technology), learning 
effects (e.g., as can be gathered from the use of word processing, the user will tend to stick to 
the chosen piece of software more easily than replacing it altogether), coordination effects or 
network effects (e.g., a good incorporating a standard is more valuable the more people use 
it), and adaptive expectations, which is really a magnifier of the coordination effect insofar as 
the people who purchase a good that carries a standard have expectations about its chances of 
success. In addition. North argued that increasing returns can also arise from '"'‘the 
interdependent web o f  an institutional matrix’\^^ i.e. increasing returns can stem from the 
interactions between different institutions.
Increasing returns are a condition for path dependence and lock-in effects. In fact, 
strictly speaking, path dependence is one of the properties of systems under increasing 
returns. In mathematics, path independence is a condition for the existence of exact solutions
17
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for differential equations. In probability theory, a stochastic process is path independent if 
the probability distribution for period t+1 is conditioned only on values of the system in 
period t. In both cases, path independence means that it does not matter how you arrive to a 
particular point, only that you arrive there. Under increasing returns, sequence becomes 
crucial. Getting ahead early on means eventually to take on the entire market. This 
magnifies the importance of timing, as small events do not cancel out. If you were “the first 
out of the gate” due to sheer luck, that may feed-in into the sequence of events so that you get 
ahead of a competitor by that inch which eventually gives you the power to capture the entire 
market.
One of the implications of the foregoing is that, under increasing returns, outcomes 
may be contingent upon fortuitous circumstances and become independent of the actual 
merits of the product. Let us assume two competing products, which are both subject to 
increasing returns. Let us further assume that product A is superior to product B. If product 
B is marketed first, though, it will enjoy increasing returns and each sale will trigger new 
sales and so on. When product A comes onto the market, it will find it very difficult to 
“catch up” in spite of its superiority. In fact, students of path dependence show that product 
B will gain a monopoly, whilst product A will never take off. In the QWERTY example 
mentioned above, a rival standard, allegedly superior, never caught up precisely because 
QWERTY could capitalize on increasing returns at the expenses of the later standard. Thus, 
even a minor advantage over a rival technology caused by some contingent event may ‘tip’ 
the final outcome regardless of the merits.
Moreover, assuming that two products are competing, the reinforcing mechanism 
described above confers a permanent advantage over its alternative to the extent that the 
course of action is irreversible. This is an essential feature of path dependence theory.
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According to David, ""the core content o f  the concept o f path dependence as a dynamic 
property refers to the idea o f history as an irreversible branching process’'}^ Once more, the 
QWERTY examples shows that, even if a superior alternative were available, its pursuit 
became impossible since the investment in training on the earlier standard (QWERTY) stifled 
sales of other keyboard arrangements and this in turn prevented training on such alternative 
products. A lock-in occurred in so far as the choice of the QWERTY standard became 
irreversible.
III. PATH DEPENDENCE AND INSTITUTIONS: CURRENT SHORTCOMINGS
AND THE RESEARCH QUESTION
Path dependence can provide a significant value added to the study of institutions. By 
emphasizing the importance of sequence and time-dimension, it improves the researcher’s 
ability to assess institutional change. In particular, path dependence encourages more careful 
assessment of how a single episode fits into an overall trajectory, i.e., whether a single 
episode is merely another step in the same direction or whether, on the contrary, such a step 
falls outside the existing path. This may sometimes remarkably affect the perspective on 
institutional change. Some instances that appeared ‘major change’ if  assessed without the 
benefit of the study of increasing returns can be re-branded as a ‘mere’ step along the same 
path, properly valuing the extent to which they bear the hallmark of continuity with past 
trajectory. Conversely, path dependence can point to the importance of apparently small 
events that set a path due to increasing returns. Moreover, the focus on increasing returns 
provides an empirically rooted explanation for discussing claims of continuity and change in 
institutional development. In other words, one is not only able to better discern change from
P. A. David, ‘Path Dependence, Its Critics and the Quest for “Historical Economics’”, in P. 
Garrouste and S. loannides (eds.). Evolution and Path Dependence in Economics Ideas: Past 
and Present (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2000).
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continuity, but can also provide an empirical explanation as to the mechanisms that generate 
continuity during a path.
However, as a theory to study institutions, path dependence is currently facing the 
challenge of translating the rich economics’ tools into operational concepts that may help 
explain political life and, in particular, institutions. For instance, the very notion of 
increasing returns, itself lying at the heart of the theory, is difficult to pinpoint outside the 
economic market place as students may initially remain too attached to the economist’s 
vocabulary and look for “returns” in the sense of money quantities augmenting. In addition, 
despite Pierson’s claim about the abundance of increasing returns in processes of institutional 
development, there is a lack of empirical evidence on which this claim may rest. This is 
compounded by theoretical problems that the theory is currently experiencing in dealing with 
institutional change.
It is difficult to deny that a universe riddled with increasing returns is more likely to 
be a static one than not. In fact, the very term of increasing returns points out to a set of 
phenomena whose hallmark tilts towards continuity more readily than change. Perhaps this is 
one of the reasons for which some even labelled path dependence as a form of “new 
determinism”.^ ® Reacting to this criticism, Pierson states that ""\N]othing in path-dependent 
analyses implies that a particular alternative is permanently “locked in” following the move 
onto a self-reinforcing path ... Asserting that the social landscape can be permanently frozen 
is hardly credible, however, and that is not the claim. Change continues, but it is bounded 
change — until something erodes or swamps the mechanisms o f reproduction that generate
Crouch and Farrell, ‘Breaking the Path of Institutional Development? Alternatives to the New 
Determinism’. For a recent contribution of Crouch on path dependence, see C. Crouch, 
Capitalist Diversity and Change — Recombinant Governance and Institutional Entrepreneurs 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), ch. 4.
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continuity" (emphasis supplied).^^ These caveats usefully put the researcher on guard against 
the risk of over-emphasising continuity within path dependence. Yet, they seem rather 
negative statements about what path dependence does not say about change and continuity 
rather than attempts at theory building. In fact, we are still left with very general and 
unsatisfactory predictions on change and continuity issues, such as the following: ^'when 
sequences involve self-reinforcing dynamics, we can expect periods o f  relative (but not total) 
openness, followed by periods o f relative (but not total or permanent) stability"?^
Furthermore, as recent contributions emphasise, institutions are far more plastic than 
one may think. Change and continuity may happily cohabitate within the same institution.^^ 
There are different ways in which an institution can remain the same and yet change. For 
instance, institutions are often subject to adaptation in response to external pressure. While 
wholesale change is ruled out, in these cases institutions may respond by “layering”. 
According to Thelen,^"  ^ layering '‘''involves the partial renegotiation o f  some elements o f  a 
given set o f  institutions while leaving others in place"". Institutional conversion is another 
instance of change-cum-continuity that seems difficult to explain purely in terms of path
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dependence as it involves a complex process of reinterpretation of existing institution in the 
face of new pressures.
The foregoing shows that path dependence seems currently ill equipped to provide an 
explanation for such a rich phenomenology of institutional change. More specifically, in its 
current state of development, path dependence seems to offer arguments to mainly explain 
instances in which previous choices limit actors’ ability to initiate institutional reform. Under 
the current state of development of path dependence, one could argue the following:
• Actors seeking to design new institutions will find their discretion is limited 
by reinforcing mechanisms of existing institutions.
• Therefore, institutional change will be bounded change as argued by Pierson 
in the sense that, from a given institutional configuration, only a limited 
number of options are eligible for choice.
To use a simple example, from institutional configuration A, present increasing 
returns, path dependence would claim that only configurations B and C are options of 
institutional reform, while configuration X has been removed from the choice menu. The 
shortcoming of this argument, though, is that it caters only for certain types of change and, 
indeed, perhaps not the most important ones. Moments of institutional reform are of crucial 
importance in a country’s history. A theory that can account for bounded change only runs 
the risk of becoming confined to explaining ‘small’ change, or to argue invariably that what 
looks like change is in fact more of the old.
In an effort to overcome these weaknesses, Deeg has proposed, first, a definition of 
‘path’ within path dependence theory. Indeed, although path dependence has been the
Ibidem.
32
subject of numerous contributions, this is a surprisingly underdeveloped point and it is true 
that very little effort has been made to define what is a path. Deeg proposes that a path be 
defined its logic, that is, a distinct pattern o f institutionally rooted constraints and 
incentives that create typical strategies, routine approaches to problems, and shared decision 
rules that produce predictable patterns o f behaviour''}^ In clarifying his proposal, Deeg also 
stated that the definition of a path must incorporate “the institutions that constrain the 
behaviour o f  actors (and make it predictable) by establishing a matrix o f  (dis)incentives''\^^ 
Thus, for instance, he labels as “bank-based' the logic of the German financial system in the 
period after the Second World War.^^ One of the main advantages of defining a path by its 
logic is that it allows for a more nuanced treatment of institutional change because it prevents 
a simplistic equation between the continuation of a formal institution with the absence of 
change.
A second point illustrated by Deeg concerns the distinction between ‘on-path’ and 
‘off-path’ c h a n g e . S o m e  changes can be understood as ‘big changes’ as opposed to small 
or incremental change. The notion of ‘off-path’ change to designate the former (and ‘on- 
path’ change for the latter) brings an added dose of clarity to the terminology used to describe 
different instances of changes. According to Deeg, “[UJ^mg a definition o f  a path as a 
‘logic ’ allows fo r  the possibility that some institutions may be altered or changed, but i f  the 
patterns o f actor behaviour, strategies, etc. remain largely unchanged (i.e. the logic), then we 
are seeing on-path change"?^
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A third clarification to the theory of path dependence brought by Deeg is his emphasis 
on the need to distinguish the level at which institutional change occurs. He proposes three 
levels “(7j individual institutions and organizations (2) institutional systems or complexes
-  a banking system, an industrial sector, a welfare system; (3) a national political economy 
or regime By adding a specification of the level at which path dependence takes place,
Deeg’s suggestion has several advantages. First of all, the focus on a given sector enhances 
analytical clarity as to claims of path dependence and the empirical evidence. Secondly, a 
specification of the level where path dependence takes place points researcher to the 
interactions between such level and other levels, particularly higher ones. By identifying a 
given level as the terrain of study, one is in a better position to understand complex patterns 
of interactions involving different levels. Equally, institutional changes in cases where 
increasing returns stem from interactions between different levels are often national changes 
of significant importance. Being able to address these types of changes under path 
dependence would be a significant step forward in the theory, given that so far path 
dependence seems more apt to explain why countries do not change.
Deeg’s contribution is useful insofar as it allows specifying better what is the current 
gap of path dependence. The theory suffers from a divorce between increasing returns, its 
core concept, and ‘off-path’ change. If increasing returns work to restrict the menu of 
choices available, how is it that sometimes the menu opens up? In other words, where do ‘big 
changes’ come from under path dependence? Relying on exogenous shock as the explanation 
for ‘off-path’ change, path dependence seems to rely on deus ex machina explanation. In 
sum, the challenge for path dependence to evolve as a theory of institutional change is to 
expand its understanding of how increasing returns work to affect institutions, so that path
Ibidem, 30.
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dependence can continue to be a useful pair of lenses to look at the full gamut of institutional 
life, not just consolidation, but also reform.
The thesis takes up this challenge by investigating precisely what is the role of path 
dependence and, more specifically, increasing returns in processes of institutional reform. 
Building on Deeg’s contribution, the research question aims at investigating institutional 
reform at a well-defined level, i.e. within a sector of the economy. As discussed, this 
promises to be a fruitful avenue to refine path dependence since it caters for a richer type of 
institutional change. The methodology used to address the research question is discussed 
below.
IV. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN THE STUDY OF PATH DEPENDENCE
AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
The first methodological issue concerns the choice of research design. A case study 
methodology recommends itself because it enables the study with a high level of detail and 
makes it possible to organize the empirical material fruitfully. In order to address the 
familiar downsides of this methodology, i.e., selection bias and the inability to arrive at 
conclusions that go beyond the specific facts at issue, the strategy adopted in the thesis has 
been to look for a form of critical case s tudy .Cr i t i ca l  case studies may be assumed as the
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extreme in a continuous spectrum of cases. This enables the conclusions reached in a critical 
case to be applicable to other less extreme cases.
A set of related issues concerns the design of such a case study. In this respect, it is 
important to stress that studies of path dependence must necessarily encompass long stretches 
of time. Since the theory is premised on the self-reinforcing effect of increasing returns and 
since these effects take place through time, it is necessary to take into account not just single 
key moments, e.g., the years in which the institutional change took place, but also the time 
before and after. This seems an effective remedy against what Pierson calls a "''tendency to 
focus on the immediate sources o f  institutional change"'* that, in his opinion, besets studies of 
institutional change. Equally, by paying attention to the time preceding the moment of 
institutional change, the research design also reduces a second methodological fault that 
Pierson attributes to current studies of institutional change. Pierson argues that 
'’"understanding the preconditions fo r  particular types o f  institutional change requires 
attentiveness not only to the pressures for reform but also to the character and extent o f
resistance to such pressures. Change and stability are two sides o f the same coin An
adequate theory o f institutional development must pay sustained attention to the issue o f  
institutional resilience"\^^ An extended time horizon before the time of change helps to 
understand the operation of increasing returns and how they successfully manage to keep the 
institutional development on a given path. This may shed light on aspects that make a given 
set of increasing returns vulnerable and help to identify the causes for change at a later stage. 
In other words, to understand times of change, one must get the full picture with long 
stretches of resilience too.
V'lQxson, Politics in Time, 139-42. 
P. Pierson, Politics in Time, 142.
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Another methodological challenge that is specific to the study of path dependence is 
how to characterize a path. To study change within path dependence, the researcher should 
as a preliminary matter be able to tell where is a path going. The answer in the thesis has 
been to adopt a benchmark-type comparison. To benchmark a country’s institutional 
trajectory means to be able to tell whether that country is converging and to what extent with 
another trajectory that is assumed as the benchmark. If increasing returns lead to path 
dependence and bounded change, trajectories that are diverging at an initial point of 
observation in time should continue to diverge through time. By contrast, deviation from this 
trajectory, e.g. convergence between paths, offers a simple but effective way to detect an 
anomalous functioning of increasing returns. Similarly, changes in the distances between the 
chosen trajectories can also be used as a proxy to indicate that some alterations in the way 
increasing returns work has taken place.
Issues of convergence and divergence, though, need to be assessed not only from the 
point of view of single institutions, but also from that of the logic of the paths. This is 
because convergence in formal institutions may conceal ongoing divergence if one does not 
look at the logics of the path too. Thus, the thesis explores convergence and divergence by 
using two levels of analysis: the first one concerns formal institutions and the second 
concerns the logic of the path, which, as explained before, is defined by the way in which 
institutions provide a set of incentives and disincentives for behaviours by actors.
It is important to underline in this connection that the object of inquiry is the 
“benchmarked” country and not the benchmark nation. That is to say that the thesis is 
interested in the increasing returns dynamics that occur in the former and that the benchmark 
is used purely to better evaluate these. As a consequence, the thesis does not purport to
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analyse in detail increasing returns dynamics in the benchmark country. The latter’s 
trajectory is simply assumed as a point of reference and not as the object of study.
An important feature of the research design at issue is its inductive approach. The 
aim of the thesis is to contribute to the emerging body of literature that addresses issues of 
path dependence and institutional dynamics. The explanatory toolkit of path dependence has 
been so far limited in this domain. Therefore, through the systematic observation of 
increasing returns and their impact on institutional dynamics it is expected that the thesis will 
arrive at a better understanding of the ways in which path dependence can help to analyze 
institutions. This angle of research is clearly inductive as there is no pre-defined hypothesis 
on the way in which increasing returns affect institutional development. To expand the reach 
of path dependence, one needs experiments to foster the theoretical toolkit of path 
dependence.
Further, consistent with the theoretical premises illustrated above, the case study 
concerns institutions at a sector-specific level, given that interactions between different levels 
may contribute to enrich the explanatory power of path dependence.
A final methodological point is in order concerning the definition of institution that 
will be used in the course of the thesis. Definitions of ‘institution’ abound in political 
s c i e n c e . A l l  of them concur in identifying institutions as rules. Thatcher has criticized the 
inclusion of informal rules, practices and norms within the definition of institution as it blurs
3 6 See, e.g., P. A. Hall, Governing the Economy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986), 19, who 
defines institutions as '‘'"the formal rules, compliance procedures and standard operating 
procedures that structure the relationship between individuals in various units o f the polity 
and economÿ\ According to E. M. Immergut, Health Politics: Interests and Institutions in 
Western Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 3, 24-26, the definition of 
institution covers de jure and de facto rules that mediate conflicts and organize political 
systems as a whole.
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the distinction between “institutions” and patterns of behaviour in policy making. Indeed, 
when focusing on institutional change, the inclusion of informal rules within the scope of the 
investigation could undermine the achievement of meaningful results, expanding the range of 
units to be investigated. Similarly, the inclusion of behaviour within institutions can be done 
at the expenses of analytical clarity. For instance, one could claim that change in formal rules 
has taken place, but behaviour has not, leading to a blurring of the analytical findings and 
contrasting results. It is therefore both useful and necessary to adopt a narrow construction of 
the term.
Throughout the thesis, the term “institution” will be used to designate acts having a 
binding effect such as acts of law. Consequently, when analyzing the stability part of the 
historical sequence, the thesis concentrates on reinforcing mechanisms that made the law 
concerning prior institutional features difficult to reverse. Similarly, when dealing with 
institutional change and the design of new institutions, the thesis concentrates on the way the 
new rules of the sector have been created to connect this process to the past trajectory of 
institutional development. Adopting formal institutions as the units for comparison has two 
main advantages: (i) it helps to make the argument more precise and (ii) it enhances the 
ability to obtain empirical evidence. This is due to the nature of law as public acts. When a 
law is replaced, this happens usually in a public way. The same applies for other rules having 
the force of law. Thus, it is possible to obtain detailed evidence of the process of change.
It should also be borne in mind that institutions within the meaning illustrated above 
are the object of the enquiry. It is well-known that, once an institution is created, it will also
Thatcher, The Politics o f Telecommunications, 2 1,
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become an actor in its own r i g h t . D u e  to the multi-level nature of regulation in the 
telecommunications sector, complex games can be played between national regulators, 
national governments, and the Commission. However, the thesis focuses on institutions as 
the explanandum and does not attempt to also explore how institutions, once created, use 
their powers. For this reason, for the period after 1997 the thesis does not focus on the 
relationships between regulators and regulatees nor on the relationships between regulators at 
different levels (i.e. the Commission and national regulatory authorities). Indeed, to relate 
increasing returns to (i) institutional development and (ii) the use made by an institution of its 
powers, would exceed the task at hand.
V. THE CHOICE OF CASE STUDY: ITALY’S TRAJECTORY OF REFORM OF 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INSTITUTIONS IN COMPARISON WITH 
BRITAIN'S
Having described the general methodological issues connected with the research 
question, one can now turn to the rationale for the choice of the specific case study.
The thesis focuses on the trajectory of institutional reform of Italian 
telecommunications in comparison with the British trajectory as a benchmark. Italy’s 
trajectory of stability and change promises to be an ideal candidate for the study of increasing 
returns in cases of institutional change because it experienced a long period of stability. In 
particular, Italian telecommunications services were provided by several suppliers until 1992, 
which makes Italy a unique case in the landscape of telecommunications in Europe, given 
that all other countries had adopted a model based on a single supplier.
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See L. Hancher and M, Moran, Capitalism, Culture and Regulation (London: Routledge, 
1989); and C. Scott, ‘Analysing Regulatory Space: Fragmented Resources and Institutional 
Design’, Public Law  ^ (Summer) 2001, 329-353.
S. Cassese, ‘L’arena pubblica: Nuovi paradigmi per lo Stato’, Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto 
Pubblico, 3 (2001), 601-650 and D. Coen, ‘Business-Regulatory Relations: Learning to Play 
Regulatory Games’, Governance, 18(3) (2005), 375-398.
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The split-supplier model was commonly blamed in Italy as the source of inefficiency 
and there were several proposals for reform. Yet, until 1992 no law was adopted and the law 
that was eventually adopted in that year provided for change in the number of suppliers, but 
still permitted that several suppliers continued to exist. Thus, the trajectory of Italian 
telecommunications institutions until 1992 seems an ideal case of a path dependent trajectory, 
i.e. of a country whose institutional path is locked in onto a steady course, with change 
occurring but in the shape of bounded change.
Moreover, Italian telecommunications seems to offer a ‘critical case’ for increasing 
returns, given that Italy was the only country in Europe to hold onto its course in spite of very 
strong pressures for change, common to all European countries, notably technological change 
which transformed radically the sector from being a mono-product industry, whose revenues 
derived essentially from the provision of fixed-line telephony, into a multi-product one, with 
mobile telephony and Internet representing the fastest-growing areas of revenues.'*^ In short, 
observations of increasing returns in Italian telecommunications can be assumed to have the 
potential for being relevant to other countries and sectors too.
After 1992, though, Italian telecommunications took a very significant turn and in the 
space of a few years, i.e. between 1992 and 1997, legislative measures were passed in Italy 
that embraced a model based on a single supplier, competition, privatization and allocation of 
regulatory powers to an Independent Regulatory Authority (“IRA”). This marked a 
convergence in key institutional aspects with Britain, a country from which Italy had long 
and profoundly differed. The table below summarizes the trajectory of Italian and British
40 See statistical data published by the International Telecommunications Union at 
http://www.itu.int/dms pub/itu-d/opb/reg/D-REG-TTR.8-2006-SUM-MSW-E.doc. For the 
specific situation of the UK and Italian sectors, see the regulators’ annual report (OFTEL’s 
annual reports for the years before 1998 are available in paper form only; for annual reports 
after 1998, see the institutional website at www.ofcom.org.uk; for Italy, see the website of 
Autorité per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni at www.agcom.it).
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telecommunications institutions between 1979 and 1997 by reference to four key institutional 
aspects including:
•  The number o f operators. Usually, there was only one company entrusted 
with the provision of telecommunications services within a country’s 
boundaries. Italy was an exception, with four telecommunications operators 
active in the sector.
•  Ownership o f suppliers. Provision of telecommunications services was, at its 
inception, in private hands. However, private ownership has been relatively 
short lived and the state has intervened, directly or indirectly in the provision 
of telecommunications services. The pendulum swung back when, starting 
with Britain in the early 1980s, a movement towards privatisation took place 
in Europe.
•  Degree o f competition permitted. State ownership was commonly associated 
with monopoly. The company (or the companies) entrusted with the provision 
of telecommunications serviced enjoyed exclusive rights that prevented the 
emergence of any rival provider and guaranteed, in the minds of those who 
devised this system, a well-functioning service. This view has been radically 
subverted and, starting from the early 1990s, competition has rather become 
the dominant paradigm in the supply of telecommunications services.
•  Allocation o f regulatory powers. The forms through which state intervention 
was channelled varied considerably across time. The creation of Oftel in 1984 
was the avant-garde of a host of independent regulatory agencies. With the
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passing of time, regulation by independent agency has become the standard 
way to oversee the sector in Europe.
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Table 1 -  Italy and Britain before and after 1997
Before 1997 After 1997
No. o f providers •UK ' 1 (BT) .- .vV’ .
Italy 4 (ASST, SIP, Italcable, Telespazio) 1 (T e leco m  Italia)
O wnership UK ' Private / listed . - . - Private/Ihtyd
Italy Private companies under state control (SIP, 
Italcable, Telespazio) / Ministerial body 
(ASST)
Private / listed
Com petition UK ~ Com petition 7 "   ^ ” aT Competition
Italy Monopoly Competition
A llocation of 
regulatory 
powers
^ U K V Sector specific regulator/Competitiori 
* Authority , - \
Æ*** **4 , 7* * 4 - V- * *  ^  ^Î* ' * * "*(
' i ' ‘ i
^  Sector specific 
^fc-egulator/Competition^;:;Q  
Authority
Italy Minister/ASST/CIPE Sector sp ec ific  
regu lator/C om petition  
A uthority
The convergence between Britain and Italy in 1997 promises to offer an opportunity 
to study the relationships between increasing returns and ‘off-path’ change, given the 
magnitude o f the institutional turn taken after 1992. Thus, the study o f Italy’s trajectory, with 
its sequence of long stability and change lends itself as a laboratory to address the research 
question at issue, i.e. whether increasing returns affected institutional reform and, if  so, how 
and why.
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Italy lends itself to a critical case study of path dependence and different levels of 
institutional change also because the year 1992 saw very important changes at the level of 
national politics. In fact, 1992 is commonly held in Italian history and the year that marked 
the end of the ‘First Republic’. The end of the ‘First Republic’ thus confronts the student of 
path dependence and institutional change with further important issues. First of all, the 
occurrence of a large-scale event such as the political turmoil of 1992 may lead one to think 
that increasing returns were not longer relevant due to an exogenous shock. As a 
consequence, the institutional trajectory after 1992 may no longer be related to increasing 
returns. Secondly, the end of the First Republic also raises the question as to whether 
increasing returns continued to exist or not. Indeed, an often-overlooked point about 
increasing returns is that they may come to an end since they cannot be eternal. These issues 
add an increased level of complexity to the study of the Italian case that makes it suitable to 
generate propositions that can be of wider relevance for other cases.
With respect to Britain’s role as benchmark country, it can be useful to recall that the 
benchmark device is used to trace the direction of institutional change. More precisely, given 
the difference in their institutional starting points, path dependence predicts that increasing 
returns would drive Italy and Britain onto different trajectories. This means that through time 
the direction of change should continuously diverge. Thus, divergence between the two 
countries’ selected institutions provides an indicator of increasing returns at work in the 
process of institutional change. On the contrary, convergence and/or a nearing of the 
trajectories is an alert to the researcher, showing that increasing returns have either ceased to 
operate or that increasing returns operate in a way that has not been described by path 
dependence. Furthermore, comparison of the logics of the respective paths can also provide 
important insights into the degree of convergence/divergence and the role of increasing 
returns.
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A word of caution is also in order about what the benchmark does not provide. The 
benchmark does not provide insights on the presence of increasing returns in the very country 
adopted as a benchmark. In fact, its role is purely instrumental to the study of increasing 
returns in the benchmarked country. Thus, the thesis does not argue that the trajectory 
followed by Britain during the period studied is linked to increasing returns nor that 
increasing returns have played a role in such institutional developments. This has also an 
impact on the breadth of the materials covered. The changes in the UK telecommunications 
regime have been the subject of extensive research."*  ^ In this study, these developments will 
only be detailed to the extent that this is necessary to fulfil the already mentioned benchmark 
role.
VI. INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS AND INCREASING RETURNS IN ITALIAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
As the foregoing discussion showed, the thesis focuses on institutional developments 
occurred across a long period of time. Some further remarks are in order on the empirical 
evidence to better understand its relevance and fit with the research question.
In trying to understand the role of increasing returns for institutional reform, the thesis 
does not focus on all four key institutional aspects at the same time. In different periods, 
different institutions have enjoyed more relevance than others and this varied across time. 
Moreover, the role of increasing returns has been different through time. One can broadly 
distinguish two periods.
41 See, e.g., J. Hills, Deregulating Telecoms: Competition and Control in the United States, 
Japan and Britain (London: Pinter, 1986); J. Vickers and G. Yarrow (eds.). Privatization : an 
economic analysis (MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass, 1988); M. Armstrong, S. Cowan and J. 
Vickers (eds.). Regulatory reform : economic analysis and British experience (MIT Press: 
London, 1994); M. Bishop, J. Kay and C. Mayer, The regulatory challenge (Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 1995), Thatcher, The politics o f telecommunications.
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Before 1992. Before 1992 efforts to bring about institutional reforms centered 
on the organization of the sector and the attempts to reform the split-supply structure 
on which it was based. The other institutional features, i.e. ownership, competition 
and allocation of regulatory powers, were not affected by any legislative initiative of 
reform. The empirical evidence relating to this period provides evidence of 
increasing returns for the period 1979-1992. These were based on the relationships 
between telecommunications providers and elected politicians whereby the latter 
sought to appropriate the resources of the former to obtain votes and power. 
Increasing returns had an essential institutional dimension since the fragmented 
structure of telecommunications providers matched the fragmented nature of the 
ruling coalitions. Thus, increasing returns worked to maintain the status quo, which is 
consistent with path dependence current claims.
After 1992. This period presents a complex picture, where all four 
institutional units of observation were changed. The thesis shows how increasing 
returns played a decisive role in fostering ‘off path’ institutional change. However, 
increasing returns have not affected all institutional elements at the same time and in 
the same way. The table below lists the key institutional aspects and grades the role 
played by increasing returns in shaping the direction of change according to a low- 
strong scale; it also provides the year in which the institutional reforms were 
accomplished.
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Institutional reforms and increasing returns in Italian telecommunications 1992-
1997
Strong
i '.  Institution ' *
'i
N o.ofp ro \id ers 7 ' '
(1992-1994)
Ownership
(1997)
' Competition
^  (1997) ;
s' *
Allocation of regulatory 
powers -
(1997-2007)
Role played by increasing returns in 
shaping direction of institutional change
X
X
X
X
The table shows, first o f all, a difference between the change in rules concerning 
competition and the other institutional factors with respect to the role played by increasing 
returns in shaping institutional change. Namely, increasingly returns had a more limited 
impact on the direction o f change of rules on competition. This can be explained based on 
two factors. First o f all, past increasing returns centered on the organization o f the sector and 
the relationships between providers and political parties. A rejection o f increasing returns 
after 1992 meant that there was a clear signal to (i) end the split-supplier system and (ii) cut
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the relationships between political parties and suppliers hy privatization and delegation to an 
IRA.
Rejection of past increasing returns also meant that rules to favour objective market 
criteria, hence competition, were preferred to the old pattern based on subjective criteria and 
relationships between suppliers and politicians. However, this did not translate into a 
pressure for a direction of change as clearly discernible as that for the other factors, where, 
for instance, one could detect that rejection for increasing returns meant the unification of the 
different suppliers.
In addition, there was a strong exogenous factor, namely EU legislation. The 
treatment of the EU in the process of reform of Italian telecommunications institutions within 
the thesis deserves a separate discussion, which is carried out in the following Section.
Before turning to this point, a remark is in order concerning another difference, that 
between the reform in the rules on allocation of regulatory powers and the other institutional 
features. The table shows that this reform spans a considerable period. This is because 
ACCOM institutional design has been the locus where a prolonged confrontation between 
different actors has taken place relative to the direction of institutional reform. This 
contested path of change continued until 2007, which justifies a longer time horizon and 
spans two chapters in the thesis (chapters 5 and 6).
Through a close tracing of the institutional changes accompanying this institutional
feature, the thesis offers insights on the degree to which the new Italian telecommunications
institutions have embraced a different logic compared to the old one. The study of the
developments occurred after 1997 presents a unique challenge, though. The years between
1997 and 2007 are of course very rich years in terms of regulatory action since ACCOM
started to operate and to interact with other regulators, notably the Commission, and a host of
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regulatees and elected politicians. Moreover, as noted, ACCOM became an actor in its own 
right.
However, the thesis’s focus on institutional reform justifies concentrating on 
ACCOM as the object of study and, in particular, on the legislative measures affecting 
ACCOM institutional design. When looked at from this angle, the period after 1997 in fact 
emerges as one of relative stability, since there were only few binding acts which modified 
the institutional design of ACCOM, i.e. (i) the law of 2001 on the power to assign licenses 
(transferred to the Ministry); and (ii) the law of 2003 assigning new and unspecified 
regulatory powers to the Ministry of Communications.
This focused approach does not mean that the changing nature of political 
intervention in telecommunications is ignored. Chapter 6 indeed shows what was the context 
in which legislative measure affecting ACCOM’s institutional design were passed. 
Moreover, the chapter also provides empirical evidence on the way in which elected 
politicians used their powers after 1997. These findings converge with the earlier ones based 
on analysis of legislative measures on institutional design to confirm the existence of a new 
Italian logic based on limited separation between elected politicians and suppliers.
Finally, the ‘new-ness’ of the Italian trajectory after 1997 should not be obfuscated by 
the link with past increasing returns. In fact, the thesis argues that there was a movement of 
rejection of increasing returns at the origin of the initial institutional choices, i.e. that the new 
institutions deliberately sought to introduce a break with the past trajectory. At the same 
time, the past trajectory was not simply wiped out, but provided a rich source of inspiration 
for new institutions. By being able to trace this process to the original reaction to past 
increasing returns and the ensuing debate it created between policy makers, the thesis 
establishes the general validity of the path dependent approach. Indeed, failure to
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acknowledge the historical causes at the root of the trajectory followed by Italian 
telecommunications would lead to severely downplaying the tension that is underlying the 
current institutional structure. This leads to considerations about the appropriateness of path 
dependence to deal with the Italian case, which -together with a discussion on the role of the 
EU - are developed in the Section below.
VII. THE CHOICE OF PATH DEPENDENCE TO STUDY THE ITALIAN CASE.
OTHER RIVAL EXPLANATIONS AND THE ROLE OF THE EU
Before undertaking the examination of the empirical evidence, it is important to deal 
with two issues of relevance for the structure of the thesis. First, is the choice of path 
dependence in itself a conditioning factor which makes the findings biased? In other words, 
is there a risk to become “prisoners of path dependence”? A second, albeit related issue, 
concerns the reasons for discarding alternative explanations, and, notably, exogenous factors, 
such as the impact of the European Union.
The reply to these questions requires that one first sets out what is the value-added of 
path dependence compared to other theories to study institutional change; then, one should 
reflect on the fit between path dependence and the Italian case; finally, due to its importance, 
the role played by the EU needs to be discussed separately.
Path dependence’s most distinctive trait is the attention to the time dimension of 
processes. To paraphrase one of Pierson’s contributions on this subject,"*  ^ if increasing 
returns are present, when things happen is more important than what happens. Thus, as 
Mahoney stated, explanations based on path dependence '‘"reject common-place arguments
Pierson, Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes.
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that emphasize solely or primarily short-term causes'' and look for '"'‘more fundamental 
historical causes"
In the Italian case, indeed explanations based on short-term causes are unable to 
account fully for some developments which thus continue to puzzle the researcher. The long 
period of continuity enjoyed by the organization of the sector is illustrative.
As it will be explained below, in 1924 the Fascist government had received a 
technical advice contrary to the allocation of several licenses for the supply of 
telecommunications services. In spite of this advice, it proceeded to award 6 different 
licenses. Thus, the split-supplier system was considered inefficient since its inception and it 
grew more and more “obsolete and irrational” through time. Yet, in spite of general 
agreement on the need for institutional change, no institutional reform took place for a long 
time and, when a law was passed in 1992, it provided for essentially the continuation of the 
status-quo. It was only in 1994 that the split-supplier system was eventually terminated.
Explanations based on short term causes, tend to start from existing institutions (in 
this case, a single supplier) and ask what functions they serve to arrive at an explanation of 
their o r i g i n . I n  the Italian case, though, it would be odd to observe that, on the one hand, 
there was general agreement on the fact that it was “obsolete and irrational” to have several 
suppliers, and, on the other hand, that it took 70 years to arrive at institutional change.
The foregoing shows that there is a very good fit between path dependence as a 
theoretical framework and the Italian case. Thus, far from making the researcher a 
“prisoner”, this choice has the potential to bring additional clarity on the study of Italian 
telecommunications institutions.
See Mahoney, Legacies of Liberalism, 17. 
See, Pierson, The Limits of Design, 477.
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It is also important to remember that the fit between the theoretical framework and the 
empirical evidence runs in the opposite direction too. That is, the thesis sets out to explore 
the ability of path dependence to cope with the complex phenomenology of institutional 
continuity and change. As a consequence, the thesis’s relevance goes beyond the Italian case, 
since its main object of enquiry is path dependence and the Italian case is selected insofar as 
it provides a critical case for path dependence. Thus, the thesis does not deny that other 
theories may be able to also provide important insights to study the trajectory followed by 
Italian telecommunications. Isomorphism, policy-transfer or technocratic policy making are 
not dismissed. However, they fall outside the angle of enquiry adopted in the thesis, which is 
premised on fostering path dependence as a theory to study institutional change.
With respect to the EU, it is important to state at the outset that there is no attempt to 
downplay or deny the essential role played by the EU in promoting change in Italian 
telecommunications, as it has been highlighted in several contributions a l r eady . I nd eed ,  
one of the interviewees described it as the real engine behind change in Italian 
telecommunications."*^
However, as highlighted in the previous Section, a distinction must be drawn between 
rules on competition and other institutional aspects. Whereas the former were affected by EU 
rules to a high degree, as far as the design of regulatory institutions is concerned, one must
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See, e.g., L. Radicati di Brozolo, 11 diritto comunitario delle telecomunicazioni. Un modello 
di liberalizzazione di un servizio pubblico (Torino: Giappichelli, 1999); R. Perez, 
Telecomunicazioni e Concorrenza (Milano: Giuffrè, 2002); 11 nuovo ordinamento delle 
comunicazioni elettroniche (Milano: Giuffré, 2004); and F. Pammolli, C. Cambini, and A. 
Giannacari, Le politiche di liberalizzazione e concorrenza in Italia (Bologna: il Mulino, 
2007).
Director of Public and Legal Affairs.
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recognize that the EU only provides a frameworks with several gaps/^ This has been 
especially important in the Italian case. The following examples may be illustrative."^^
• In 1990, a European Directive mandated the separation between regulatory 
functions and provision of telecommunication services."^  ^ However, the 
Directive did not contain any rule on the regulatory body. Thus, the European 
Directive made it possible that regulatory functions be exercised by the 
government through, e.g., a Ministry.
• In 1997, when ACCOM was created, the European Directives which provided 
for the liberalization of the market, still lacked any detailed institutional rule 
on the independent regulator, save for the mention of promotion of 
interconnection as one of regulators’ most important tasks.
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The new regulatory framework adopted in 2002 goes a long way in specifying 
the tasks of national regulatory authorities. As such, the 2002 European 
legislation certainly possesses a wider impact in terms of national institutions
See P. Nicolaïdes, ‘Regulation of Liberalised Markets: A New Role for the State? (or How to 
Induce Competition Among Regulators), in D. Geradin, R. Munoz, and N. Petit, Regulation 
through Agencies- A New Paradigm o f European Governance (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,
2005), 23-43. See also M. Thatcher, ‘Independent Regulatory Agencies and Elected 
Politicians in Europe’, in Geradin, Munoz, and Petit, Regulation through Agencies, 47-66, 
who shows that national regulatory agencies display a significant degree of variation across 
Europe in terms of institutional design.
See also F. M. Salerno, ‘Telecomunicazioni e autorité indipendenti: appunti sullo sviluppo dei 
rapporti tra diritto comunitario e organizzazione ammini strati va interna”, Rivista Italiana di 
Diritto Pubblico Comunitario, 3-4 (2003), 679-720.
See Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for 
telecommunications services (OJ 1990 L 192/10), article 6.
See Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 on 
interconnection in Telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and 
interoperability through application of the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP) (OJ 
1997 L 199/32), Article 9 { '^'General responsibilities of the national regulatory authorities. 1. 
National regulatory authorities shall encourage and secure adequate interconnection in the 
interests o f all users, exercising their responsibility in a way that provides maximum 
economic efficiency and gives the maximum benefit to end-users. ...”)
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that earlier legislation. However, even the 2002 EU legislation does not 
contain any provision about the regulator’s independence from elected 
politicians.
The foregoing shows that a distinction must be drawn concerning the role of 
European law. Albeit playing a pivotal role in Italian telecommunications, the role of the EU 
was different depending on whether one looks at substantive rules on competition or rules on 
institutional design. For the latter, EU law provided at best a framework, whose gaps have 
been filled by national actors. In doing so, they have responded to domestic factors. For 
instance, while the EU can be said to have contributed effectively to the creation of a 
regulatory body for telecommunications, the design of ACCOM has a collegial body with 
eight Commissioners and a President responded to a domestic factor. Accordingly, the thesis 
does not ignore or downplays the role of the EU, but simply treats it as one of the factors that 
have shaped interactions between telecommunications companies and elected politicians.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The use of path dependence as a theory to study institutional development promises to 
deliver an important contribution to the study of institutions. However, due to its relative 
novelty, there is a lack of empirical data on the correlation between increasing returns and 
institutional change and, moreover, path dependence currently seems conceptually ill- 
equipped to explain what can be defined ‘off-path’ change, i.e. institutional reform that 
breaks away with past trajectory. The thesis therefore seeks to make a contribution to path 
dependence by improving on the understanding of how increasing returns operate in cases of 
institutional reform. For this reasons, the research question asks if increasing returns affect 
institutional reform at the sector specific level and, if so, how and why, through a case-study
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methodology based on Italy’s trajectory of institutional development and a systematic 
benchmark-comparison with Britain.
Based on the empirical evidence collected in response to this question, the thesis 
upholds the claims of path dependence as to increasing returns generating a bounded 
trajectory of change. At the same time, the thesis shows that the notion of increasing returns 
needs to be refined by specifying to whom they accrue. This is because the empirical 
evidence shows the strong role played by increasing returns in shaping the views of policy 
makers as some actors staged a reaction against increasing returns which translated into an 
attempt to design new institutions in such a way as to prevent increasing returns to occur. 
Other actors in turn reacted by pushing for more limited change. This conflict had a 
profound impact on Italy’s trajectory, which eventually settled around a distinctive Italian 
logic, based on limited separation between suppliers and elected politicians. This sets Italy 
on a diverging trajectory from Britain after a short time of convergence of formal institutions.
These findings confirm that the concept of increasing returns can be a powerful 
explanatory factor also for institutional change, provided path dependence studies pay a more 
sustained attention to actors’ dynamics. By contrast, the language of increasing returns 
seems to imply that there is something almost automatic about their functioning as if, once set 
in motion, increasing returns start a sequence that admits no variations. It is by paying a 
more sustained attention to the role of actors benefiting from increasing returns, and the 
reactions to such appropriation of increasing returns, that path dependence can better cope 
with the rich complexity brought about by institutional change and overcome the dilemma in 
which it seems currently placed, between the deus ex machina of exogenous shocks and ‘on- 
path’ change.
56
2. THE ROOTS OF THE PATH: TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
INSTITUTIONS BEFORE 1979
I. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides information on telecommunications institutions before 1979. 
Although the thesis seeks to explore increasing returns in the period starting from 1979, it is 
nonetheless important to provide information on the history of telecommunications 
institutions from the beginning of telephony until 1979. This is because, firstly, through this 
account, one can better understand the institutions that will be studied in depth in the 
remainder of the thesis, namely (i) the number of providers; (ii) ownership (public, private or 
a mixture of the two); (iii) the degree of competition permitted; and (iv) the allocation of 
regulatory powers. Secondly, in 1979, i.e. the point of departure of the thesis, 
telecommunications institutions had already experienced almost a century of history. An 
exploration of long-standing features is therefore useful to put pressures for change and 
endurance in perspective. Thirdly, the chapter shows that significant institutional differences 
developed between Italy and Britain before 1979. Path dependence predicts that if increasing 
returns are present (which is regarded as likely for institutions), institutional differences will 
increase over time as countries follow different institutional paths. The thesis will show that 
such increasing returns were present after 1979 in Italy in following chapters.
This chapter therefore sets the starting points for analysis by outlining what 
differences had developed by 1979. The chapter thus provides a short account of the 
trajectory followed by telecommunications institutions prior to 1979. In keeping with the 
thesis’ methodology, whereby British telecommunications institutions are used as a 
benchmark to study Italian ones and their trajectory of change, the chapter focuses on the 
latter, while providing only essential information for the former.
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The chapter is organized in chronological order and by country. The first three 
sections deal, first, with the formative years of Italian telecommunications institutions, i.e. the 
period from 1878 and until World War II, second, the institutional changes that took place 
between the years following the end of World War II and 1968 and, third, the period between 
1968 and 1979 in order to provide a suitable introduction to the years for which a detailed 
study is provided in chapters 4 to 6. Afterwards, the chapter describes the situation of British 
telecommunications before 1979 to better understand the reforms that took place in Britain 
and the direction of the British path.
II. THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF ITALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INSTITUTIONS: FROM 1878 TO WORLD WAR II
The birth date of telephony in Italy can be set at 1878, when the first official trial took 
place before the Royal family. It was a connection between the Quirinale Palace and the 
telegraph office of Tivoli, near Rome. The experiment was apparently very successful and 
their Royal Highnesses were “fully satisfied”. A t  that time, the provision of telephony 
services was confined to a local network, normally encompassing a city.
A ministerial decree of 1881^  ^ established that telephony services were reserved to 
the state, which could opt to license private individuals to carry them out under a licence 
{concessione). In 1881, there were 37 licensees (concessionari), some of them providing 
rival services in the same city. A law passed in 1892 enshrined the early relationships 
between the state and private individuals as far as telephony was c o n c e r n e d . T h e  law 
permitted private individuals to run telephony services; however, they could only do so under 
a licence, which was to last for 15 years. After such time, the state was entitled to claim back
5 ]
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Relazione statistica sui telegrafi del Regno d ’Italia, 1878. 
Ministerial Decree of April 1, 1881.
”  Law No. 184 of April 7, 1892.
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all the assets, without paying any fee. This obviously created an uncertain climate, which 
was not beneficial for investments. As a consequence, the industry lagged behind and fell 
below the levels of other European countries. This was remedied in part by direct state 
intervention.
In 1907, the Ministry of Posts and Telegraph took control of the two most important 
licensees, Societa Generale Italiana dei telefoni e applicazioni elettriche and Società 
Telefonica alia Italia. Under state control, though, the sector declined even further. In 1916, 
a ministerial commission presided by Mr. Semenza concluded that the state had to entrust 
telephony services to private investors. The First World War impoverished the State to a 
significant extent and the Mussolini government decided to embrace privatization, albeit 
retaining a licensing system.
In its 1921 manifesto, the national fascist party had stated its intention to return public 
services to the private sector. Once in power, the Mussolini government faced strong 
pressure to make good its promises. Several private groups were interested in investing in the 
telephone sector. The low penetration of telephony in Italy compared with other countries,^"* 
offered a good business opportunity that attracted the interest of equipment manufacturers 
and private investors who foresaw the potential profitability of the telecommunications 
industry. The main equipment manufacturers included Pirelli and Tedeschi, which merged 
after World War I to form Sirti. Private investors included both industry and banking 
institutions. In fact, at that time banks were co-venturers with industry in companies active in 
the sector. The leading Italian banks were Banca Commerciale Italiana (Comit) and Credito 
Italiano (Credit).
According to a study of 1927, there was one telephone per 392 inhabitants in Italy, against 12 
in the USA, 45 in Germany, 116 in France and 58 in Britain. See B. Bottiglieri, SIP (Milano: 
Franco Angeli, 1987), 82.
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In 1924, the government started the privatization process. The aim was to improve 
the provision of telephony services, which had languished under state control. For this 
reasons, the licences contained conditions imposing a demanding investment plan to develop 
the service across Italy.
Although it received technical advice on the superiority of a system based on a single 
provider, the government decided against it. Several factors explained this choice. Firstly, 
the government feared the concentration of power in the hands of a single company. 
Secondly, putting to tender a single licence would have attracted only very large groups, 
whereas the government also wanted to favour smaller investors. Finally, by awarding 
several licences the government could more easily please the plethora of private investors 
who expected a reward for supporting the party.
Italy was thus split into five areas, each to be assigned to a licensee. A sixth licence 
comprised the provision of inter-area and international telephony. In 1925, the licences were 
awarded as follows:
• Area 1, comprising the North-west of Italy, to Step-Società telefonica 
piemontese, which soon after changed its name into Stipel-Società telefonica 
interrégionale piemontese e lombarda, a company which belonged to the SIP- 
Societa Idroelettrica Piemontese group, a holding whose primary activities 
were in the field of electricity production and sale and with strong ties with 
Comit bank. Stipel could also count on an alliance with equipment 
manufacturer Siemens. This licence was by far the most lucrative one, given 
that it covered the richest area of the country.
55 See Bottiglieri, SIP, 90.
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• Area 2, comprising the North-East Italy, to Telve-Società telefonica delle 
Venezie. Originally Telve was a company founded by a group of local 
investors. It is important to note that in 1928, Telve came under the control of 
SIP, which, in turn, meant an alliance with Comit bank. This area, however, 
remained with limited prospects in terms of revenues and growth.
• Area 3, comprising the centre-North of Italy, to TIMO-Società telefoni Italia 
medio-orientale. Already in 1926, TIMO was bought by SIP, which thus 
controlled three out of five licensees.
• Area 4, comprising the North-West and central Italy and Sardinia, to Teti- 
Società telefonica tirrena. This area was the second richest one in the country, 
comprising Rome and Florence. Teti was controlled by two private groups: 
Pirelli and Orlando, a company with mining activities. The other major Italian 
bank. Credit, also supported Teti.
• Area 5, comprising the South of Italy and Sicily, to SET-Società esercizi 
telefonici. This company included Ericsson of Sweden and it was the only one 
with foreign investment. In fact, Ericsson exercised control over the company 
thanks to a complex corporate structure, which, through the creation of 
holding company Setemer-Societa elettrotelefonica méridionale, was designed 
to circumvent the rules against control by foreign parties over Italian 
companies.
As to the sixth licence, since there was only one bidder, the government decided to 
take direct responsibility for the provision of inter-area and international telephony. It thus 
decided to set up a body, which could operate with significant latitude from the minister.
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although reporting to the latter. Thus, in 1925 the government set up ASST- Azienda di Stato 
per i Servizi T e le fo n ic i,under the control of the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, 
itself a recent creation dating back to a law of 1924/^ ASST, like its sister organisation 
entrusted with postal services, the Administration for Posts and Telegraphs {Amministrazione 
PP. TT.),^^ enjoyed significant autonomy within the ministry. First of all, ASST was the seat 
of expertise in telecommunications; thus the minister was dependent on ASST for advice on 
telecommunications, lacking any such resource directly in the ministry. In other words, the 
ministry itself was a rather light body, whilst the two Aziende, ASST and Amministrazione 
PP. TT., had a significant number of employees and their heads wielded important powers 
that could be exercised with much independence from the Minister. Secondly, ASST also 
enjoyed financial independence since its budget was separate from the Ministry’s budget. Its 
revenues derived from the fees that licensees had to pay to the state for grant of the licence. 
ASST could then use its resources to enter into contracts, subject only to a form of light 
supervision from the Comptroller {Carte dei Conti).
ASST was both a provider of telecommunications services and a regulator. This is 
because, while being in charge of providing inter-area and international services, ASST was 
also entrusted with monitoring the performance of the licensees. The relationships between 
ASST and licensees were further complicated by the fact that often ASST was in fact unable 
to fulfil its mission as a provider. For instance, in 1927 ASST entered into an agreement with 
the licensees for the building and operations of the telecommunications network linking the 
cities, which were the seat of regional authorities (capoluoghi di provincia).^^ Although it
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Royal Decree No. 884 of 1925.
Royal Decree No. 596 of 1924.
Royal Decree No. 520 of 1925.
See Convenzioni aggiuntive issued by Royal legislative decree No. 36 of 1926.
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fell within its remit, ASST was unable to carry out the activities necessary to realize this 
project and so decided to contract it out to the licensees. This, however, started innumerable 
claims on both sides as to the compensation to which the licensees were entitled and lengthy 
disputes on the use of infrastructure, since the services entailed both ASST’s network and the 
licensees’. The relationships between ASST and the licensees did not improve in the 
following years. In fact, the need for ASST to use the licensees gave rise to more contracting 
out, which, in turn, meant more disputes and litigation.
The financial crisis that hit the US markets in 1929 spread to Italy, albeit a few years 
later. The effects on the telecommunications sector were substantial. The licensees had 
borrowed heavily to finance the construction of the network. Comit and Credit banks had a 
very significant exposure with the licensees, both as lenders and as shareholders. In order to 
rescue the banks from the crisis, in January 1933 the Mussolini government created IRl- 
Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale. In October 1933, IRI created STET—Società 
Torinese Esercizi Telefonici, its first sector-specific h o l d i n g . S T E T  acquired participations 
from Comit, including a controlling stake in SIP. By controlling SIP, IRI-STET became the 
most prominent operator of private telephony in Italy. Given that ASST was also a 
telecommunications provider and that IRI-STET was funded through state resources, the year 
1933 saw a sort of re-nationalization of the telecommunications industry, the only private 
undertakings remaining outside state control being TETI and SET.
Thus, before the Second World War broke out, the situation of Italian 
telecommunications institutions could be described as follows:
See B. Bottiglieri, STET: strategic e struttura delle telecomunicazioni (Milano: Franco 
Angeli, 1987).
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•  Number o f providers There were six providers of telephony services, five of 
which operated under a licence. The licences were drawn on the basis of the 
territory covered. The sixth provider, ASST, differentiated itself for the type 
of service provided -  inter-area and international telephony -, although ASST 
often contracted out to the licensees its services and, in any event, was 
dependent on the licensees’ collaboration to operate, since its network was 
connected to the licensees’.
•  Ownership. There was a mix of public and private ownership, although the 
state played a major role. While ASST was part of the Ministry, the licensees 
were private companies. However, through IRI-STET, the State had control 
over three out of five private providers. IRI-STET aimed to manage the 
companies for which it had control according to market criteria, but it could 
not act independently from the government, which, ultimately, provided 
funding and had the right to appoint its management.
•  Degree of competition. The licensees and ASST operated under exclusive 
licenses. In the allotted area, only the licensee had the right to provide the 
services for which it was awarded the licence. Thus, there was no competition 
between licensees, nor could anybody provide telephony services without a 
licence.
•  Allocation o f regulatory powers. Regulatory functions were entrusted to 
ASST. However, generally speaking, ASST did not exercise its regulatory 
functions effectively. As a consequence, there was a lack of guidance and 
planning.
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III. FROM WORLD WAR II TO 1968: THE CONSOLIDATION OF ITALIAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INSTITUTIONS
Telecommunications infrastructures were badly hit by the war. Subscribers also 
dropped from 634,483 in 1942 to 459,361 in 1945.^  ^ However, conditions improved in the 
years between 1945 and 1948, thanks to a tariff increase granted by the government, a surge 
in demand and a stabilization of the economy. This translated into new investment to replace 
lost infrastructure and to build new, more modem one. In 1946, TIMO, one of the licensees 
under IRI-STET, implemented one of the first systems to enable customers to route calls 
outside of their areas without the need for an operator.
While Italian telecommunications were improving their performance, a cloud hung 
above the destiny of the licensees. The licences were to expire in 1955 and it was not clear 
whether the government intended to renew them or not. After the war, several plans were put 
forward to modernize telecommunications institutions, including plans from U.S. 
c o m p a n i e s . A l l  of them proposed some sort of re-unification, given that the split of the 
service between six providers was largely inefficient and increasingly untenable from a 
technological point of view. However, some argued that such reunification should be led by 
ASST, with the state re-taking direct control over telecommunications. Some others, on the 
contrary, favoured the IRI formula and argued that IRI should control the licensees it did not 
already control, and, moreover, there was a plan for IRI to also acquire ASST’ assets. 
ASST mounted a vigorous and successful battle against such option and the final solution 
was dictated by the desire to preserve ASST’ sphere of power.
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See Telecom Italia, L ’Italia al telefono, 2006, internal publication available on request 
(extracts are published in Telecom Italia’s website, www.telecomitalia.it).
See, e.g., the plan by International Telegraph and Telephone corporation to acquire control 
over the entire sector, a plan which was met with favour by ASST and fought by IRI (see 
Bottiglieri, SIP, 250).
See Bottiglieri, SIP, 337.
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In 1957, TETI and SET came under state control through an acquisition by STET, 
The five licensees obtained a new licence, whose terms, though, were highly favourable to 
ASST. The latter was confirmed in its earlier role of provider of inter-area services and 
international services. The licensees were obliged to collect payments due to ASST and to 
guarantee such payments, even if the customer failed to do so. In addition, ASST continued 
to be empowered to monitor the licensees’ compliance with the terms of their licences.
A further re-organization of the sector took place in 1964, when SIP (controlled by 
IRI-STET) incorporated all other telecommunications providers under IRI’s control. This 
reorganization took place after a law of 1962 that nationalized the electricity sector, thus 
forcing SIP to sell its electricity assets to the state-controlled body Ente Nazionale per 
VEnergia Elettrica (ENEL).^^ IRI decided to use the sums obtained as consideration for such 
assets to buy out the other licensees, thus streamlining its holdings in the telecommunications 
sector. As a consequence, in 1964, SIP-Società Idroelettrica Piemontese, became SIP- 
Società italiana per I 'esercizio telefonico per azioni and incorporated the other licensees. In 
the same year, a new licence was signed between SIP and the state.^^ One of the key issues 
underlying the 1964 licence was the criteria for sharing traffic between ASST and the 
licensees, including SIP. While at the beginning of telephony demarcation lines could be 
drawn between inter-district traffic and within-district traffic, as interconnection between 
districts grew, this division lost any economic or technical backing. Yet it was of paramount 
importance for ASST, whose role was directly proportional to the amount of traffic for which 
it could be held responsible. As a consequence, while economically or technologically 
unsound, at every licence renewal ASST sought to preserve its share of traffic as a means to 
defend its position vis-à-vis the licensees. In this respect, the 1964 licence perpetuated the
Law No. 1643 of 1962.
See Presidential Decree No. 1594 of 1964.
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pre-existing situation whereby traffic was shared between ASST and the licensees. In an 
attempt to reduce the uncertainty as to the respective allocation of traffic and the ensuing 
disputes, the 1964 licence adopted three categories, of which two were to be the exclusive 
competence of ASST and SIP, respectively, and only the third one constituted shared traffic, 
i.e. traffic for which both ASST and SIP were responsible. More specifically, the telephone 
calls were categorized as follows:
• the traffic that fell exclusively under ASST competence was traffic between 
the twenty-one cities that were considered as being important nodes of the 
network (centri di compartimentd).
• The traffic between a centro di compartimento and another city, which was 
not a centro di compartimento was shared traffic, for which both SIP and 
ASST had competence (in the former Area 5, i.e. in the South of Italy and 
Sicily, due to the development of the network shared traffic also included 
traffic between different telephone districts).
• All traffic outside the two above categories was SIP’s exclusive competence 
(in the former Area 5, this also included traffic between cities within the same 
telephone district or compartimentd).
As can be seen, the division of competences between ASST and SIP was far from 
clear. There were several drawbacks: it was more difficult to plan network development, 
maintenance and provision of services; there were costs from duplication of equipment and 
networks; revenue sharing was difficult and lent itself to endless disputes. It also acted as a 
deterrent for investment and thus resulted into a low level of service. Only 15% of shared
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traffic was through automated switching, as opposed to 90% and 70% for traffic which fell 
under the exclusive competence of, respectively, SIP and ASST.
The plan to bring automatic switching to the entire network by the end of the 1960s 
required a new division of competences between SIP and ASST. ASST, though, was 
reluctant to enter into this negotiation, as it feared to lose a share of its competences. This 
fear only increased when, in 1964, SIP merged with other licensees. In order to allay ASST’s 
concerns and to promote the desired improvement, a new licence was signed in 1968.^^ The 
new licence increased the number of cities centro di compartimento, whose traffic fell within 
ASST’s exclusive competence, from twenty-one to thirty-seven. In return, the licence set out 
that all other traffic would belong to SIP. Thus, the division was dictated by the need to 
compensate ASST for its loss, rather than by technological or economic reasons. Indeed, 
having more centri di compartimento meant that ASST could expand its presence by 
acquiring offices, infrastructure and hiring new staff. An expansion of its activities was in 
itself a guarantee for the future survival of ASST since, by having a sizeable number of 
employees and infrastructures, ASST could carry considerable weight in negotiations with 
the licensee as to the division of tasks. In exchange for letting ASST increase the number of 
centri di compartimento, SIP gained clearer boundaries and less interference by ASST.^^
It is useful to summarize the main provisions laid down in the 1968 licence since they 
provide valuable information on the provision of telecommunications services in Italy at that 
time and the effects of a split system of providers (ASST, SIP and the other licensees).^^
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See Presidential Decree No. 427 of 1968.
Bottiglieri, SIP, 395.
It should be noted that licence terms and conditions were set out in a separate document 
attached to the licence, called the “Convenzione”. While the licence was the formal act of 
appointment, the Convenzione contained the detailed list of rights and obligations of the 
licensee.
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• Investment. SIP was under an obligation to invest in such a way as to ensure 
the development of infrastructure in accordance with a plan set out by the 
Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, acting in accordance with the 
Treasury and the Minister for State Holdings. In this respect, it is important to 
note that the licence incorporated by reference a development plan set out by 
the Ministry in 1957.^^ Further, SIP had to submit annual plans of the 
investments it intended to carry out and the plans were subject to amendments 
and final approval by the Council and the Board, two technical bodies, which 
were part of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.
• Ownership. SIP was a publicly traded company. By law, the majority of its 
shares had to be in the hands of IRI, directly or indirectly.
• Regulation. ASST had ample powers to monitor SIP’s compliance with the 
terms of its licence. For instance, ASST had to approve the equipment used 
by SIP to build infrastructure. Furthermore, ASST had to ensure that SIP 
complied with the investment plans and could for this reason conduct 
inspections, request information and conduct technical verifications.
• Targets. SIP’s targets included the development of a system of direct dialling 
by the customer, i.e., the ability of each customer to call another user without 
the need to speak to an operator. Interestingly, SIP had to provide ASST with 
the means to enable the traffic which fell under ASST competence to also 
benefit from direct dialling. Further, SIP had to set up a telephone network 
every time that at least 25 subscribers so requested, with a time limit of 30
69 Piano regolatore telefonico nazionale, approved by Ministerial Decree of December 11, 
1957.
69
days for the new connections to become operational. SIP had also to meet 
demand from rural communities who wished to be connected to the network. 
Finally, SIP had to publish the telephone directory.
• Tariffs. The licence set out the tariffs that SIP could charge to its users. 
Tariffs were to be updated every two years to be brought in line with industrial 
costs, taking into account a comparison with costs incurred for similar services 
by foreign operators. Tariffs were decided by a ministerial decree, following a 
deliberation of CIPE -  Comitato Intenninisteriale per la Programmazione 
Economica (the Inter-ministerial Committee for Economic Planning), a body 
created by law in 1967 with powers over economic policy.^®
• Licence fee. SIP had to pay ASST 4.5% of its total revenues each year as 
licence fee. This fee could be increased by 0.8% after one year from the start 
of the licence.
• Duration. The concession was to run until 1996.
Thus, at the end of the 1960s, Italian telecommunications services were provided 
mainly by SIP, which, after the incorporation of the former licensees, had become by far the 
most important provider, and ASST. In addition, specific services were provided by other 
two companies under STET control, namely Italcable and Telespazio. The former was 
founded in 1941 to provide international telephony services between Italy and non-European 
states and it came under STET control in 1964. The latter was created in 1961 with the 
participation of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, Italcable and RAJ, to provide 
satellite communications. It also became part of STET group in 1964.
See Law No. 48 of 1967.
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Although this represented a more simplified organization of the sector compared to 
the earlier period, when provision of telecommunications services was split between six area 
providers (besides Italcable and Telespazio), it still meant a high degree of fragmentation. 
Moreover, the relationships between SIP and ASST acted as a hindrance to an orderly 
development of telecommunications services.
IV. SIP 1968-1978
Thanks to stability and strong growth in the economy between the end of the 1960s 
and the early 1970s, the Italian telecommunications sector fared well, compared with other 
countries. The table below shows that, e.g., the penetration of telephony, as measured by the 
number of subscribers per 100 inhabitants, was higher in Italy than in France and it was not 
far from Germany and United Kingdom. This result was all the more remarkable given that, 
starting fi*om 1968, a wave of strikes and industrial actions severely hit the growth potential 
of the sector.
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Table 2 -  Number of subscribers and telephone penetration as of January 1, 1973 (Source: R. Abeille,
Storia delle telecomimicazioni italiane e della Sip 1964-1994, 49).
umber of su
73.X49
25,675
10,830
. -, United Kingdom f 10,308
France
Sweden
Switzerland
In 1972, SIP signed a new licence, with a view to promoting further expansion of the 
service.^' The 1972 licence provided, inter alia, the following obligations for SIP:
• to connect not fewer than 800,000 new subscribers per year, with priority for 
new subscribers in the South of Italy.
• To connect within a reasonable time and no later than by 1975 all subscribers 
who had already applied for service and whose demand had not been satisfied.
71 See Presidential D ecree No. 803 o f  1972.
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• Within two years, to start providing mobile telephony in the district of Rome 
and, progressively, to extend the service to the other districts.
• To upgrade the network in order to provide videotelephony and cable 
television.
• To start data transmission over the existing public telephony network and 
other network segments, to be developed accordingly.
At the same time, SIP tariffs were amended to enable the company to increase its 
revenues by approximately 15%.^^ Amendments to SIP tariffs were decided by CIPE having 
regard to the significant investment that was required to meet the ambitious targets set in the 
1972 licence. The tariff increase of 1972 was the first one since 1964. In the same period, 
inflation rose by 40%, though. In France, Germany and the United Kingdom there had been 
already, respectively, three, two and four tariff increases in the same period. This increase 
notwithstanding, Italian customers still benefited from one of the lowest tariffs for local calls 
in E u r o p e . T h i s  already shows the delicate financial equilibrium of SIP. While the 
company had to meet the targets set in the licence, it was dependent on the government for its 
revenues. Tariffs obviously had a profound impact on the company’s ability to finance 
investments and, consequently, to meet demand and bring about new services. This meant 
that the company was very vulnerable to political interference, as the government could use 
its power over tariffs as a tool of economic policy-making.
In the period between 1973 and 1978, the economic crisis brought about by the oil 
shock was compounded in Italy by a period of social unrest. The ‘anni di piombo’ as they
R. Abeille, Storia delle telecomunicazioni italiane, 41 
Ibidem.
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were defined, marked a very low point of confidence in Italian institutions. In 1978, the 
Prime Minister, Aldo Moro, was kidnapped and assassinated by a group of left-wing 
terrorists, the red brigades. These severe hardships took a heavy toll on the Italian 
telecommunications sector too, especially on SIP. This is because, faced with high inflation 
and the need to sustain investments, both to fulfil the licence terms and to avoid jeopardising 
even further industrial relationships, SIP saw its expenses far exceed its revenues and started 
to borrow heavily. A tariff adjustment was needed to enable SIP to comply with its mission 
and continue to supply services.
In 1975, CIPE granted a tariff increase to remedy SIP’s disastrous situation. 
However, this increase provoked a backlash from public opinion. The company was not able 
to fight back with an adequate information campaign. Thus, shortly afterwards the 
government partly retracted on such increase. The period thereafter (i.e. 1976-1979) was 
characterized by a pattern of requests for tariff increase in the face of a worsening financial 
situation, and continuous delays as governments were short-lived and, in any event, hostile to 
such increases.
The role of CIPE as a regulator increased, as this body was in fact the ultimate centre 
of decision making over this vital matter. However, CIPE too, as a ministerial body, was 
prey to government instability. As a result, investment was lagging, the rate of increase of 
new subscribers slowed down and the financial burden escalated. In 1978, the company 
failed to earn a profit on its operations and in 1979 the company had a significant deficit. 
The table below shows the composition of cost items in SIP accounts between 1973 and 
1979.
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Table 3 - SIP - Costs and profits in percentage 1973-1979 (Source: R. Abeille, Storia delle telecomimicazioni
italiane, 61)
197T.?
*5^
Amortization' 15.2 13.6 15.6 15.7 16.6 11.2 24.7
Other 6.3 4.7 5.0 4.8 5.0 4.4 4.7
Profits 4.9 2.2  ' 3.1 2.6 2X). 0 ^ 18.9
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Being unable to finance its operations and with tariffs systematically lagging behind 
inflation, SIP experienced a very serious financial crisis in 1979. The crisis had severe 
repercussions on SIP’s ability to deliver telecommunications services, plummeting the sector 
into stagnation amidst public outcry about lack of adequate services. It is against this 
scenario that one must assess pressures for changing telecommunications institutions and 
increasing returns. Before turning to this matter, the section below provides information on 
British telecommunications institutions before 1979.
V. BRITISH TELECOMMUNICATIONS INSTITUTIONS BEFORE 1979
The provision of telecommunications services in Britain differed markedly from that 
of Italy since the very beginning of telephony. In contrast to the fragmented state of the 
sector in Italy, starting from 1869, the Post Office ran the services on the basis of a 
monopoly.
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The Post Office had been created in 1840 as a government department, headed by a 
minister, the Post Master G e n e r a l I t s  remit originally encompassed the telegraph. 
However, when telephone systems appeared in 1877, the Post Office claimed that they fell 
within the definition of ‘telegraph’ as provided under the Telegraph Act of 1869.^^ Thus, the 
Post Office asserted a monopoly overt telecommunications. The Post Office was not the only 
actual provider of telecommunications services. It chose to license private operators, 
alongside its own operations. However, the co-existence of private licensees and Post Office 
was progressively reduced and ended in 1912, when the Post Office completed the 
acquisition of the National Telephone Company’s assets.^^ By 1912, therefore, the Post 
Office was the only provider of telecommunications services in Britain (with the exception of 
the municipal network of Kingston upon Hull).
This can be usefully contrasted with the Italian situation. As noted, in 1925 the 
Mussolini government decided to award six licences for the provision of telecommunications 
services, based on geographic areas, rejecting an advice on the superiority of a single 
provider from the point of view of technology and economic efficiency. Thus, the split- 
supply model adopted by the Italian telecommunications sector contrasted with the single­
supplier model of Britain. Moreover, the Italian licensees were private companies, with 
ASST being the exception. Ownership arrangements in Britain, by contrast, hinged on full 
state control over the provider, with the Post Office being a government department.
Small reforms were introduced in the 1930s, when a Post Office board was created 
and there was an attempt to separate postal from telecommunications services, and in the
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See the Telegraph Act 1868; H. Robinson, The British Post Office: A History (Princeton; 
Princeton University Press, 1948); Thatcher, The Politics of Telecommunications, 32-9.
See Thatcher, The Politics o f Telecommunications, 32, who also explains that this position 
was endorsed by a judgment issued by the High Court in 1880.
The Post Office had bought the National Telephone Company’s trunk network in 1896 and 
bought its local networks in 1911 (see Thatcher, The Politics of Telecommunications, 32).
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1960s, when separate Deputy Director Generals for posts and telecommunications were 
created with a view to grant more autonomy to the two/^ In 1961, the Post Office Act ""made 
the Post Office a hybrid between a department and a public corporation"', thus altering the 
Post Office’s institutional position, albeit to a ""modest" extent.
Further to an act of law passed in 1969, the Post Office became a public corporation, 
thus ending its position as part of the gov er nment .The  Act created a Minister within the 
government, the Minister for Post and Telecommunications, with responsibility for drawing 
up policy measures and overseeing the Post Office. The status of public corporation was 
intended to afford the Post Office the ability to behave more independently from the 
government. The Post Office was responsible to provide postal, telecommunications and data 
processing services in the UK and abroad,under  an all-encompassing monopoly regime, as 
it enjoyed an ""exclusive privilege" to run the telecommunications network. The monopoly 
thus conferred on the Post Office was as comprehensive as anything in Europe and a 
commentator claimed that under, this regime, the UK telecommunications market was ""the 
most closed within the O E C D " Moreover, the Post Office was free to decide charges and 
terms and conditions for its services.
The duties it was charged with were phrased in very general terms. For instance, 
under para. 9.1 of the 1969 Act, the Post Office had to ""exercise its powers as to meet the 
social, industrial, and commercial needs o f the British Islands in regard to matters that are 
subserved by those powers and in particular to provide throughout those Islands (save in so
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See Thatcher, The Politics of Telecommunications, 34-5.
Thatcher, The Politics of Telecommunications, 38.
See Post Office Act 1969.
See para. 7 of the 1969 Act.
J. Solomon, ‘Telecommunications Evolution in the UK’, Telecommunications Policy, (1996), 
186-192, at 186.
See § 27 of the 1969 Act.
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fa r  as the provision thereof is in its opinion impracticable or not reasonably practicable) 
such services fo r  the conveyance o f letters and such telephone services as satisfy all 
reasonable demands fo r  these'\ When compared with the terms of SIP’s licence, these 
obligations appeared both vague and difficult to be enforced. In particular, the requirement 
of “reasonable practicability” undermined the binding force of such provision, also given that 
the Post Office was ultimately the sole entity that could judge such requirement.*^
The most significant constraint to the Post Office autonomy was in financial matters. 
The Post Office had to at least break even over the years, taking into account amortization.*"^ 
Capital expenditure was to be agreed with the Minister.*^ Borrowing required approval by 
both the Treasury and the Minister and there was a limit to the amount of borrowing. The 
financial limitations that impinged on the Post Office autonomy also derived from outside the 
legal framework of the telecommunications sector. In fact, constraints outside the 1969 Act 
proved probably more severe.
The Post Office finances were part of the general public expenditures. An increase in 
the Post Office spending raised total public expenditure. In practice this meant that the Post 
Office’s finances and the general budget were intertwined and that the government could 
deny a tariff increase in light of its objectives of macro-economic policy. For instance, the 
Heath government refused to allow a tariff increase that would have kept prices abreast of 
inflation and sacked the Post Office chairman for advocating commercial freedom from the 
government. In addition to price restraint, the Post Office also had to contend with sudden 
cuts in its capital investments programme as the government in 1973 imposed a cut of 20%
See Thatcher, The Politics of Telecommunications, 95. 
^ See para. 31 of the 1969 Act.
See para. 11.8 of the 1969 Act.
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with no prior consultation. Lack of resources and poor investments inevitably lead to 
growing unsatisfied demand among users.
In order to tackle the Post Office situation, the new Labour government set up a major 
review of the Post Office in 1975. The review (the “Carter Report”) carried out an 
assessment of the Post Office efficiency compared to other postal and telecommunications 
authorities with similar t a s k s . A l t h o u g h  guarding against the difficulties of such 
assessment, the report concluded that ^'Whilst the Telecommunications Business o f the Post 
Office has much to be proud o f it remains significantly less efficient than the best o f  its 
overseas competitors''}^ On the marketing side, the Carter report pointed out that '’'"its 
customers get the feeling that they are being graciously permitted to use the systems"}^ and 
that ‘7/ze Postal and Telecommunications Business needed to understand a great deal more 
than they [did] about the profiles o f  the various markets they served'}^ Moreover, the Carter 
Report addressed the issue of relations with government. It found that there was a thoroughly 
confused relationship between government and the Post Office with no clear agreement as to 
their respective roles in policy formation. In particular, government intervention was short­
term and concerned with ad hoc issues, with no ability to devise a long-term strategic plan.^*
The report issued recommendations to overcome the impasse, among which the 
following are noteworthy:
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A. Cawson, K. Moran, D. Webber, P. Holmes and A. Stevens, Hostile Brothers (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990), 90.
Department of Industry, Report o f the Post Office Review Committee, Cmdn. 6850 (London: 
HMSG, 1977).
Ibidem, 19.
Ibidem, 42.
Ibidem, 43.
Ibidem, 59.
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• the division of the Post Office in two structures, the first comprising postal 
services and the second telecommunications;
• the establishment of a Council on Post Office and Telecommunications Affairs 
to serve as a source of expertise for the government;
• a reconsideration of the exclusive privilege of the Post Office as to 
telecommunications equipment.
The recommendations of the Carter Report were not implemented immediately but 
they formed the basis upon which the next government would start to reform the organisation 
of the telecommunications market.
VI. CONCLUSION
This chapter has provided an overview of the history of Italian and British trajectories, 
prior to 1979, i.e. the year that is the starting point for the study carried out in the thesis. As 
explained, the chapter does not purport to show dynamics of increasing returns, its task being 
confined to provide the reader with an introduction to this process. Nevertheless, given the 
weight than almost a century of history is bound to have on the subsequent institutional 
development, its importance should not be underestimated. It is thus useful to set out two 
concluding remarks.
First of all, what seems most prominent in the starting point of the Italian path is the 
fragmented organization of the sector. Whereas in Britain the Post Office appeared as 
dominating the scene as a provider of telecommunications (and postal) services, in Italy 
provision was divided among four entities in 1979 (down from eight). What is more, two of 
them (SIP and ASST) clearly had overlapping roles and the latter often times simply
Ibidem, 120-130.
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contracted out to the former its duties. The system of split providers had started already in 
1924 and passed unscathed the Second World War and the birth of the Italian Republic in 
1948. Already during the period studied, the split-provider system was difficult to justify 
from a technological and economic point of view. It is worth remembering that in 1924 the 
government of the day had received advice on the technical superiority of a single provider 
system. Equally, after the Second World War, a project of re-unification of the 
telecommunications sector similarly failed due to political pressure.
A second concluding remark pertains to the difference in the starting points between 
Italian and British telecommunications. The table below provides an overview of the 
telecommunications institutions in Britain and Italy in 1979.
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Table 4 - Italian and British telecom institutions in 1979
Britàin Italy •
Number o f providers
Degree of CO
* , 
Allocation of
1 (Post 
Office)
4 (ASST, SIP, Italcable, Telespazio)
Public Private com p an ies under state control (SIP, Italcable, 
Telespazio) / Ministerial body (ASST)
Monopoly Monopoly
regulatory powers
Minister Minister/CIPE/ASST
Viewed in 1979, these two countries’ institutional starting points could have hardly 
been more different. In particular, the fragmented organization of the Italian 
telecommunications sector provides a striking contrast with the single dominance of the Post 
Office in the United Kingdom, an organization entrusted with the sole responsibility to 
provide postal and telecommunications services "^throughout the British Islands'’". Equally, 
the mixed ownership of Italian telecommunications, where a body fully under state control 
operated alongside private companies, can be contrasted with the situation in Britain where 
the Post Office was clearly in state hands.
Thus, by 1979 these two countries displayed a very significant difference in their 
institutional starting points. The differences were also long standing, given that Italy’s 
fragmentation from 1924 found no parallel in Britain, where the Post Office already in 1912
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held a legal and de facto monopoly. The differences between the two countries were set to 
continue until 1997.
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3. SETTING THE BENCHMARK: TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
INSTITUTIONS IN BRITAIN 1979-2007
I. INTRODUCTION
This chapter sets out the institutional development that took place in the benchmark 
country, i.e. the United Kingdom. During the period 1979-1984, a Conservative government 
was able to drive major institutional changes in the telecommunications sector. The adoption 
of the 1984 Telecommunications Act in particular marked the creation of a privatized 
operator, monitored by a sector-specific independent regulatory body. The same Act also 
started the transformation of the sector from a closed monopoly into a competitive market. 
These changes brought about a very significant break with the past. Moreover, the reforms 
made Britain the first country in Europe to adopt privatization and regulation. Taken 
together, these changes show that Britain had embraced a ‘logic’ based on delegation to an 
IRA of regulatory powers and elected officials relinquishing ability to control day-to-day 
operations of telecommunications companies -  that were privately-owned.
In the period after 1984 the new British telecommunications institutions experienced a 
period of stability, which continued until 2007. Institutions did not remain frozen, of course, 
but the direction of change remained constant. This is to say that the logic of the British path 
remained unaltered, even if individual pieces of the institutional structure were replaced. The 
creation of Ofcom in 2003 illustrates this point. Ofcom replaced Oftel and merged other 
regulators in order to create a single regulatory body for the entire electronic communications 
industry. But the creation of Ofcom continued the same logic and thus represents another 
step on the same path embraced by Britain after 1984.
The task of the chapter thus consists in providing information on the British path of 
reform in order to enable the benchmark-type comparison with Italy that will be performed
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throughout chapters 4-6. Before undertaking this task, it is useful to recall that the chapter 
does not attempt to establish that changes in Britain were linked to increasing returns nor to 
make any in-depth study on the creation of new telecommunications institutions, this chapter 
and the following being instrumental to the analysis on Italian telecommunications 
institutions and not per se. Rather it sets out the UK’s institutional development with which 
the Italian one will be compared.
After concisely recapitulating the institutional situation pre-1979, the chapter will 
describe the economic and technological developments that created pressures for institutional 
change in both countries and how policy makers responded to pressures for change. In this 
respect, the chapter also notes that institutional reforms in Britain came about in the face of 
strong opposition, both in and outside Parliament. A section will provide a description of the 
new 1984 institutional arrangements, i.e. the rules on ownership, competition and licensing 
and the structure and powers of the regulator. Another section continues to provide 
information on the trajectory of the benchmark country by completing the description of the 
British path after the radical reforms that took place in 1981-1984.
II. THE STARTING POINTS AND TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC
PRESSURES FOR CHANGE: 1979-1984
It is useful at the outset to briefly recall that the provision of telecommunications 
services in Britain was entrusted to the Post Office, established as a public corporation under 
the Post Office Act 1969. This meant that:
• The Post Office -  in contrast with Italy -  was the only entity in charge of 
supplying telecommunications services throughout ‘7/ze British Islands’'.
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• The Post Office enjoyed a statutory monopoly, since the Post Office Act 1969 
vested it with the ""exclusive privilege^'' of running telecommunications 
networks.
• The Post Office was under state control, with the Minister of Post and 
Telecommunications appointing the chairman and its finances being counted 
within the overall public finances.
This also meant that, in 1979, there was no independent regulator, all rules 
concerning the sector being approved either by the Parliament or by the Minister. In fact, 
since the state was supplying telecommunications through the Post Office, there was limited 
need to issue such rules. This institutional background provided pressures for institutional 
change in the period between 1979-1984 due to technological and economic change in the 
industry. Starting from 1960s, the changes that were taking place in the microelectronics 
industry changed profoundly the telecommunications in d u s try .T h e  two sectors had until 
then been separated by clear boundaries, telecommunications being based on 
electromechanical technology. The digitalization of information, coupled with the increased 
capability of microchips, meant that network operation, equipment manufacturing and 
customer premises equipment and other services were transformed and improved. As will be 
showed below, this carried significant implications for existing telecommunications 
institutions.
First of all, public ownership and, more generally, state control came under pressure. 
New technology offered the ability to greatly improve the quality, reliability and breadth of 
telecommunications services offered. However, this entailed heavy investment. Existing
See, e.g., OECD, Telecommunications. Pressures and Policies for Change (Paris: OECD, 
1983); The Telecommunications Industry (Paris: OECD, 1988); and Telecommunications 
Network-Based Services (Paris: OECD, 1989),
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telecommunications networks needed to be upgraded and existing equipment was to be 
written off as obsolete.M oreover, there were economies of scale in replacing large chunks 
of the network as opposed to incremental upgrading. This is because having a network that is 
only partly digitalized implied added costs due to the need to transform signals from digital to 
analogue and viceversa. High investment, concentrated in a short space of time, though, run 
against tight financial limits imposed on public bodies and had negative implications for 
overall public finances. Privatization became a potential institutional solution to overcome 
these shortcomings. A privatized telecommunications operator would be able to borrow 
more easily the funds needed for the profitable investments and, moreover, such borrowing 
would not have an impact on state finances, while at the same time allowing for the provision 
of more modem telecommunications services.
Secondly, the economic rationale for monopoly also became weaker. Network 
operation was traditionally regarded as a ‘natural’ monopoly, i.e. a service, which could be 
more economically supplied over one single infrastructure.^^ However, new technology 
meant that the cost of new networks fell. The opportunities thus arose to set up limited 
networks (as opposed to the ubiquitous public network) in highly concentrated areas and then 
interconnect such networks with the public network. The new networks in turn could be open 
to a variety of users or be ‘closed’ networks, designed to link together only the premises of, 
for instance, a multinational enterprise with a better and more secure connection. This meant 
that new technology also threatened the traditional network monopoly. Business users saw 
the added benefits of having more than one provider both in terms of variety and quality of 
services as well as prices. These developments meant that another pillar of
See O. Stehmann, Network Competition for European Telecommunications (Oxford: GUP, 
1995), 15, 18.
See R. Noll, ‘The Future of Telecommunications Regulation’, in E. Noam (ed.). 
Telecommunications Regulation: Today and Tomorrow (NY: Aspen, 1982), ch. 2.
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telecommunications institutions, namely monopoly, became unstable. In its place, 
competition started to gain acceptance as a suitable institutional arrangement to allow several 
operators to co-exist.
The newly elected Conservative government commissioned a report from Professor 
Beesley to study the extent to which competition could take place in the telecommunications 
sector. The Beesley report, published in April 1981,^^ considered the benefits and costs of 
resale of leased lines. He concluded that competitors should be allowed to lease lines from 
BT and to sell all services through such leased lines, including “basic” voice telephony since 
otherwise it was impossible to enable viable competition. His conclusions were based on the 
US experience whereby the development of non-voice or “value added” services was linked 
to the ability to sell also “basic” or voice services. He argued that if BT moved to a cost- 
based structure for each service or to equalising returns on charges, then the loss to BT’s 
revenues could be accommodated by a balancing of its return on charges. Finally, although 
he did not advocate that a direct competitor to BT should be licensed, Beesley anticipated that 
resale would itself lead to full liberalisation and the creation of alternative networks to BT’s.
Thirdly, a privatized operator, competing with other suppliers on networks and 
services provided incentives to create a sector-specific regulator to supervise the development 
of competition in the sector. This was due to several reasons. First, the industry was 
achieving a very high degree of complexity. Indeed, one of the implication of technological 
change for telecommunications was the evolution from a single-product industry to a much 
more complex environment, where different products became available to users. In addition, 
technological change meant that there was a continuous process of replacing old products and 
services with new ones. A ‘generalist’ bureaucracy in a ministerial department was ill-suited
See M. E, Beesley, Liberalisation o f the use of British Telecommunications Network (London: 
HMSO, 1981).
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for a task that required very specialized expertise and involvement in the day-to-day 
operation. Second, even if placed outside state control, a privatized telecommunication 
operator would nonetheless continue to require a high degree of public supervision. For 
instance, such operator would continue to fulfil a public service mission. The state would 
therefore need to be involved in defining the scope of such mission. Finally, the provision of 
services where competition is not developed would require price controls.
Various types of price regulation mechanisms were analysed in the 1983 report 
prepared by Professor Stephen Littlechild to regulate BT profitability.^^ In carrying out his 
mandate. Professor Littlechild proceeded on the base of five criteria: (i) protection against 
monopoly; (ii) efficiency and innovation; (iii) burden of regulation; (iv) promotion of 
competition; and (v) proceeds from flotation and prospects. The assumption of his report was 
that competition was the most effective check for market power: regulation was merely a way 
of ‘holding the fort’ until competition a r r i v e d . H e  therefore put great emphasis on price 
regulation mechanisms that minimized the level of discretion by the r e g u l a t o r . A  
regulatory body would be needed, though, to enforce price regulation.
In sum, economic and technological developments during the period studied posed a 
threat to then existing institutional arrangements. They created powerful incentives to 
abandon direct state control, monopoly and a centralized supplier especially since new
97
98
See S. Littlechild, Regulation of British Telecommunications’ Profitability (London: HMSO, 
1983).
See Littlechild, Regulation, 7.
The choice fell on a local tariff reduction scheme, by which BT would be required to set 
tariffs so that a local tariff index increased by less than retail prices in general. The 
Littlechild proposal was accepted by the government (see Statement on Telecommunications 
Policy, HC Deb 7.2.83 c.633). What came to be known as the RPI-X formula was 
incorporated in condition 24 of BT’s license. X was set equal to 3 until 21 July 1989 when a 
price revision was deemed to take place. Increases in the value of the price cap during the 5 
years of its duration were subject to certain limitations so as to ensure stability in the 
regulatory framework. Thus, from 1984 to 1989 BT's retail prices were regulated at RPI-3%.
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technologies meant that, through investments, new and better services could be delivered 
through alternative networks and/or by using the public network. Policy makes thus were 
faced with very important institutional choices, as privatization, competition and regulation 
by independent agency would have meant a complete institutional overhaul.
III. NEW TELECOMMUNICATIONS INSTITUTIONS IN BRITAIN: 1981-1984
The period studied coincided with the victories o f the Conservative party at the 1979 
and 1983 elections. Reforms that changed the landscape o f British telecommunications came 
about in two stages: first, in 1981 the telecommunications operations o f the Post Office were 
incorporated as a separate entity; second, in 1984 British Telecommunications, as the new 
entity was called, was privatized and a sector specific regulator was established. The table 
below summarizes the main changes in the key institutional aspects.
Table 5 - Changes in British telecommunications institutions 1979-1984
1984
NumW# o f providers
Ownership
One Public corporation with 
responsibility for Posts and 
Telecommunications
Public
Monopoly
lafory Powers
Minister
BT and Mercury
Private/listed/51 % publicly 
traded
Competition (Duopoly)
OFTEL
The Act that created British Telecommunications was the 1981 British
Telecommunications Act. It provided for the creation o f BT as a public corporation entrusted
with the provision o f telecommunications and data processing services, separate from the
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Post O f f i c e / T h e  main thrust of the Act was to vest the newly-created BT with generally 
the same powers as the Post Office pursuant to earlier legislation. In particular, the 1981 
British Telecommunications Act maintained intact monopoly arrangements as BT continued 
to enjoy the exclusive privilege o f running telecoms systems throughout the British 
Islands'’\^^^ while giving to the corporation power to fix charges for its services and other 
terms and conditions.
Limited exceptions to BT’s monopoly concerned equipment provision and sale of so- 
called value-added services, i.e. telecommunications services other than the transportation of 
calls over the network for the purposes of providing voice telephony. With respect to 
equipment provision, the 1981 British Telecommunications Act provided that standards to 
which subscribers’ apparatus had to conform could be approved by the Secretary of State 
after consultation with BT or by a person appointed by the Secretary of State after
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BT acquired all undertakings belonging to the Post Office concerned with the provision of 
telecommunications and data processing services (see para. 1).
See para. 12. Likewise, much in the same fashion as the Post Office 1969 Act, BT exercised 
its powers to provide such telephone services as satisfy all reasonable demands for them and 
with regard to efficiency and economy; the social, industrial and commercial needs of the 
British Islands, the desirability of improving and developing its operating systems and 
developments in the fields of telecoms and data processing (see para. 3). Furthermore, BT 
had ample powers to carry out its task, in particular it could '''‘[c\onstruct, manufacture, 
produce, purchase, take on hire or hire-purchase, install, maintain and repair anything 
required for the purposes o f its business ” (see para. 2, subsection 2, lett (a)). In addition, BT 
could construct, manufacture, produce or purchase for supply to the Post Office (underlined 
not in the text) or any subsidiary of the Post Office anything required for the purposes of the 
business of the Post Office or the subsidiary and to install, maintain, repair and test for the 
Post Office or any subsidiary of the Post Off anything so required (para. 2, subsection 2, lett 
(b)). Finally, BT could perform the same activities with respect to outside persons with 
respect to any articles a function of which necessarily involved the use of telecommunications 
(para. 2(c)). In carrying out these tasks, BT had powers, among other things, to enter into 
agency, or other, agreements with any person for the carrying on by him of any of the 
activities which itself could carry on; to dispose of parts of its business and to acquire a body 
corporate if it deemed to do so for its business (see para. 2, subsection 3)
See para. 21.
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consultation with The 1981 British Telecommunications Act also empowered the
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry to grant licences to operators other than BT to 
provide network and value added services.'®"^
Under the 1981 British Telecommunications Act, the Secretary of State for Industry 
continued to enjoy direct control over BT. For instance, the Secretary of State had, inter alia, 
the power to appoint the chairman of BT, to exercise general control and supervision and
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In the equipment market, the practical necessity of phasing liberalisation over a number of 
years and dependence on BT for technical expertise limited the liberalisation programme. 
Formally the British Standard Institution took responsibility for setting standards for the 
equipment, but because of the time needed to formulate standards and because the equipment 
certifying body, a subsidiary of the British Electric Equipment board, was inadequately 
financed and staffed, BT continued to wield power over equipment certification. See Hills, 
Deregulating Telecoms, 95. In addition, para. 16, subsection 4 virtually immunised BT 
against any complaints. This is because the 1981 Act provided that if  it appeared to the 
Secretary of State that BT was showing undue preference against a competitor as to the 
connection of a telecom apparatus, he should consult with BT before “g/v[ing] it such 
directions as appear to him to be requisite to secure that it ceases to do sd’\
In the summer of 1981, the government announced that it had received a detailed proposal for 
a business transmission system to compete with BT and that it was in principle in favour of 
such a proposal {Financial Times, 15.7.1981). Fortified by a report prepared by 
Microelectronics Design Associates, an independent consultancy company, the government 
considered with favour the Mercury consortium, as it was called, formed by Cable and 
Wireless, Barclays Bank and British Petroleum. Mercury planned to lay optic fibre cables 
linking 26 major cities in Britain and to provide trunk and international services to business. 
In October 1981, the Mercury consortium received a letter of intent from the government, 
anticipating the grant of its actual license to operate a national and international digital 
network. Despite these assurances, the licence was not issued until February 1982.
‘T/ze Secretary of State may, after consultation with the Corporation, give to it such 
directions o f a general character as to the exercise by it o f its powers as appears to the 
Secretary o f State to be requisite in the national interest. I f it appears to the Secretary o f State 
that there is a defect in the general plans or arrangements o f the corporation for exercising 
any o f its powers, he may, after consultation with it, give it directions o f a general character 
for remedying the defect ... Without prejudice to the foregoing provisions o f this section, if  it 
appears to the Secretary of State to be requisite or expedient so to do
In the interest o f national security or relations with the government of a country or territory 
outside the British Islands; or
In order
To discharge or facilitate the discharge of, an obligation binding on her Majesty’s 
Government in the United Kingdom by virtue of it being a member o f an international 
organisation or a party to an international agreement;
to attain, or facilitate the attainment of, or any other object the attainment o f which is, in the 
Secretary o f State's opinion, requisite or expedient in view o f Her Majesty’s Government in
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to give directions. Moreover, if BT was to carry out any work, which involved 
^^substantial outlay o f capital a c c o u n t it had to submit a general programme to the 
Secretary of State for approval. In addition, BT was under a duty to supply the information 
the Secretary of State may request from time to time, notwithstanding the submission of an 
annual report on the performance of its services.
Finally, BT had an obligation to consult with the Secretary of State for, e.g., relevant 
variations in the construction, manufacturing or production of telecommunications 
equipment; or the construction, manufacturing or production of new equipment. Unless 
so approved by the Secretary of State, BT could not engage in the production or purchase of 
things other than for its use or to supply the Post Office or outside persons in connection with 
telecommunications services or equipment.*’®
the United Kingdom being a member of such an organisation or party to such an agreement; 
or
to enable Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to become a member o f such an 
organisation or a party to such an agreement,
he may, after consultation with the Corporation, give to it directions requiring it (according 
to the circumstances o f the case) to secure that a particular thing that it or any of its 
subsidiaries is doing, is no longer done or that a particular thing that it has power to do, but 
is not being done, either by it or by any of its subsidiaries, is so done*^  (see para. 6 of the 1981 
British Telecommunications Act).
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See para. 6, subsection 7. Para. 6, subsection 12 required the Secretary of State to lay a copy 
of the annual report sent to him by BT before each House of Parliament.
See para. 6, subparagraph 10.
'''‘The construction, manufacturing or production for BT use or to supply the Post Office or 
outside persons for use in connection with telecommunications services or equipment, o f 
things o f any kind to an extent substantially greater than BT had done during the three 
accounting years before".
’’The construction, manufacturing or production to a substantial extent for BT use or to 
supply the Post Office or outside persons for use in connection with telecommunications 
services or equipment, o f things o f a kind not previously produced, constructed or 
manufactured during the three accounting years before".
These provisions were carried on from the 1969 Act, which at para. 13, provided for the same 
restrictions on the Post Office activities.
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With respect to BT’s finances, BT had a general duty to break even/^^ The Secretary 
of State could lay down, with the approval of the Treasury, and after consultation with BT, 
certain financial objectives and BT was under a duty to comply with those; he could also 
direct BT to allocate to reserve certain sums. Moreover, BT could, with the consent of the 
Secretary of State, and with the approval of the Treasury, borrow money, be it in the form of 
temporary loans or otherwise, from third parties or in currencies other than sterling, to meet 
its obligations and discharging its functions, and to cover its capital expenditures.
However, there was a cap to BT’s total borrowing set at £5,000 million “or such 
greater sum, not exceeding £6,500 million, as the Secretary o f  State may from time to time 
specify\^^^ A draft of the order by the Secretary of State to raise the limitation on 
indebtedness needed to be approved by resolution of the Commons H o u s e . F i n a l l y ,  when 
the Treasury issued a guarantee in favour of BT, it had to lay a statement before each House 
of Parliament immediately afterwards.
The limitations placed on BT’s finances arising out of its status as a public 
corporation played a significant role in the subsequent decision to privatize BT. Indeed, in
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“7/ shall be the duty o f the Corporation to secure that the combined revenues o f the 
Corporation and its all subsidiaries taken together are not less sufficient than
to meet all their combined charges properly chargeable to revenue account, taking one year 
with another; and
to enable the Corporation and its wholly owned subsidiaries to make such allocations to 
reserve as the Corporation considers adequate, and as may be necessary to comply with any 
directions given by the Secretary of State under section 2T’ (para. 24).
See para. 26, subsections 1 and 2.
See para. 27. Under para. 28, the Secretary of State could lend to BT certain sums with the 
approval of the Treasury.
See para. 27 of the 1981 Act.
See para. 29, subsection 2, of the 1981 Act. BT accounts were audited and a copy of the 
auditors’ report was laid each year before the Houses of Parliament. When it became a public 
corporation, BT ceased to be subject to the Comptroller’s and the Auditor General’s review 
(see para. 39 of the 1969 Act); external auditors appointed by the Secretary of State audited 
its accounts (see para. 31 of the 1981 Act).
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his announcement to Parliament on July 19, 1982, the Secretary of State stated that the 
decision to privatize was intended to resolve the problem of how to reconcile BT's investment 
programme with the government’s tight limits on b o rro w in g /A lth o u g h  it did not form part 
of the Conservative party’s manifesto in 1979, privatization of telecommunications certainly 
suited the Conservative party politics as it allowed it to claim that they were ‘rolling back the 
State’ by contrast with the pro-nationalization Labour party/
It is worth noting that the plans to privatize British Telecom and to set up a regulatory 
body met with considerable opposition. In particular, besides opposition parties, the camp of 
those who were hostile to the institutional reforms enlisted trade unions and equipment 
manufacturers. When the bill to privatize BT and create Oftel was considered in the Lords in 
1983, no fewer than three hundred amendments were made.’*^  Thus, the ability to carry out 
the significant reforms that took place between 1981 and 1984 notwithstanding such 
opposition indicates how being able to draw on strong political support was key for 
telecommunications reform, a lesson that would be of great value for the study of Italian 
telecommunications in the following chapters.
BT privatization together with a number of very significant institutional changes, 
were carried out under the 1984 Telecommunications Act. The sale of 51% of BT shares in 
November 1984 proved the world's largest single share issue, raising nearly £ 3.9 billion for 
the UK Treasury. A privatization of this scale had far reaching consequences for the
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'‘'"Unless something is done radically to change the capital structure and ownership o f BT and 
to provide a direct spur to efficiency, higher investment could mean still higher charges for  
the customer”. See also Department of Industry, The Future o f Telecommunications in 
Britain, Cmnd. 8610 (London: HMSO, 1982).
See Thatcher, The Politics of Telecommunications, 144.
See Thatcher, The Politics of Telecommunications, 147.
The issue was heavily oversubscribed and the share price rose by 33% on the first day of 
trading, giving rise to criticism about the pricing of the offer. For a more detailed account of
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government and the industry. Save for the golden sh a re /p riv a tiz a tio n  ended the 
government’s ability to influence BT conduct, e.g., by using BT’s tariffs according to its anti- 
inflationary policy or denying funds for investment for reasons due to limitations on overall 
public spending. For the industry as a whole, privatization also meant a very significant 
break with the past. This is because privatization formed an integral part of a wider plan to 
introduce competition, which, in turn, created an incentive to create a specialized body.
Indeed, the 1984 Telecommunications Act ended BT exclusive privilege"" to run 
telecommunications systems. Instead it introduced a general licensing regime aimed at 
regulating entry into the different segments of the telecommunications market. Although 
licensing powers were formally in the hands of the Secretary of State, he could delegate such 
power to the Director General. The Director General was the head of the Office of 
Telecommunications (Oftel), a non-ministerial d e p a r t m e n t T h e  Director General, whose 
term lasted for five years, chose his staff, subject to Treasury oversee of the budget as Oftel 
was funded by monies voted by Parliament. The Secretary of State did not have power to 
give Oftel general directions, save in exceptional circumstances.’^^
the sale, see K. Newmann, The Selling of British Telecom (London: Holt Rinehart and 
Winston, 1985).
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The special rights redeemable preference share of £1 par value in the company (“the Special 
Share”) did not carry any rights to vote at general meetings, but did entitle the shareholder to 
receive notice of, attend and speak at such meetings. Certain matters, in particular the 
alteration of specified articles of the company, including the articles relating to limitations 
which prevent a person from owing or having an interest in 15% of more of the company’s 
voting share and to the requirement that the executive chairman is a British citizen, required 
written consent of the holder of the Special Share. The issue of any shares with voting rights 
not identical to those of the shares also required the consent of the holder of the Special 
Share. As the holder of the Special Share, HM Government was also entitled to appoint or 
nominate two persons to be directors. The Government appointed Directors had no special 
powers and their duties, like those of all directors, were to the company as a whole.
The legal form was borrowed from the Office of Fair Trading. See C. Hall, C. Scott and C. 
Hood, Telecommunications Regulation -  Culture, Chaos and interdependence inside the 
regulatory process (London: Routledge, 2000), 20-2.
See para. 47, subsection 3.
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The 1984 Telecommunications Act laid down the general duties of the Secretary of 
State and the Director General and specified the objectives they had to s e c u r e . O A e T s  
most important power derived from licence modification. Given that licences needed to be 
updated in light of changing market conditions, this became the chief avenue through which 
the Director General could wield very significant p o w e r s . T h e  case of BT’s licence, by far 
the most important licence, is illustrative.
The 1984 Telecommunications Act did not contain any detailed condition on BT’s 
licence, but it provided that such conditions could be determined separately by the Secretary 
of State or the Director. Before privatization, teams from the Department of Industry and BT
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See para, 3, subsection 1, which stated: '‘'’The Secretary o f State and the Director shall each 
have a duty to exercise the functions assigned or transferred to him by or under Part II or 
Part III o f this Act in the manner which he considers is best calculated
to secure that there are provided throughout the United Kingdom, save in so far as the 
provision thereof is impracticable or not reasonably practicable, such telecommunication 
services as satisfy all reasonable demands for them including, in particular, emergency 
services, public call services, directory information services, maritime services and services 
in rural areas; and
without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (a) above, to secure that any person by 
whom any such services fall to be provided is able to finance the provision o f those services”.
According to paragraph 12, the Director General had the power to modify licenses. The 
modification, though, had to obtain the licensee’s consent. In addition, the Director General 
had to inform the Secretary of State who could direct him not proceed with the modification. 
In case the licensee did not consent, the Director General could make a reference to the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission as to whether a matter relating to the provision of 
telecommunications services under a licence operated or could be expected to operate against 
the public interest and, if so, whether such adverse effect on the public interest could be 
remedied by a modification to the licence (See para. 13). A copy of the reference was also 
sent to the Secretary of State who could direct the MMC not to proceed with the Director 
General's reference. When the MMC report supported the conclusion that any of the matters 
specified in the reference operated against the public interest, the Director General was 
empowered under para. 15 to make the modification that appeared to him to remedy the 
adverse effect documented in the report. The Secretary of State could direct the Director 
General not to make any modification to the license for reasons of '‘'‘national security or 
relations with the government of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom” (See 
para. 15(6)). The 1984 Telecommunications Act also contained procedural requirements that 
the Director General needed to follow in pursuing licence modification. These mainly dealt 
with the obligation to state his reasons in a notice and inviting representations with respect to 
the proposed modification (See para. 12, subsection 2 in the case of modification by 
agreement; para. 13, subsection 4 and para. 14, subsection 5 (b) in case of a reference to the 
MMC; final modification orders too needed to be preceded by adequate publicity as provided 
by para. 17).
97
negotiated BT's licence, which was to cover all major aspects of its activity. In particular, 
Condition 1 entrusted BT with universal service mission, condition 13 laid provisions to the 
effect that BT shall enter into interconnection agreements with other licensed operators. This 
condition specified that, if after a reasonable time, BT failed to reach such agreement, the 
Director General had the power to make a determination as to the permitted terms and 
conditions of interconnection. Some of the conditions dealt with certain type of 
anticompetitive behaviour. Condition 17 prevented BT from discriminating against a 
competitor. Condition 35 similarly barred BT from pursuing certain exclusive deals. 
Furthermore, BT was not to enter into any agreement with a foreign telecommunications 
operator, which could unfairly preclude the provision of international services by another 
telecommunications operator.
Finally, Condition 49 provided for a pre-merger notification system, whereby BT was 
under an obligation to inform the Director General 30 days before the taking effect of any 
joint venture whose purpose was to run a telecom network, to provide telecommunications 
services within the UK, the production of telecommunications equipment or any activity that 
required a licence. Condition 24 incorporated the RPI-X formula proposed by Professor’s 
Littlechild Report.
The above shows that, through licences, Oftel had come to occupy a central role in 
exercise of regulatory powers. This was not contested by elected officials, mainly because 
the two held different powers. Notably, “[T]/ze Secretary o f  State’s powers over the D G ’s
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The principle upon which charges were to be set by the Director General in case of a 
determination was that of fully allocated historic cost, applicable rate of return on capital and 
access deficit contribution. As to the equipment business, Condition 21 provided that if BT 
became involved in such business, then it was obliged to transfer it to a separate subsidiary, 
which was in turn prohibited from entering the telecommunications services business.
See Condition 47.
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day-to-day activities were limited ' I n  other words, there was a division of tasks between 
the Secretary of State and the Director General, which ensured that, while exercising powers 
in the same sectors, the two did not encroach on each other’s spheres. Oftel’s power did not 
imply any form of hegemony over regulatory powers in the sector. Oftel and the Secretary of 
State happily co-existed, based on clear rules, which designed their ‘territories’ and provided 
for suitable coordination mechanisms. This is an important element to bear in mind when 
dealing with Italy’s trajectory.
IV. BRITAIN’S INSTITUTIONAL TRAJECTORY AFTER 1984: A PERIOD OF
CONTINUITY
In the years following 1984, changes happened that did not alter the direction of 
Britain’s institutional trajectory. The Labour Party, which governed the country after the 
1997, left intact the institutional trajectory. The table below provides an overview of 
developments in the key institutional arrangements between 1985 and 2007.
127 See Thatcher, The Politics o f Telecommunications, 151. With respect to the powers granted 
to him under the 1984 Act, it is important to note that, as Thatcher states, "fAe Secretary o f  
State had strategic powers over the telecommunications sector. He controlled the issue o f  
licenses. Under §7 [of the 1984 Telecommunications Act] he could either issue licenses for  
running a telecommunications system himself after 'consultation ’ with the DG, or by giving 
consent to licenses issued by the DG ... The Secretary of State could block license changes 
agreed between the DG and licensee ... He also appointed the DC" (Ibidem).
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Table 6 Changes in British telecommunications institutions 1985-2007
rganuÊatioD of the
Competition
Regulatory
body
1985 1993 2007,
BT/Mercury Multiple suppliers o f  
fixed line telephony
Multiple suppliers o f  fixed line, 
mobile telephony and internet/ 
multiple platforms
Private/listed/51% publicly 
traded
Private/listed/full 
floatation/golden share
Private/listed/full flotation/ No  
golden share
Competition/Duopoly/licences Competition/ End o f  
duopoly/licences
Full competition
OFTEL OFTEL OFCOM
In 1992, the duopoly regime e n d e d . I n  1991 and 1993, two sales o f share disposed 
of all public shareholding in In 1996, competition was extended to the whole sector
and in July 1997, the then newly elected Labour Government relinquished the Special Share 
that was held by the government after two sales of share in 1991 and 1993 had disposed o f all 
public shareholding in the company, thus completing the process started under the previous 
Conservative governments. Given its traditional stance on public ownership, this
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See Thatcher, The Politics o f  Telecomimmications, 207-212.
In 1991, the G overnm ent m ade available 1,598 m illion ordinary  BT shares (25.6 per cent o f  
ordinary issued shares) for purchase in a second flotation (B T2) on 21 N ovem ber, am ounting 
to around h a lf o f  its holding o f  47.6 per cent o f  shares in the com pany, w hich rem ained from 
the original 1984 flotation. The sale raised over £5 billion for the G overnm ent, reducing its 
stake to 1,343 m illion shares (21.8 per cent o f  ordinary issued shares). In 1993, v irtually  all 
the rem aining shares in BT left to the G overnm ent from the first and second share offers were 
sold in BT3, a third flotation o f  G overnm ent owned shares in July  1993, raising £5 billion for 
the Treasury and introducing 750,000 new shareholders to the com pany.
100
development showed clearly the Labour Government’s intention not to alter the institutional 
arrangements/^^
In December 2000, the Government published the Communications White Paper - A 
New Future fo r  Communications}^^ The White Paper announced the Government's 
proposals for the reform of the regulatory framework for the communications sector. The 
proposals centered on the creation of a unified regulator for the communications sector, 
instead of having five bodies or office holders regulating the communications sector, i.e., the 
Broadcasting Standards Commission, the Director General of Telecommunications, the 
Independent Television Commission, the Radio Authority, and the Secretary of State, who 
has a regulatory role through the Radiocommunications Agency. The Government's 
objective was to replace all of these regulators with one unified regulator, the Office of 
Communications (Ofcom).
In November 2002, the Government presented the Communications Bill, whereby it 
proposed the replacement of Oftel and the other regulatory bodies by Ofcom. In order to help 
a smooth transition, the 2002 Office of Communications Act was passed to make it possible 
for the Secretary of State to create Ofcom before the main Communications Bill achieved 
Royal Assent. Thus, the transition effectively took place in two stages. The first stage was 
the creation of Ofcom through the 2002 Office of Communications Act. The second stage 
was the entrusting to Ofcom of his functions through the 2003 Communications Act.
130
131
For the sake of completeness, one should note the adoption of the 1992 Competition and 
Services (Utilities) Act of 1992 which gave Oftel the power to issue '‘‘'regulations prescribing, 
for any designated operator, such standards o f performance in connection the provision of 
relevant services by that operator as, in his opinion, ought to be achieved in individual cases'  ^
(see para. 1, which inserted a para. 27 A in the 1984 Telecommunications Act). In 
furtherance of these powers, the Secretary of State has the power to designate operators for 
the purposes of complying with performance standards and other obligations set forth in 
Sections 21A  to 27K of the Telecommunications Act (as amended). The 1992 Act left Oftel’s 
institutional position unaffected and for this reason it is not discussed in the text.
Cm 5010, published on December 12, 2000.
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The 2002 Office of Communications Act had two main purposes. The first one was 
to design Ofcom’s structure from the point of view of its governance. The second was to put 
in place transitory arrangements between the pre-existing regulators and Ofcom. Ofcom’s 
regulatory design represented a significant change, compared to Oftel. As noted, Oftel was 
headed by a single person, the Director General. The Director General, ultimately, was the 
person responsible for Oftel’s decision. This had led to some commentators criticizing 
Oftel’s model for the scope it left to personalism in the handling of regulatory matters. 
Ofcom’s design, by contrast, was based on a board and committee structure.
More specifically, the body, which is responsible for the regulatory decision-making, 
is the Board. The Board comprises a non-executive Chairman and both executive and non­
executive members. Besides the Chairman, there are up to nine members of the Board. Four 
members, including the Chief executive (CEO), have executive responsibility.'^^ The Board 
is appointed by the Secretary of State. It is intended that the Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry will make the appointment jointly with the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and 
Sport. The CEO is appointed by the Chairman and the non-executive members, with the 
approval of the Secretary of State.
The Executive comprises Ofcom’s CEO, the three executive board members and other 
senior staff. More specifically, the Executive is organized in committees: the executive 
committee, the policy committee, the operations board and the senior management group. 
The Board is assisted by a number of committees and advisory bodies, which either have 
been given delegated powers or offer advice to the main Ofcom Board. These committees 
and advisory bodies include the Consumer Panel, the Content Board, the Nations and
See C. Hall, C. Scott and C. Hood, Telecommunications Regulation, esp. Part III, “The 
absolutist myth in regulation”.
' See http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about/csg/ofcom board/ for more information in Ofcom board.
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Regions Advisory Committees and the Older Persons and Disabled Persons Advisory 
Committee.
As to the transitory arrangements, the 2002 Act essentially provides that the existing 
regulators should act in such a way as to ensure that Ofcom is able to take up his duties, as 
specified in the 2003 Communications Act.
The 2003 Communications Act received Royal Assent on July 17, 2003 a few days 
before the second generation of EU directives were due to be implemented.*^"^ In fact, 
several provisions in the six parts in which the Act is divided concern implementation of the 
EU directives. Under the new EU legislation individual licences, such as the one granted to 
BT in 1984, no longer exist. Instead, there is a general authorization regime for the provision 
of electronic communications networks and services. The general authorizations provide for 
a set of basic requirements that all providers of communications services must meet. Then 
there are obligations that are specific for SMP (Significant Market Power) operators. BT is 
designated as having SMP in a number of markets as well as having to comply with a 
universal service obligations.*^^
Below follows a summary of the provisions that relate to the organization of Ofcom 
and the telecommunications sector.
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See OJ 2002 L 108.
See BT 2005 Annual report
(http://www.btplc.com/report/report05/Qperatingandfinancialreview/reguIation.htm).
BT has been designated as the supplier of Universal Service for the UK excluding the Hull 
area, where Kingston Communications is the designated provider. The services covered by 
the Universal Service Obligation (USO) are defined in an Order issued by the Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry. BT’s basic obligation is to provide a single narrowband 
connection to the fixed telephone network. Additional USO conditions relate to issues such as 
schemes for consumers with special social needs and the provision of payphone services.
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Under paragraph 2 of the Act, Ofcom will take over the functions that were 
previously carried out by the Secretary of State and the regulators. Paragraph 3 
sets out the duties of Ofcom. The list is extensive. It distinguishes between 
“principal duties” and specific ones. The former comprise (i) to further the 
interests of citizens in relation to communications matters; and (ii) to further 
the interests of consumers in relevant markets, where appropriate by 
promoting competition. The latter include the (i) the optimal use of the radio 
spectrum; (ii) the availability throughout the United Kingdom of a wide range 
of electronic communications services; (iii) the availability in the UK of a 
wide range of TV and radio services, comprising high quality services of 
broad appeal; (iv) the maintenance of a sufficient plurality of providers of 
different television and radio services; (v) the application, in television and 
radio services, of standards that provide adequate protection to members of the 
public from any offensive and harmful material; and (vi) the application, in 
television and radio services, of standards that safeguard people from being 
unfairly treated and from unwarranted infringements of privacy.
Subsection 3 sets out principles of Ofcom regulatory activity, stating that 
Ofcom shall have regard to transparency, accountability, proportionality, 
appropriateness and consistency. Subsection 4 sets out a list of factors to 
which OFCOM must have regard, wherever relevant, in the performance of 
their general duties.
These are ‘‘'(a) the desirability o f promoting the fulfilment of the purposes o f public service 
television broadcasting in the United Kingdom; (b) the desirability o f promoting competition 
in relevant markets; (c) the desirability o f promoting andfacilitating the development and use 
o f effective forms o f self-regulation; (d) the desirability o f encouraging investment and 
innovation in relevant markets; (e) the desirability o f encouraging the availability and use of
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• There follows in paragraphs 4-9 other general duties. Of note, the duty to act 
in accordance with certain EC principles of telecommunications regulation^ 
and the duty to ensure the least possible level of regulation through periodic 
review of the regulatory burden and impact assessment.
• It is also important to underline the functions of Ofcom with respect to 
competition law. Ofcom is entitled to carry out market reviews as set out in 
the EU directives and to designate, if  applicable, SMP operators.*"** 
Moreover, Ofcom will exercise the competition law powers exercised by
high speed data transfer services throughout the United Kingdom; (f) the different needs and 
interests, so far as the use o f the electro-magnetic spectrum for wireless telegraphy is 
concerned, o f all persons who may wish to make use o f it; (g) the need to secure that the 
application in the case of television and radio services o f standards falling within subsection 
(2)(e) and (f) is in the manner that best guarantees an appropriate level o f freedom of 
expression; (h) the vulnerability of children and o f others whose circumstances appear to 
OFCOM to put them in need o f special protection; (i) the needs ofpersons with disabilities, of  
the elderly and o f those on low incomes; (j) the desirability o f preventing crime and disorder; 
(k) the opinions o f consumers in relevant markets and o f members o f the public generally; (I) 
the different interests o f persons in the different parts o f the United Kingdom, of the different 
ethnic communities within the United Kingdom and o f persons living in rural and in urban 
areas; (m) the extent to which, in the circumstances o f the case, the furthering or securing of  
the matters mentioned in subsections (1) and (2) is reasonably practicable''.
See para. 4, according to which Ofcom must comply with the following Community 
requirements: (i) to promote competition; (ii) to ensure that Ofcom’s activities contribute to 
the development of the European internal market; (iii) to promote the interests of all persons 
who are citizens of the European Union; (iv) to take account of the desirability of carrying our 
their functions in a manner which, so far as practicable, does not favour one form of network, 
service or associated facility, or one means of providing or making available such a network, 
service or facility over another; (v) to encourage the provision of network access and service 
interoperability; (vi) to encourage compliance with international standards to the extent 
necessary to facilitate service interoperability; and (vii) to secure a freedom of choice for 
customers.
See para. 6. Under this section, Ofcom has a duty to ensure that regulation does not lead to the 
imposition or maintenance of burdens that are or have become unnecessary. To this end, 
Ofcom must from time to time publish a statement setting out how it proposes to comply with 
this duty and must have regard to that statement when carrying out its functions.
See para. 7. This section requires Ofcom to carry out and publish an assessment of the likely 
impact of the proposed new regulations on regulates.
See paras. 78-104. For an update on market reviews by Ofcom, see 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/telecoms/ioi/mrs/.
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Oftel. This means that Ofcom will have concurrent powers with OFT to 
enforce the competition law provisions in the field of communications 
services. As was already provided by the concurrency arrangements between 
OFT and Oftel, in general only one body will be acting to apply competition 
law and, in so far as communication services are concerned, this would be 
Ofcom. With respect to market investigations, para. 370 gives Ofcom the 
power to make a reference to the Competition Commission for the purposes of 
launching such a market investigation. This section equally empowers Ofcom 
to accept undertakings in lieu of a market reference.
By making use of its powers under the competition law rules, in 2005 Ofcom 
addressed one of the longest standing issues of UK telecommunications regulation: the 
separation between network activities and other businesses to ensure a non discriminatory 
treatment to competitors.^"^ In September 2005, BT offered undertaking in lieu of a market
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See paras. 369-372.
See Letter from the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) setting out OFT/Ofcom Concurrency 
Arrangements (http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about/accoun/oft/).
In April 2004, it published a document called Strategic Review of Telecommunications (the 
“Telecoms Review”). The Telecom Review was designed to set out a strategic direction for 
Ofcom’s activities in relation to telecoms, and to create a new settlement between the new 
regulator, the regulatees and consumers. One of the issues addressed in the Telecoms Review 
was the structural or operational separation of BT. The consultation process ended in 
November 2004. With respect to the issue of structural or operational separation of BT, 
Ofcom found that, despite twenty years of regulation, the fixed line segment remained 
dominated by BT, with competition being both fragile and limited. To address this issue, it 
put forward three options: Option 1: Full deregulation. Removing the existing mesh of 
regulation entirely and relying instead on ex post competition law to resolve complaints 
would significantly reduce intervention in fixed-line markets. However, given BT's continued 
market power, Ofcom believed that this would be unlikely to encourage the growth of greater 
competition and as such would not serve the best interests of the consumer. Option 2: 
Enterprise Act investigation. Ofcom could investigate the market under the Enterprise Act 
2002, with the potential for a subsequent referral to the Competition Commission. Option 3: 
BT to deliver real equality of access. Ofcom could require BT to allow its competitors to gain 
genuinely equal access to its networks. This option would also require BT to commit to 
behavioural and organizational changes to ensure that its competitors benefited from access to 
products and processes, which were truly equivalent to those, offered to BT’s own retail 
businesses.
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investigation under the Enterprise Act. These undertakings represent a functional equivalent
to a structural break up. 145
With respect to the role of supranational r egu l a t ion / the  changes that were required 
involved a change in some specific rules, but the overall direction of the British path 
remained unchanged. For instance, the notion of significant market power which plays a 
central role in EU regulation, implied a change in the forma rules. However, UK 
regulation was already based on the concept of a-symmetrical regulation. As a consequence, 
as Thatcher argued, '"'‘EU regulation played almost no visible part in developments in Britain
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See Final statements on the Strategic Review of Telecommunications, and BT undertakings, 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/telecoms review/final statement.htm. The key undertakings 
given by BT are to: - establish a new access services division to operate BT’s local access and 
backhaul networks, and to provide services over those networks to the UK communications 
industry on the basis of equivalence -  we established Openreach for this purpose on 21 
January 2006; - deliver equivalence of input for key wholesale products, and increased 
transparency for others; - introduce new rules on access to, and sharing of, certain restricted 
information -  in particular the commercial information of Openreach and BT Wholesale; - 
restrict the exercise of influence by other parts of BT on the commercial policy of both 
Openreach and parts of BT Wholesale; - ensure fair access and migration to BT’s next- 
generation network -  21CN -  for other communications providers; - publish and make 
available to all BT people a code of practice explaining what they must do to comply with the 
Undertakings; - create an Equality of Access Board (EAB) to monitor, report and advise on 
BT’s compliance with the Undertakings and the code of practice. The undertakings were 
accepted by Ofcom on September 22, 2005.
For studies on the role of supranational regulation in telecommunications reform, see M. 
Thatcher, ‘Regulatory Reform and Internationalization in Telecommunications’, in J.E.S. 
Hayward (ed.). Industrial Enterprise and European Integration (Oxford: OUP, 1995); id., 
‘The Development of European Regulatory Frameworks: The Expansion of European 
Community Policy Making in Telecommunications’, in E. Stavridis, E. Mosialos, R. Morgan 
and H. Machin (eds.), New Challenges for the European Union (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 
1997); W. Sandholtz, ‘The Emergence of a Supranational Telecommunications Regime’, in 
W. Sandholtz and A. Stone Sweet (eds.), European Integration and Supranational 
Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 134-64; G. Natalicchi, ‘II tramonto dei 
monopoli di stato: telecomunicazioni e processi di integrazione nell’Unione Europea’, Rivista 
Italiana di Scienza Politica, (2) (1999), 283-318. See also, E. Noam, Telecommunications in 
Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); K. H. F. Dyson, The Political economy 
of communications: international and European dimensions (London: Routledge, 1990); K. 
A. Eliassen and M. Sjovaag (eds.), European telecommunications liberalisation (London, 
New York: Routledge, 1999); G. Natalicchi, Wiring Europe: reshaping the European 
telecommunications regime (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001).
See Article 4 of the Telecommunications (Interconnection) Regulation 1997 implementing 
the Interconnection Directive.
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during the 1990s or after 2000. Britain had little adjustment to make to incorporate EU  
legislation: it had liberalized and privatized before EU action took place and its new reforms 
were compatible with the E U ’s regulatory frameworl^\^^^
V. CONCLUSION
Given that no other European Member State had undertaken similar changes at the 
time and that EU initiatives to adopt liberalization only started in 1987 and, even then, only 
proposed gradual opening, by 1984 Britain was at the forefront of institutional reform in 
telecommunications. Since 1984, the British institutional trajectory has remained stable, with 
the replacement of Oftel by Ofcom being an attempt to build upon an existing institution to 
modernize it.
Following Deeg, one could argue that the overall logic of the British path was based 
on separation between elected politicians and suppliers and delegation of regulatory powers 
to a powerful IRA. The British logic had several dimensions. First of all, pricing decisions 
and other commercial choices became a matter exclusively left to suppliers acting under the 
supervision of the IRA. The latter issued rules and had the power to request changes from the 
regulated firm under certain conditions. Elected politicians had few formal powers to affect 
pricing decisions by the suppliers and/or the rules issued by IRA after the issue of the initial 
licenses. Regulatees, in turn, engaged in a complex regulatory game with the IRA,*"^  ^ as 
shown by the case of BT interconnection charges mentioned above.
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See M. Thatcher, ‘Reforming National Regulatory Institutions: the EU and Cross-National 
Variety in European Network Industries”, in B. Hancké, M. Rhodes and M. Thatcher (eds.). 
Beyond Varieties o f  Capitalism -  Conflict, contradictions, and complementarities in the 
European economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 147-172, at 158.
See Coen, ‘Business-Regulatory Relations: Learning to Play Regulatory Games’.
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Secondly, elected politicians also lost power to affect market structure. In this 
respect, it is worth noting that the creation of a separate division to manage BT’s network, 
which is regarded as a watershed in telecommunications regulation, was the result of 
interactions between the IRA and BT, with elected politicians playing no visible role in the 
process.
Thirdly, rules were established under which IRA and elected politicians cooperated, 
whereby the latter took care of policy issues and the former was in charge of regulatory 
functions, i.e. enforcement of rules and monitoring of compliance in the day-to-day 
operations. Thus, delegation also meant a division of spheres between IRA and elected 
politicians in a spirit of cooperation. In this respect, it can be noted that the Secretary of 
State, although formally entitled to do so, never issued directions to Oftel.
The British stable path between 1984 and 2007 and its logic sets the base-line against 
which one can more easily observe Italy’s direction of institutional evolution. Thus, 
throughout the chapters that follow, one will be able to witness continued divergence until 
1997, when an abrupt change in Italy’s institutions will lead the two countries on a 
convergent trajectory. However, assessing convergence will require careful consideration of 
the logic of the Italian path between 1997 and 2007, when the powers of the independent 
regulator would be restricted in favor of the Ministry. This complex scenario will be 
analyzed in the following chapters.
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4. The Italian Path: Increasing Returns and
Teiecommunications Institutions 1979-1992
I. INTRODUCTION
This chapter deals with Italy’s institutional trajectory between 1979 and 1992. It 
performs an essential role within the thesis because it provides empirical evidence on the 
existence of increasing returns and how they operated in the Italian path. The findings of this 
chapter will form the basis upon which the following chapters will build to describe rejection 
of increasing returns and its consequences on institutional reform.
It is useful to summarize the main findings of the chapter at the beginning and their 
link with the research design. Based on the empirical evidence, increasing returns arose from 
the interactions between political parties and telecommunications suppliers. In particular, the 
chapter provides evidence that all the political parties in the ruling coalition during the period 
studied used telecommunications suppliers to foster their goals in terms of consolidating and 
expanding their power base. This is consistent with rational behaviour by elected officials, 
who try to maximize their goals in terms of power and secure re-election.
However, expenses carried out in the name of patronage politics were inefficient and 
dilapidated resources. In this respect, the behaviour of politicians damaged the business of 
telecommunications providers, that were profit-maximizing entities. This applies both to the 
licensees, which were publicly listed companies, and to ASST, which was also bound by 
rules of sound and economic management. When faced with a difficult economic situation 
and losses, the providers were forced to return to political parties to obtain new resources, 
either in the form of direct grants or higher tariffs. Political parties met the providers request 
with new obligations to act in their favour. As a consequence, there was a self-reinforcing
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effect arising out of the repeated interactions between telecommunications providers and 
elected politicians, which embodies a case of increasing returns.
The effect of such increasing returns on the institutional trajectory were consistent 
with path dependence. The efforts for reform centered on the split-supplier system, which is 
therefore analyzed in depth; the other institutional features, i.e. ownership, competition and 
regulatory powers were not affected by legislative initiatives of reform.
There can be distinguished two phases. Between 1979 and 1987, there was no 
legislative initiative to reform the organization of the sector and end the split-supplier system 
in spite of the fact that the latter was blamed as the source of Italy’s backwardness in 
telecommunications. In fact, SIP licence of 1984 even contained provisions that reinforced 
the split-supplier system by giving to ASST powers over new services, i.e. data transmission. 
In the second phase, between 1987 and 1992, when the 1987 EU Green Paper put pressure to 
end the role of ASST as regulator and provider and a bill was eventually tabled in 1992 to 
that effect, the reform that was envisaged provided for a continuation of the split-supplier 
system, albeit in a revised fashion.
The trajectory of institutional development followed by Italian telecommunications 
institutions between 1979 and 1992 is consistent with path dependence, as it shows how 
increasing returns drove Italy along a path of bounded change, firmly anchored to the split- 
supplier system in spite of pressures to switch to a single-supplier system. With respect to its 
logic, the chapter shows that the Italian path was based on elected politicians’ control over 
suppliers.
The chapter’s task within the thesis is essential for several reasons. First of all, it
provides empirical evidence as to the existence of increasing returns in Italian
telecommunications. Secondly, the chapter upholds the claim of path dependence on
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institutional development. Increasing returns blocked institutional reform and kept Italy on a 
very different path to Britain despite many pressures for change in Italy. Thirdly, the 
increasing returns described in this chapter will form the point of reference for the rest of 
Italy’s trajectory, which will be influenced by reactions and counter reactions to the 
increasing returns described herein.
It is also worth stressing that the thesis adopts an inductive approach and, 
consequently, the task of the chapter is to make sense ex post of the empirical evidence. 
Thus, there is no attempt to pre-defme the type of increasing returns. In addition, the findings 
of the chapter about increasing returns arising out of interactions between elected officials 
and telecommunications providers are a novel contribution insofar as they provide an 
anatomy of increasing returns and point to the importance of defining to whom increasing 
returns accrue. As a consequence, it would have been impossible to make an ex ante 
hypothesis about actors’ logics and mechanisms, because it was not possible to tell from the 
beginning what structure increasing returns would have had and whether actors would turn 
out to be present at all, let alone to have a key role.
Also, as it can be seen from the above, the inductive methodology does not prevent 
the findings from remaining fully valid. Indeed, the findings about actors’ logics and 
mechanisms are consistent with rational behaviour of elected politicians and managers, acting 
as maximizers. Thus, assuming rational behaviour from the beginning (instead of an ex post 
finding) would have had no impact on the findings, which would have turned out simply to 
confirm the hypothesis. In sum, logics and mechanism of actors are an ex post finding for 
methodological reasons, which in no way detract from the validity of the results reached, 
since the findings in this respect are in line with common assumptions about rational 
behaviour.
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The chapter is organized as follows: firstly, it focuses on the existing institutional 
structure as of 1979 and on its main characteristic, i.e. the split-supplier system whereby 
telecommunications services were provided by several companies. Secondly, it shows how 
increasing returns operated. Thirdly, it provides an account of how increasing returns were 
responsible for a bounded trajectory of institutional change, culminating in the law of 1992, 
which, in providing for a re-organization of the sector, left intact the possibility of continuing 
the split-supplier system.
II. THE STARTING POINT: THE SPLIT-SUPPLIER SYSTEM
It is useful to recall that the essential institutional feature of Italian 
telecommunications at the beginning of the period studied was the split-supplier system, 
based on the fragmentation of the provision of telecommunications services across multiple 
companies. The efforts for reform during the period studied centred on this feature, whereas 
ownership, competition and regulatory powers were not affected by legislative initiative of 
reform.
The focus on the reform of the split-supplier system can be explained by several 
factors. First, the split-supplier system was an anomaly in the European landscape ,where  
provision of telecommunications services was firmly in the hands of one entity, be it solely 
entrusted with telecommunications or, more often, uniting post and telecommunications 
services. In any event, in other countries the multiplication of providers had been consigned 
to the archaeology of telecommunications. Second, the split-supplier system was blamed as 
the source of Italy’s backwardness. This requires understanding that the split-supplier system 
was in itself based on more than one split.
E. Noam, Telecommunications in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
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On the one hand, there was a split between public and private suppliers. The public 
supplier was ASST, a branch of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. The private 
suppliers encompassed three listed companies, incorporated as limited liability companies, 
operating under a licence. SIP was the most important provider of telecommunications 
services in Italy. However, it should not be forgotten that SIP was under the control of 
STET, a holding company for the financial participations of IRI in the telecommunications 
sector and that IRI, the state-controlled super-holding entity, with diversified interests in 
several economic sectors, of which telecommunications was one of the most important, was 
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry for State Holdings. Thus, the so-called IRI-formula 
entailed a mix of private ownership and state control.’^ ’
On the other hand, the second split concerned the scope of services being entrusted to 
each of the suppliers. Among the three licensees, SIP held the most important licence, being 
entrusted with the provision of local and long-distance services within Italy. The other 
licensees’ remit encompassed a narrower portion of telecommunications services, i.e. 
intercontinental (Italcable) and satellite telephony (Telespazio). ASST’s scope of services 
historically comprised the provision of certain long-distance telephony services. With time, 
though, ASST’s services largely overlapped with SIP’s. In fact, it was the latter that often 
provided services on ASST’s behalf because ASST leased circuits and asked SIP to handle 
technical issues from end to end.
The uncertain boundary between SIP and ASST had already created confusion before 
1979, when telecommunications services enjoyed a relatively limited development. With 
time and as the number of users and services grew, the confusion was only bound to increase. 
It is not surprising, then, to see that the role of ASST and the validity of the continued split
See G. Amato (ed.), II governo dell’industria in Italia (Bologna: II Mulino, 1972) and F. 
Barca (ed.), Storia del capitalismo italiano dal dopoguerra ad oggi (Roma: Donzelli, 1997).
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between the latter and the licensees came more and more under attack during the period 
studied. Yet, in spite of these pressures, reform only took place in 1992 and, even then, in a 
limited form. In fact, because of increasing returns, reform meant little else than an update of 
the status quo or the continuation of the split supplier system, albeit in a revamped way. 
These increasing returns and their effects on the institutional trajectory are now analyzed.
III. INCREASING RETURNS IN ITALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
The starting point of the period studied is the 1979 SIP financial crisis due to its 
impact on the relationships between SIP and political parties. SIP’s crisis threatened the 
company’s ability to provide basic services, invest in infrastructure and offer new services. 
SIP provided local telephony services and was responsible for universal service obligations. 
However, SIP was forced to cut back on investments and to stop them in 1980, while demand 
was s o a r i n g . T h e  waiting list for a phone became longer and longer (see table below) and 
connection times rose dramatically.
Table 7 - Number of applications for a phone connection 1978 -  1981 and their status (Source: Rapporto
Morganti, p. 83)
1978 1979 1980 1981
Number of applications (000) 1.255 1.431 1.235 1.162
Sorted applications (000) 678 716 845 844
Waiting to be connected (000) 463 794 828 751
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IRI annual reports 1979-1984.
See E. Pontarollo and A. Costa, ‘Regolamentazione e concorrenza nei servizi di pubblica 
utilità: il caso delle telecomunicazioni’, L ’Industria, 2 (1992), 337-360, at 335.
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When the SIP crisis took place in 1979, Italy was governed by coalition governments. 
In the period between 1976-1979 the emergency threat of terrorism had led the Christian 
Democrat Party (Democrazia Cristiana or “DC”) and the other parties to govern in a unified 
fashion. At the beginning of the 1980s, when Italy saw this threat off, the Communist Party 
was consistently in opposition and the Christian Democrat Party had to form alliances with 
smaller parties to obtain the majority needed to form governments. The ruling coalitions 
were based on the agreement of five parties, including
1. the Christian Democrat Party,
2. the Socialist Party {Partito Socialista Italiano or “PSI”),
3. the Liberal Party,
4. the Republican Party and
5. the Social-Democratic Party.
The Christian Democrat Party was the leading party in the coalition. The Socialist 
Party was the second most important party, with the other three parties being considered as 
junior members in the coalition. The Communist Party {Partita Comunista Italiano or 
“PCI”) was the largest party in opposition and in absolute terms it was the second party in 
Italy after the DC.
Coalition governments were very unstable due to the heterogeneous nature of the 
allies. Between the 1979 general elections and the 1992 general elections there were twelve
General elections were called in 1979, 1983, 1987 and 1992. For the results of these elections, 
see http://www.batsweb.org/cultura/Geopolitica/Italia/elezioni 1946.htm.
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governments.'^^ In this climate of instability, political parties tried to secure their electoral 
base through patronage politics. The large apparatus of state-controlled companies provided 
an ideal instrument. Political parties would try first to appoint managers that were ToyaT to 
the party and then use these appointments to foster their electoral base.'^^ That explains why 
a practice grew whereby appointments were decided between political parties in a way that 
reflected their electoral weight. This practice was called ‘lottizzazione’ and the years in 
which it became more visible are those that coincide with the ascendancy of the Socialist 
Party between 1983 and 1992, with the PSI leader, Bettino Craxi, holding the premiership 
between 1983 and 1987.'^^ Managers were political appointees and had to obey to the their
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For information on the governments in Italy since 1947, see www.govemo.it. Between 1979 
and 1980, there were two governments held by Francesco Cossiga (August 4, 1979 -  April 4 
and from the latter date until October 18, 1980). Between 1980 and 1981 there was a 
government held by Amaldo Forlani (October 18, 1980 -  June 28, 1981). Between 1981 and 
1982, Giovanni Spadolini was the first prime minister not belonging to the mling Christian 
Democrat party. He held the premiership during two successive governments (October 28, 
1981 -  August 23, 1982 and August 23, 1982 -  December 1, 1982). Afterwards, Bettino 
Craxi, the leader of the Socialist Party, held the premiership between 1983 and 1987, after the 
elections in 1983 had seen his party obtaining a larger percentage of votes (11,4% in the 
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate) than in the earlier 1979 elections. New elections were 
held in 1987, with the Socialist Party further ascending in popularity (14.3% in the Chamber 
of Deputies and 10.4% in the Senate). More precisely, the first Craxi government lasted from 
August 4, 1983 until August 1, 1986 and then the second Craxi government lasted until April 
17, 1987. Afterwards, there were the Fanfani government (from April 17, 1987 to July 28, 
1987); the Goria government (from July 28, 1987 to April 13, 1988); the De Mita 
Government (from April 13, 1988 to July 22, 1989); and two Andreotti governments (from 
July 22, 1989 to April 12, 1991 and from April 12, 1991 to April 24, 1992, respectively).
See L. Cafagna, La grande slavina (Marsilio: Venezia, 1993), ’’‘Per stabilizzare il suo potere, 
poi, la nomenklatura Italiana ha per la piii infaticabilmente teso a selezionare i capi 
dell’economia pubblica («boiardi») in funzione pressoché esclusiva della loro disponibilità 
ad obbedire alle pretese crescenti della parafiscalità partitica” (175).
See G. Carli, Intervista sul capitalismo (Bari: Laterza, 1977), 71; J. La Palombara, 
Democracy, Italian Style (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); P. Ginsborg, A history 
of contemporary Italy: society and politics, 1943-1988 (London: Penguin, 1990); P. Scoppola, 
La repubblica dei partiti (Bologna: II Mulino, 1991); S. Cassese, ‘Le système administrative 
italien ou l’art de l’arrangement’. Revue Française de F Administration Publique, 67 (1993), 
337; V. Bufacchi and S. Burges, Italy since 1989 (London: Palgrave, 2001). For a discussion 
of lottizzazione within the Italian telecommunications sector, see Natalicchi, Wiring Europe, 
158-161; V. Verdier-Bonchut, ‘Regulation of the audiovisual and telecommunications sector 
in Italy: From Community challenge to national issue’. International Review o f 
Administrative Sciences, 69 (2003), 271-283 and Thatcher, Internationalisation and 
Economic Institutions, ch. 7, ‘The Force of Inertia: Telecommunications in France, West 
Germany, and Italy 1965-87’, 154.
117
political masters. One could say that they were ‘seconded’ to state-controlled enterprises 
from political parties (‘comando politico’, where ‘comando’ is the expression used to indicate 
secondment from one administration to another). According to the President of the 
Constitutional Court, Ettore Gallo, “/o sviluppo delle carrière resta afjîdato più alle intese fra  
i partiti che alVeffettivo merito deWaspirante ... la spartizione politica delle funzioni direttive 
é arbitraria, perché la scelta dovrebbe essere determinata invece esclusivamente dalle 
capacità individuali e dalla particolare attitudine che caratterizza la personalità di un 
dirigente ... [gran parte dei mali che affliggono gli enti pubblici] sono determinati anche da 
queste spartizioni che tengono conto soltanto del colore politico del prescelto anziché délia 
sua competenza specifica ... espressione di una totalizzante invasione di ogni settore 
decisionale da parte dei partiti politici, che ha finito per dominare persino lo sviluppo delle 
carrière i n t e r n e ' " Indeed, one could draw a ‘map’, based on which party controlled which 
position over which company.
Thus, for instance in 1991, at IRI, President Franco Nobili was a DC appointee, Vice- 
President Riccardo Gallo belonged to Partito Repubblicano, board members Massimo Pini, 
Bruno Corti, and Michele Tedeschi belonged to respectively, Partito Socialista, Partito Social 
Democratico, and DC; the Partito Liberate was ‘entitled’ to appoint another board member.
158 See II sole 24 ore, 26.6.1991. '"'‘Career opportunities depend more on dealings between 
parties than on the merits o f the applicant ... the political assignment of executive posts is 
arbitrary because the choice should be on the contrary based exclusively on the individual 
capacities and abilities that characterizes the personality o f a senior official ... [the great 
majority of the evils besetting public bodies] are determined by assignments that take into 
account only the political affiliation of the chosen candidate rather than his specific 
competence ... expression o f a total invasion by political parties o f every decisional sector 
that has become the dominant way to proceed even in internal careers".
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but had not done so at that time. Similar arrangements applied to other state-owned
159companies.
In the telecommunications sector there were several examples of ‘lottizzazione’. In 
1987, IRI and Fiat decided to create a joint-venture for the production of terminal equipment 
(Telit). However, the project was sunk by the PSI’s demand to appoint Marisa Bellisario as 
Chief Executive Officer in spite of a prior different agreement between Fiat and IRI. As a 
Fiat representative later exp l a i ned , F i a t  refused to accept the PSI’s demand because of its 
unilateral character and also because it was only dictated by party loyalty, without any 
consideration for technical competence.
The appointments to the state-owned companies under IRI were also an example of 
lottizzazione. By the early 1990s, the politics behind it became so accepted and well- 
documented through time that press sources started to openly report about them, by giving 
exact indications as to who was whose candidate. For instance, in 1990, under the 
government of Ciriaco De Mita (a key figure in the Christian Democrat Party and himself 
Prime Minister between 1988 and 1989) a new post of CEO at STET was expressly created to 
be assigned to a representative of one of the factions of the Christian Democrat Party, while 
the Socialist Party obtained an executive director. The Christian Democrats also held the 
other post of CEO and the presidency.’^ '
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At ENI, the oil company, the President, Gabriele Cagliari, was a PSI appointee, Vice- 
President Alberto Grotti was a DC-sponsored manager, the CEOs post were allotted to Partito 
Social-Democratico (Gaetano Cecchetti) and Partito Libérale (Beppe Facchetti). At EFIM, a 
holding company for the manufacturing sector, the President, Gaetano Mancini, was a PSI 
appointee, while Vice-President Mauro Leone belonged to DC, board members Roberto 
Buzio, Luigi Moscheri, and Roberto Savasta belonged to, respectively, Partito Social- 
Democratico, Partito Repubblicano and Partito Libérale.
11 sole 24 ore, 10.12.1987. See also 7/5o/e 2^ ore, 20.3.1986.
See 11 sole 24 ore 26.6.1990, 27.6.1990, and 28.6.1990. STET had two C.E.O.s., Giuliano 
Graziosi (associated with Giulio Andreotti and Antonio Gava-DC) and Umberto Silvestri
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In 1991, when new appointments had to be made at SIP, the Christian Democrats and 
the Socialists fought hard to gain the upper hand. Until then, the Socialist Party had held the 
presidency and the DC the two posts of CEO. However, the presidency did not carry 
executive powers and therefore the Socialists aimed at one of the CEO posts. The 
situation evolved in what was termed as a real ‘earthquake’ at the time.*^  ^ All the existing 
officers were replaced. Giulio Andreotti (then Prime Minister) saw his power increased. He 
appointed former Italcable CEO Ernesto Pascale as SIP president. The CEO posts went to 
Vito Gamberale, an appointee of the Socialist Party, and to Antonio Zappi (formerly general 
manager of SIP). They replaced Michele Giannotta, SIP former president and socialist 
appointee, and CEOs Paolo Benzoni and Francesco Silvano. This turn was made possible by 
an agreement between Andreotti, with the help of Antonio Gava, and PSI secretary Bettino 
Craxi. As a matter of fact, the PSI increased it influence in SIP due to the fact that a post of 
CEO carried more power than the presidency. At the same time, Giuliano Graziosi left the 
helm of Stet, lacking political sponsorship.^^
Having appointed ‘loyal’ managers, political parties requested licensees to carry out 
different actions in support of their i n t e r e s t s . Th e se  mechanisms operated at all levels, i.e. 
both at the local level and the central level. Each party claimed a share of influence over the 
licensees. Unlike RAl, the public broadcaster, where each channel was controlled
(DC). The president was Biagio Agnes (Ciriaco De Mita-DC). The director general was Miro 
Allione (PSI).
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SeQ 11 sole 24 ore, 8.5.1991.
Sqq II sole 24 ore, 17.5.1991.
See II sole 24 ore, 17.5.1991. See also interview by Graziosi in II sole 24 ore, 3.12.1993.
The information concerning the ways in which political parties directed licensees to act in 
their interests has been provided during personal interviews with STET official and senior 
academic and economic consultant.
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exclusively by a political pa r ty /c on t ro l  over the licensees was shared between the coalition 
parties.
First of all, it was common that licensees would hire personnel en mass on the basis of 
political directions. For instance, every time that a new Minister of Posts and 
Telecommunications was appointed, the licensees would hire people in the region from 
which the Minister was ffom.^^^ Secondly, licensees would be directed to purchase goods or 
services from people who were close to politicians. For instance, one of the Annexes to SIP 
licenses included locations at which SIP undertook to have offices. The office premises were 
leased from landlords chosen by political appointment. Thirdly, licensees would use public 
tenders to reward ‘friends’. This partly explains why Italian authorities fought hard against 
European legislation, which sought to harmonize tender procedures in the public services, i.e. 
Directive 93/38. This legislation would have made more difficult to control the outcome of 
tenders and thus would have reduced the scope for using tenders to reward ‘friends’.
Besides appointment of managers, political parties influenced licensees’ behaviour 
through tariff setting. Tariffs were in the hands of political parties, as tariff approvals 
required the agreement of the Ministers of Posts and Telecommunications and the Treasury. 
In 1979, when industrial costs rose by account of inflation by 40% and tariff revenues 
increased only by 23%, SIP had painfully learnt that delays in tariff adjustments at times of 
burgeoning inflation could inflict severe damages to the survival of the company. After then, 
the tariffs were used as a tool for social and economic policy, in order to stave off inflationary 
pressures and make basic services affordable to the majority of the population. As a 
consequence, tariff increases were systematically delayed. For instance, the tariff increase
Rai Uno was traditionally allotted to the DC, Rai Due to PSI and Rai Tre to the Communist 
Party.
Personal interview senior economic consultant.
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announced in 1977 took effect only in 1980. In 1986, SIP requested a tariff increase to obtain 
an extra 720 billion lira, while it obtained merely 367.^^  ^ After the increase approved in 
1986, tariffs remained unchanged in spite of SIP formal requests for a 3.5% increase, when 
inflation rose in the same period by 5.5%.^^  ^ Still in 1990, the tariffs remained at the 1986 
level.
This shows the key link between SIP (and the other licensees) and political parties, 
whose support was needed to obtain adequate revenues. Given that licences provided for 
high investment targets to expand the network, the level of dependence was even magnified 
as tariffs had to cover not only current expenses, but also extraordinary ones. In order to free 
itself from this dependence, SIP repeatedly asked for the introduction of a system of 
automatic tariff adjustment. This system would have curtailed the discretionary powers of 
political parties and so eased the grip they exerted on licensees.
In 1985, SIP’s CEO argued that tariffs should be updated automatically, i.e. without 
the need for an express ministerial decree. Similarly, in 1991 Romano Prodi and Luigi 
Prosperetti (both acting in their capacity as members of an independent research centre, 
NOMISMA, headed by Romano Prodi) proposed the creation of an agency with tariff setting 
powers with the aim to free tariff setting from the hands of political parties and thus to curb
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See II sole 24 ore, 15.2.1986 (interview with SIP CEO, Paolo Benzoni).
See II sole 24 ore, 25,11.1989 and 24.2.1990.
See II sole 24 ore, 10.5.1990 and 12,5.1990.
See, e.g., II sole 24 ore, 13.11.1984 and 22.2.1991.
See II sole 24 ore, 12.4.1985 (“/« Italia da sempre le tariffe vengono gestite «alla giornata»: 
gli adeguamenti hanno un andamento quanto mai irregolare e riflettono esigenze di ordine 
politico del Governo'' )^. See also II sole 24 ore, 4.5.1985, and 30.6.1985.
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the latters’ power vis-à-vis the l i ce n s e e s . P o l i t i c a l  parties reacted by rejecting these 
proposals out of hand.
According to Romano Prodi, then speaking in his capacity as former IRI President, 
when he requested for the application of a price-cap mechanism, i.e., a system of automatic 
tariff adjustments, his request was quickly brushed aside. ''The politicians’', Romano Prodi 
stated, "rebuked me by saying «for tariffs, you will always need to ask us»"}^^ The 
undersecretary to the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, Francesco Tempestini, an 
MP belonging to the PSI, similarly stated that IRI and STET should stop requests for 
automatic tariff adjustments, arguing that tariff adjustments should remain with Comitato 
Interministeriale Prezzi (“CIP”, i.e. the committee of Ministers in charge of economy and 
finance) and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.^^^ This shows how tariff setting 
was regarded as a chief avenue through which political parties could influence licensees’ 
behaviour in a way that was conducive to their needs.
The self-reinforcing character of the above-described relationships between political 
parties and telecommunications providers lay in the fact that the execution of political 
instructions hurt licensees’ finances, as investment decisions taken on the basis of political 
directives were sub-optimal and did not result in higher efficiency. Licensees had to hire 
an unnecessary work force or to purchase goods of lower quality and at an inflated price
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See 11 sole 24 ore, 4.2.1991.
See 11 sole 24 ore, 17.1.1992 {"Quando ho proposto il price cap al Parlamento mi sono 
sentito brutalmente rispondere di no. Per le tariffe, mi dicevano i politici, dovrai passare da 
not Qui sta I'anomalia italiana: nella debolezza dello Stato come regolatore e nella 
conseguente invadenza della politica nella gestione delle aziende pubbliche’'). Apparently, 
this sentence was pronounced by Paolo Cirino Pomicino, a key DC leader. See also 11 sole 24 
ore, 15.11.1991, where Pontarollo and Costa showed how the tariff system was an 
impediment to the development of a more efficient telecommunications sector in Italy due to 
the cross-subsidies between long-distance calls and local calls.
See 11 sole 24 ore, 11.5.1990.
Personal interviews, IRI official and senior economic consultant.
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because they could not carry out tenders in a proper way. The damage done to their finances 
meant that telecommunications providers could not cover their expenses with ordinary 
revenues and needed to go to political parties to obtain new funds. For instance, in 1989, SIP 
was able to finance only 83% of investments through its own resources. New funds came 
with new obligations to invest according to the instructions of the political parties and thus 
the process restarted.
The practices described above with respect to the ways in which licensees were used 
to foster political goals and how this gave rise to a self-reinforcing sequence were also 
broadly applied with respect to relationships between ASST and political parties. In fact, due 
to its institutional position as a branch of the Ministry, ASST was considered to be a better 
instrument to foster political goals than the licensees.
First of all, ASST accounts were not bound by the same rules applicable to limited 
liability companies like the licensees. Secondly, because it was embedded within the 
Ministry, ASST stood shielded from the public eye (contrary to the licensees which were 
listed companies and therefore had to publish periodically accounts and reports). This meant 
that ASST was an ideal instrument to channel resources. Relatively little information was 
made available to the public on the ASST’s financial situation. ASST financial statements 
were at best cryptic and based on inconsistent accounting methodologies. ASST was thus
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See II sole 24 ore, 21.4.1989 (“SIP chiede le nuove tariffe e un aumento di capitale”).
See L. Cafagna, La grande slavina (Venezia: Marsilio, 1993), “... la corruzione politica esiste 
dovunque ... la differenza italiana ... sta nel fatto che altrove i percettori dei proventi di 
fiscalità politica parallela si sentono in dovere di fomire ... in cambio, prestazioni efficienti 
ai cittadini. In Italia, invece, no. II che configura il caso italiano, come caso di puro 
saccheggio ...” (p. 109). See also II sole 24 ore, 30.1.1987 (“Per ottenere un telefono occorre 
avere un «amico»”).
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considered “ût treasure ark whose inside was clouded with mystery^^^ and a treasure ark it 
was since it administered a significant share of the resources available for investment in the 
sector.
In 1987, ASST was entitled to 5,000 billion lira out of extraordinary funds made 
available by the Treasury in effort to improve telecommunications s e r v i c e s . I n  1991, 
ASST’s turnover was equal to 2,975 billion Lira, of which 430 billion were profits. This 
made ASST the number two telecommunications supplier after SIP. The heads of ASST, 
STET and SIP were referred to as the ‘three kings’ of Italian telecommunications. All of 
them were considered as ‘loyal’ to the Christian D e m o c r a t s , w i t h  ASST’s ties being 
perhaps the strongest due to the role of trade unions.
During the period studied, ASST had approximately 13,000 employees. The large 
majority of these employees were affiliated to CISL (Confederazione Italiana Sindacati 
Lavoratori),^^"  ^ the trade union sponsored by DC. ASST employees were thus an important 
electoral constituency for the DC, which tended to protect its territory. The table below 
shows investment levels for the licensees and ASST. The low level of investment made by 
ASST shows that its balance sheet was free from investments and could be directed to 
finance political goals.
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See 11 sole 24 ore, 9.9.1988. See also G. Lizzeri and F. De Brabant, L ’industria delle 
telecomunicazioni in Italia (Milano: Franco Angeli Editore, 1979), 18, Azienda di Stato 
è forse il mistero meglio custodito delle telecomunicazioni italiane”).
See délibéra CIPE 28.5.1987 (GURI n. 147, 26.6.1987) and II sole 24 ore, 29.5.1987.
See 11 sole 24 ore, 2.10.1992.
See 11 sole 24 ore, 5.8.1991. In 1988, ASST was headed by the leader of the Christian 
Democratic Italian Union Worker’s Confederation.
See 11 sole 24 ore, 9.6.1988
See 11 sole 24 ore, 29.10.1988 (“[i sindacati] ... nelle poste, egemonizzate dalla CISL, ... 
«controllano» I’Azienda telefonica di Stato...”). See 11 sole 24 ore, 3.11.1988 Ç^SUPERSTET, 
11 fattore CISL”), according to which CISL’s affiliates were 8,000 over a total of 13,000 
employees. See also 11 sole 24 ore, 27.12.1990 (“I/« ’Azienda inefficiente e misteriosa”).
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Table 8 - Investment level in percentage (1980-1987) (Source: D. Glacalone and F. Vergnano, La Guerra 
del Telefono - Le telecomunicazioni, la gestione, la politica (Milano: II Sole 24 ore, 1990), 73)
Admin
82 13 0,4 100
79
83
13 1,8
1,5
0,4 100
100
1983 87 0,9 100
1984 87 1,4 0,6 2,6 100
1985 87 0,6 2,6 100
1986 84 10 1,3 0,4 3,4 100
1987 81 1 1 1,3 0,9 4,3 100
The way in which political parties and ASST interacted was similar to that already 
explained for SIP. ‘Loyal’ appointees would ensure that ASST acted in a way that fostered 
political parties goals. The losses caused by ‘political’ investments were covered by State 
funds. The chief mechanism through which ASST fostered political goals and thus 
contributed to the process of increasing returns was through tenders and purchases. ASST 
could use tenders to reward ‘friends’ and to boost the economy o f chosen areas. ASST 
tenders were often conducted according to a simplified procedure, which allowed ASST a 
large margin o f discretion. For instance, in 1991 ASST became involved in a project for the
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construction of a dedicated fibre optic network for business users, the so-called “start” 
p r o j e c t / T h e  contractors did not include Philips, in spite of the latter leadership in the 
sector, and included only Italian companies.
Other episodes have been documented by court proceedings that were opened after 
1992 following the ‘mani pulite’ investigations (described in the next chapter). ASST and 
Amministrazione Poste e Telegrqfi (PP.TT.) being part of the public administration, were 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Auditors (Corte dei Conti). A judgement of 2002 
by the Court of Auditors describes in detail how the Amministrazione PP.TT. bought 5,000 
telex machines in 1991 from Olivetti in return for a bribe (‘tangente’). This episode is 
worth recalling because it is an egregious and well-documented example of the type of 
interactions between political parties and telecommunications companies that were common 
during the period studied. It is important to state at the outset that the relevance of the 
episode for increasing returns lies in the feed back aspect exemplified therein.
The judgement reports the purchase of telex machines by Amministrazione PP.TT. 
from Olivetti. The purchases were made in 1988, 1989 and 1991. The 1991 purchase 
concerned 5,000 telex machines for a consideration worth approximately 39 billion lira. 
However, the judgement reports that experts at the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications had remarked that demand for telex was severely decreasing due to 
competition from new technology, namely fax machines, and that telex was quickly
185
186
187
SQQllsole24 ore, 13.6.1991.
See Corte dei Conti, judgment of June 6, 2002. n. 1725/2002 (available at
http://www.corteconti.it/Ricerca-e-l/Gli-Atti-d/cartella/Documenti/Sezione-
gi 14/2002/Sentenza-n. 1725-2002-del-6-gmgno-20.doc).
It is not relevant that the protagonist of the episode is Amministrazione PP.TT. rather than 
ASST. Both entities were in the same institutional position, i.e. they were branches of the 
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. Therefore, from an institutional perspective, the 
evidence collected with respect to Amministrazione PP.TT. on the process of increasing 
returns is also highly relevant for ASST.
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becoming obsolete. Thus, by 1991 the continuation of purchase of telex machines from 
Olivetti was halted. Olivetti, however, was relying on this purchase and it had apparently 
already committed workforce in anticipation of the purchase being confirmed. The stop in 
the purchasing process was therefore a serious hindrance to Olivetti.
Olivetti approached the head of the Republican Party at the time, Bruno Visentini. 
Bruno Visentini informed the Minister, Oscar Mammi, another member of the same party. 
Oscar Mammi instructed his advisor, Davide Giacalone and the head of ASST, Giuseppe 
Parrella. Olivetti was therefore invited to make a payment in return for the purchase. The 
amount of the payment was negotiated and was finally set at 2% of the total amount of the 
purchase.
According to the judgment, the payment (‘tangente’) was intended to benefit not only 
the Republican Party as the holder of the Ministry, but should respect ‘political equilibria’. 
Thus, Olivetti was instructed to make payments to the other parties in the mling coalition too, 
i.e. the Christian Democracy and the Socialist Party. It is worth noting that of the 5,000 
telex machines so bought, 3,600 were never taken out of their boxes. The Court of Auditors 
proceedings were intended to ascertain the damage to public finances made by this purchase, 
given that the manifest uselessness of the purchase was a clear loss for state finances.
See judgment of June 6, 2002, according to which “... ^  lo stesso G. [a secretary to the 
Minister] che mi disse che sapeva della esigenza di versare del denaro al sistema dei partiti e 
che ora che il Ministero era afjidato alia dirigenza di un repubblicano era necessario 
mantenere i giusti equilibri e che anche il partita repubblicano godesse di questi benejici; il 
G. mi disse che per il buon mantenimento degli equilibri politici era opportuno che i 
versamenti fossero equamente distribuiti fra DC, PSI e PRl e mi chiese che per quanto lo 
riguardava egli avrebbe gradito la mia persona come interfaccia tra il sistema delle imprese 
anche per d o  che riguardava il pagamento del denaro. lo ne parlai con alcuni imprenditori 
quali P. e S. e nel giro di poco tempo tutti gli imprenditori hanno conosciuto in me 
1 ’interfaccia con il sistema politico. lo a mia volta delegai una mia persona di fiducia tale L. 
Giuseppe a seguire tutta la questione relativa alle dazioni di denaro dal sistema delle imprese 
al sistema dei partiti, naturalmente fomendo al L. le direttive necessarie affînché potesse 
prendere gli opportuni contatti con i responsabili delle imprese".
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The need to turn a normal commercial transaction into a political bargain exemplifies 
well how purchases made for political reasons resulted in a sub-optimal use of resources or in 
an outright loss. This in turn fuelled the need for fresh funds and re-started the process. The 
feedback was therefore due to the fact that these kinds of actions caused a straight loss and so 
there was a need for new funds, in addition to those needed to cover normal expenses. Thus, 
the ‘system’ of financing of political parties had an important increasing returns dimension in 
so far as it fostered a self-reinforcing process. Through time, political parties and 
telecommunications companies became more and more entangled in a spiralling relationship 
that possessed an important self-sustaining aspect.
In sum, during the period studied telecommunications companies, including ASST 
and the licensees, developed close ties with political parties. A feed back mechanism started, 
fuelled by the use of telecommunications companies’ resources for political patronage where 
expenses driven by political reasons dilapidated resources and telecommunications 
companies were obliged to obtain fresh funds from political parties. Each round of financing 
gave rise to new expenses. The section below focuses on the way in which these increasing 
returns affected institutional development and the efforts to reform the split-supplier system.
IV. INCREASING RETURNS AND THE YEARS OF INERTIA: 1979-1987
Technological developments made the co-habitation of ASST and SIP increasingly 
untenable, thus acting as a strong source of pressure to reform the organization of the system 
and merge the providers into a single entity. ASST and SIP operated two networks. 
However, since the early years of the telephone it had been very difficult to draw a clear line 
between the services which were provided by the two, due to the increasing level of 
interconnection which made undistinguishable who was contributing to what. Equally, it was 
no less difficult to calculate with exactitude how much each supplier owed to the other.
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Through time and the development of more interconnections, the boundaries between what 
had originally been two well-defined systems (long-distance services as opposed to local 
ones) blurred.
The difficulty that was inherent in the coordination between SIP and ASST had a 
severe impact on the rate of innovation. At a time in which the telecommunications sector 
was undergoing a technological revolution, the introduction of new services in Italy was 
significantly slower than in other countries. For instance, the first data network {rete fonia 
- dati) became available to users only in 1984 whereas a similar network was already 
operational in France in 1972 and in Germany in 1979. Similarly, a packet switched network, 
called Itapac, was available for general use in 1986, whereas in France such network could be 
used since 1978 and in Germany since 1980.^ ^®
The performance of Italy’s telecommunications system was no less dismal. In 1988, 
the percentage of calls completed successfully was equal to 42% for ASST and 52% for SIP, 
both being very far from European s t a n d a r d s . I n  1989, the Wall Street Journal declared 
that the Italian telephone system was one of the most decrepit in E u r o p e . I n  1990, only 
38,9% of the Italian population had a phone connection. This was below the EC average 
(approximately 40%) and put Italy in 19* position at worldwide level. According to the 
forecasts made at that time, the rate of increase in the penetration of phones was too slow to 
enable Italy to catch up with the other European countries. This is because the EC average in
189
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192
See, e.g., 11 sole 24 ore, 26.2.1991.
See Pontarollo and Costa, ‘Regolamentazione e concorrenza nei servizi di pubblica utilità: il 
caso delle telecomunicazioni’, 352.
See II sole 24 ore, 20.7.1988.
Quote reported in 11 sole 24 ore, 10.2.1989.
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1993 was projected at 46.17%, whereas Italy’s could only increase to 44.52% (Great Britain’s 
was set at 48.94%, France’s at 50.51% and Germany’s at 52.51%).*^^
In parliamentary discussions about the reform of the sector, the split-supplier system 
was time and again mentioned as the chief obstacle to having a well-functioning and modem 
telecommunications sector. For instance, in a hearing before the House of Deputies 
Committee for Transports and Communications held on September 28, 1983^ "^^  Antonio 
Gava, a leading member of the Christian Democrat Party, who held the post of Minister of 
Posts and Telecommunications at that time, stated that the bringing onto the market of new 
technologies and the connected implementation of new services made the division between 
ASST and licensees obsolete and irrational. He also stated that there was “general 
agreement” on the fact that the convergence between information technology and 
telecommunications required single strategic vision and unitary planning.
In addition, users’ dissatisfaction grew. In 1984,'^^ the Comitato Utenza Affari 
Telefonica, a business users’ group to which various industrial associations belonged 
(Associazione Bancaria Italiana, Associazione Nazionale Industria Assicurativa, Assonime, 
Confagricoltura, Confcommercio, Confindustria e Federazione Italiana Editori e 
Giornalisti), complained that prices for leased lines were too high and quality of service was 
poor. In 1986, business users issued another public complaint against poor service.
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See II sole 24 ore, 8.4.1991.
Camera dei Deputati, 10“ Commissione Permanente (Trasporti, Comunicazioni), 
Comunicazioni del Ministro delle Poste e delle Telecomunicazioni sui principali problemi di 
settore con particolare hferimento alio stato di attuazione della legge 10 febbraio 1982, n. 39 
ed alia regolamentazione delle emittenti radiotelevisive, Bollettino Commissioni (Roma: 
Tipografia della Camera, 1983).
See 11 sole 24 ore, 9.11.1984.
See 11 sole 24 ore, 3.10.1986. See also//sole 24 ore, 25.7.1987.
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Split-supply of telecommunications services was also hit from another technological 
development: the rise of mobile telephony. Mobile telephony required interconnection 
between fixed and mobile networks. In Italy, this meant interconnection with two fixed- 
network operators, i.e. SIP and ASST. In other words, mobile telephony added to the already 
existing difficulties of coordinating interconnection between ASST and SIP networks. As a 
consequence, the advent of mobile telephony brought further pressure to unify fixed network 
management. Slow and/or poor interconnection in fact threatened to realize the full potential 
of mobile telephony as a new business product.
Options to reform the organization of the sector were considered in the context of the 
preparation of a Report by the Senate Standing Committee for Transport and 
Communications between 1980 and 1982.’^  ^ The Senate Report carried out an extensive 
fact-finding exercise, aimed at collecting evidence from all parties involved. Members of the 
committee also travelled to the US to examine the role of the FCC and the American 
regulatory model. Various options for reform were then considered and there was a common 
understanding on the need to end the separation between SIP and ASST and merge the two 
entities into a single operator. This would have entailed a change in the institutional 
trajectory followed by Italy until then, which was based on a split-supplier system.
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Senate della Repubblica Italiana, 8® Commissione Permanente (Lavori Pubblici, 
Comunicazioni), Indagine conoscitiva sul settore delle telecomunicazioni (Tipografia del 
Senate: Roma, 1982). There were both oral and written submissions by managers of SIP, 
Italcable, STET, IRI, Olivetti, the Minister of Post and Telecommunications, the Minister of 
State Holdings, the Minister of the Treasury, business users’ groups and trade unions 
representatives. There were no submissions by ASST representatives or by the Post and 
T elecommunications Administration.
The legal status of such single operator was still unclear, though. The Report considered two 
options: (i) either a public corporation (Ente pubblico) in the like of Enel or ENI; or (ii) a 
State-owned company modelled after the licensees. The latter option was seen as more in 
tune with the need to grant a certain degree of flexibility, which would be difficult to achieve 
for an Ente Pubblico. It was furthermore held that the new company would have to be 
structured along two lines, one focusing on national telecommunications services and the 
other on international telecommunications services in order to ensure more transparency as to
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As to the role of the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, the Senate Report 
held that, after divesting from the provision of services through the incorporation of ASST 
into SIP, it should become the centre of policy-making. At the time of the Report, the 
committee maintained that the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications was ill-equipped to 
carry out this mission because it had little staff and heavily relied on the Aziende di Stato, 
ASST and the Amministrazione PP.TT., for expert adv ice .Fur thermore ,  certain senators 
looked with interest to the American model of regulation based on independent agencies and 
went as far as advocating the set up of a similar system in Italy.
Almost in parallel to the Senate enquiry, the Government also commissioned a report 
to a group of senior officials. The ^'Dipartimento Analisi e Verijica del Programma di 
Governd’’ (Task force on analysis and control of the Government action), formed under the 
government of Giovanni Spadolini in 1981, carried out an enquiry on the telecommunications 
sector and drew a report which was ready in 1982. Due to a government crisis, the fall of the 
Spadolini government and forthcoming elections, the report was only published in 1984 with 
the title of Commissione Morganti, Rapporta al Présidente del Consiglio sulle 
Telecomunicazioni}^^ It drew on various experts and managers belonging to SIP, STET and 
the Istituto Superiore delle Poste e Telecomunicazioni (a body within the Ministry of Posts
the financial situation relative to each service. See Indagine conoscitiva sul settore delle 
telecomunicazioni (cit.), hearing held on December 22, 1982, 332-333.
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Indagine conoscitiva sul settore delle telecomunicazioni (cit.), hearing held on May 5, 1980, 
305. It should be remembered that ASST and Amministrazione PP.TT. were separate entities, 
albeit reporting to the Minister. Thus, the latter could in fact rely on little staff, whereas the 
Aziende directly employed several thousands.
See Indagine conoscitiva sul settore delle telecomunicazioni (cit.), hearing held on March 26, 
1980, 46, showing that there was serious attention for the set up of an independent agency 
that '^‘following the Anglo-Saxon model, would be structured outside the conventional 
bureaucratic organization and staffed with top level experts. This body would be responsible 
for drawing a strategic plan for the sector and monitoring its implementation, especially as 
far as investments and technical standards are concerned"'.
The report was published in 1984 by Franco Angeli (Milano).
133
and Telecommunications). With reference to the institutional structure, the report also called 
for reform, articulating various solutions: (i) a rationalisation of the status quo (a better 
separation of competencies between ASST-Amministrazione PP. TT. and the licensees); (ii) 
the unification of the various telecommunications operators outside the Minister of Posts and 
Telecommunications; and (iii) separation between operation and regulation.
After the publication of the Senate Report, Law No. 192 of 1983 - "'Determinazione 
del canone di concessione dovuto dalla S W  - the law that lowered SIP licence fee, also 
contained a provision to the effect that the Government was under an obligation to propose a 
bill within one year since the coming into effect of the law in order to re-structure the system 
with a view to merge all telecommunications services into one operator.
In 1984, the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications stated at a Parliamentary 
hearing that he envisaged either the creation of State-owned company under the control of 
IRI, or two companies, one in charge of the network and structured like a ministerial 
department, and the other entrusted with the provision of services, under the control of IRI.^ ®"* 
In 1985, a bill to incorporate ASST under the control of STET was labelled as being 
“imminent”^^  ^ and the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications proposed at a hearing held 
in the same year a new tripartite structure for the provision of telecommunications services in 
Italy, comprising: (i) a department within the Ministry entrusted with planning, supervision
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See GURI n. 134, 18.5.1983. However, since the law provided only for the year 1982, a new 
legislative measure was passed in 1984. Law n. 870 dated December 22, 1984 repealed 
article 275 of the Postal Code, lowering the license fee to 3% of licensees’ total revenues and 
confirming the reduction enacted by the 1983 law (See GURI n. 355, 28. 12. 1984).
Law No. 192 of 1983, Article 1.
Camera dei Deputati, 10® Commissione Permanente (Trasporti, Comunicazioni), Audizione ai 
sensi delVarticolo 143, secondo comma, del regolamento, del Ministro delle Poste e delle 
Telecomunicazioni in ordine al piano nazionale delle frequenze di radiodiffusione, al 
riassetto del settore delle telecomunicazioni ed all ’aggiomamento del piano decennale delle 
telecomunicazioni, Bollettino Commissioni (Roma: Tipografia della Camera, 1984).
See II sole 24 ore, 22.2.1985.
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and granting of state resources; (ii) a public corporation for postal services; and (iii) a 
separate one for telecommunications (in the form of a limited liability company), owned by 
the State, placed under the supervision of the Minister of State h o l d i n g s S i m i l a r  plans to 
end the split supplier system were also advanced by the heads of IRI (Romano Prodi), STET 
and SIP (Paolo Benzoni).^^^
In spite of pressures for change and proposals to reform the organization of the sector, 
no legislative initiative to change the direction of institutional development was undertaken. 
On the contrary, the new SIP licence signed in 1984 showed that split-supplier system was 
not only continued, but also reinforced by giving more powers to ASST.^®^
Firstly, ASST was given powers to oversee the development of the networks in 
furtherance of its position as a regulator. In particular, the 1984 licence laid down provisions 
requiring a higher level of interconnection between SIP and ASST ne t wo r ks . Se co n d l y ,  
the 1984 licence envisaged the joint development of the integrated service data network {rete 
numerica integrata dei servizi) within 1990 and it detailed coordination procedures with 
respect to data transmission.^** It is worth underlining that the development of data 
transmission was a joint project between SIP and ASST. As noted, though, there were sound
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Camera dei Deputati, 8^  Commissione (Lavori Pubblici, Comunicazioni), Comunicazioni del 
Ministro delle Poste e Telecomunicazioni in ordine al riassetto istituzionale del settore delle 
telecomunicazioni e conseguente dibattito (Roma: Tipografia della Camera, 1985).
II sole 24 ore, 27.2.1985, 2.2.1985, 20.6.1985.
CIPE deliberation dated March 24, 1982 (GURI n. 105, 17.4.1982) established that licenses 
would have to be renewed by 1982. They were in fact renewed in September 1984, under 
Presidential Decree dated August 13, 1984, n. 523 (GURI 1984, 30.8.1984, n. 239).
See article 9 - '’’'Competenza degli impianti e dei collegamentC and Annex B - ’‘'"Unificazione 
della rete intercompartimentale’’', see also article 20 - "’Piani pluriennali di massima e piani 
tecnici esecutivf\
See article 1 - ’^ 'Oggetto della concessione”.
See article 10 - '''"Competenza degli impianti e dei collegamenti relativi alle reti pubbliche 
specializzate” and article 20.
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technological reasons to end the split-supplier system, which applied a fortiori in the 
development of such new services as data transmission/^^ In addition, since 1983 SIP also 
offered data transmission over its circuit switched network {rete fonia-datiX  providing 
services such as fax transmission, audioconferences and closed-group telephony. SIP was 
therefore well qualified to take over data transmission services. The 1984 licence not only 
ignored these reasons, but also envisaged that in future the split-supplier system should 
extend to new services since it explicitly stated that data transmission fell outside the scope of 
SIP licence.^^^ The split provision of data transmission remained in force until 1988.^ "^^
The choices in favor of an expansion of ASST’s role and, in essence, the continuation 
of the split-supplier system in spite of calls to merge all providers for reasons of efficiency, 
can be linked to increasing returns. The reinforcing process that linked together political 
parties, on the one hand, licensees and ASST, on the other hand, had an essential institutional 
dimension. The fragmentation of telecommunications supply between licensees and ASST 
matched the fragmented structure of power prevailing at the time. Having a split-supplier 
system enabled each political party and the various factions of the Christian Democracy^to 
preserve its sphere of power and influence. As Giuliano Graziosi, head of Stet, later stated, 
“«// o f  the ruling parties were hostile to a single supplier. The reason was obvious: with a
2)2
2)3
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II sole 24 ore, 15.6.1985.
See article 1 of the 1984 licence. In addition, the Minister of Post and Telecommunications 
reserved the right “to use the telex network to provide whatever services became technically 
possible.”
See Presidential Decree dated December 20, 1988 “Approvazione delle convenzioni stipulate 
in data 22 settembre 1988 tra il Ministero delle poste e delle telecomunicazioni e le société 
SIP e Italcable, relative al servizio di trasmissione dati a commutazione di pacchetto in ambito 
nazionale e intemazionale, al servizo di dettatura fonica dei telegrammi ed all’instradamento 
del traffico telefonico intemazionale” (GURI n. 172, 25.7.1989).
For a study on the internal structure of the Christian Democracy and the role of its internal 
factions (correnti), see R. Leonardi and D. A. Wertman, Italian Christian Democracy-The 
politics of dominance (London: MacMillan, 1989). See also II sole 24 ore 16.5.1991, 
17.5.1991, 26.6.1991, and 6.8.1991.
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single supplier they would lose seats in the boardrooms'*\^^^ The expansion of ASST’s 
competence to data transmission thus was an attempt to control resources by political parties 
who could use ASST as a means to their ends. It is worth recalling that data transmission 
services represented one of the most important developments in the field of 
telecommunications at that time. In 1988, a new plan to improve the state of the sector was 
launched, the Piano Europa.^’^  The Piano Europa envisaged very significant investment: SIP 
was entitled to 36,300 billion lira investment over the period 1988-1992, whereas ASST was 
entitled to 8,000 billion lira. Since control over resources was vital for political parties and 
since ASST was an ideal instrument to channel resources, political parties preferred an 
institutional arrangement where ASST had its sphere of powers preserved.
The foregoing shows that increasing returns operated in the way path dependence 
would have expected. Pressures for changing the direction of the institutional trajectory were 
kept at bay and instead an improved version of the existing institutions was preferred, i.e. 
better coordination between the different suppliers. The period after 1988 offers a more 
complex picture due to the proposals to adopt a law on the reorganization of the sector, 
eventually adopted as Law No. 58 of 1992.
V. THE YEARS OF BOUNDED CHANGE: 1988-1992
In 1987, the pressures to end the separation between ASST and SIP acquired a 
European dimension when the European Commission adopted the Green Paper on
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See II sole 24 ore, 3.12.1993 (“[answering to the interviewer’s question “who sabotaged the 
plan to create a single supplier, nda”] \T'\utte le principali forze di governo. Per ovvie ragioni: 
con I'unificazione dei gestoriperdevano posti nei consigli d'amministrazione e, soprattutto, si 
sopprimeva un centro di affari perversi come si é scoperta essere I'Asst”). Also personal 
interview, STET CEO.
See IIsole 24 ore, 29.9.1988 {’''Investimenti acceleratiper agganciare I’Europa”).
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Telecommunications.^^^ The 1987 Green Paper called into question the legal framework 
applicable to the organization of the sector since it advocated the separation of regulatory 
powers and telecommunications operation. In so doing, the Green Paper made the existence 
of ASST, with its double role as regulator and telecommunications operator, incompatible 
with the principles that, according to the Commission, should apply under Community 
law/'"
In a further step, in 1990 the Commission passed Directive 90/388 on competition in 
the markets for telecommunications services.^^® The directive concerned the rules on 
competition, but it also required termination of potentially conflicting situations whereby 
telecommunications organizations acted as providers and regulators. More precisely, the 29^^  
recital of the Directive stated that: '‘''The delegation to an undertaking which has a dominant 
position fo r the provision and exploitation o f the network, o f the power to regulate access to 
the market fo r telecommunication services constitutes a strengthening o f that dominant 
position*'. The Directive established that by July 1, 1991 all Member States should have
218
219
220
Towards a Dynamic European Economy- Green Paper on the development of the common 
market for telecommunications services and equipment (COM (87) 290, 30.6.1987).
See Disegno di legge n. 1685, Comunicazione alia Presidenza: '’’Dal punto di vista 
organizzativo si è stabilito che nei paesi della CEE i compiti di programmazione e di 
controllo devono essere nettamente separati da quelli di gestione e, comunque, direttamente 
operativi. d o  significa che i govemi di questi paesi non possono direttamente gestire servizi 
di telecomunicazioni, owero il contrario di auello che os2 i awiene in Italia con TASST' 
(underlined not in the text), 2.
Official Journal 1990, L 192/10. In 1988, the Commission had adopted a directive on 
liberalization of terminal equipment (Directive 88/301, Official Journal 1988, L 131/73). The 
impact of this directive on the organization of the sector in Italy was however much more 
reduced compared to Directive 90/388 and for this reason this directive is not discussed in the 
text. For the Commission overall role in the liberalization of the sector, see, e.g., V. 
Schneider and R. Werle, 'International Regime or Corporate Actor? The European 
Community in Telecommunication Policy’, in K. Dyson and P. Humphreys (eds.). The 
Political Economy o f Communications: International and European Dimensions (London: 
Routledge, 1990); W. Sandholtz, ‘Institutions and Collective Action: The New 
Telecommunications in Western Europe’, World Politics, (1993), 242; P. Larouche, 
Competition Law and Regulation in European Telecommunications (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2000); Thatcher, Internationalisation and Economic Institutions, ch. 6-9.
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complied with the Directive, including the provision on separation between regulatory
functions and provisions of services. 221
There was little doubt that these provisions affected ASST’s role as holding both 
regulatory powers and the provision of telecommunications services. In fact, already before 
Directive 90/388 was adopted, however, the impact of EU legislation on the reorganization of 
the sector was significant. For instance, in 1989 the Minister of Posts and 
Telecommunications mentioned that the Green Paper obliged Italy to take action in respect of 
the role of ASST, with the consequence of favouring a re-unification of the latter with SIP.^^^
EU law thus increased pressure for an end to the split-supplier system. It is worth 
pausing for a moment to state what EU law did not require. Directive 90/388 did not 
prescribe a given organization of the sector, only defining in negative terms what was 
contrary to EU law, without binding Member States to adopt a set structure. In other words, 
EU law provided a framework, which could be filled by Member States in a variety of ways. 
The institutional choices were, thus, open to be influenced by domestic factors, with the only 
limit that regulatory functions should have been separate from provision of services. It is 
therefore correct to focus on domestic factors to understand how the opportunity for reform 
provided by EU law was used at the national level.
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Article 7: '’’'Member States shall ensure that from 1 July 1991 the grant o f operating licences, 
the control o f type approval and mandatory specifications, the allocation o f frequencies and 
surveillance o f usage conditions are carried out by a body independent o f the 
telecommunications organizations. They shall inform the Commission of the measures taken 
or draft measures introduced to that end no later than 31 December 1990”.
See statement by the Minister of Post and Telecommunications at a hearing held on May 10, 
1989 before the Senate Committee for Public Works and Communications (8® Commissione, 
Lavori Pubblici, Comunicazioni); see also the statements by Senator Ando as the ruling 
coalition representative, at a hearing held on September 21, 1989 and by the Minister of State 
Holdings in a hearing held on November 23, 1989 before the same Senate Committee. Both 
statements made reference to the Green Paper’s provisions relating to the separation between 
regulation and commercial operations and their impact on the ASST role.
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IRI and STET managers were eager to seize this opportunity to foster the creation of a 
single provider under IRI/STET.^^^ In March 1988, IRI’s board, acting under the presidency 
of Romano Prodi, approved a resolution that mandated the creation of a single supplier. This 
project was advanced by STET CEO, Giuliano G r a z i o s i . T h e  new entity would have been 
the new sole licensee of telecommunications services, reuniting under a single umbrella the 
dispersed provision of telecommunications services to the public. The concentration would 
have taken the form of incorporation of the operating companies, SIP and the other licensees, 
into STET, the holding company. The new umbrella entity thus became known as ‘Super 
STET’.^ ^^  IRI’s resolution also mentioned the merger of ASST into super-STET, although it 
also stated that this required specific legislation and so it was outside IRI’s powers.
Since it threatened to limit their ability to use telecommunications providers, political 
parties opposed the Super STET plan. As the party with the relatively stronger clout in 
government, the Christian Democrat Party was also the one that stood to lose the most from 
the Super STET plan. It is worth remembering that the heads of ASST and most of the top 
managers in the boards of STET and SIP were DC appointees. The Super STET plan would 
have limited the number of posts available and so curtailed opportunities to allot sphere of 
influences. The other parties were also opposed to Super STET for the same reasons.
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See, e.g., the statement by Miro Allione, one of the key STET managers: ‘7/ primo gennaio 
del '93 scatta la direttiva Cee che stabilisée che il ministero delle Poste e Telecomunicazioni 
non pud avere un'attività produttiva: é inutile che io mi scaldi adesso perché il riassetto delle 
telecomunicazioni non va avanti. Prima di quella data qualcosa dovrà accadere ...” (see il 
sole 24 ore, 15.2.1991).
Personal interview STET CEO.
II sole 24 ore 29.3.1988,31.3.1988, and 1.4.1988.
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Super STET plan was first halted by a government crisis in 1988.^^  ^ The Minister of 
State Holdings then in charge, Luigi Granelli, wrote to IRI’s board to warn IRI’s president, 
Romano Prodi, that IRI should not proceed any further in its plans to create Super STET as 
this needed political endorsement from the government, such endorsement to be provided as 
soon as the crisis would be r e s o l v e d . O n c e  the crisis was over, the parties in the ruling 
coalition started to re-design the Super-STET plan in a way that was more conducive to the 
existing relationships between political parties and telecommunications companies.
In the second-half of 1988, a rival plan to Super STET was conceived. The new plan 
centred on an increased role of SIP and was thus called Super SIP.^^  ^ In particular. Super SIP 
involved the merger of all operators into SIP, but left open the possibility to set up other 
companies vested with special tasks, such as the management and operation of value-added 
services. In addition, STET would have also continued to act as the holding company with 
power of direction over strategic decisions. The rationale behind the Super SIP plan was 
therefore clear insofar as it aimed at leaving intact the geography of power and the possibility 
to allocate spoils in proportion to electoral weight (‘lottizzazione’).^ ^^
Also Oscar Mammi, then Minister of Posts and Telecommunications and the 
proponent of a bill to re-organize the sector, admitted that the major hurdle on the way to the 
creation of a single operator was the power play by political parties surrounding 
telecommunications. This power play was also halting the formal introduction of the bill
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In April 1988, the Goria government was replaced by a government presided by Ciriaco de 
Mita.
See II sole 24 ore, 12.4.1988. In addition, Italcable, the most important licensee after SIP, 
started to mount opposition against the merger (see, e.g., 11 sole 24 ore 17.12.1988, 13.1.1989, 
and 2.3.1989).
See II sole 24 ore, 29.10.1988.
See II sole 24 ore, 29.10.1988. The Super SIP plan was not precisely defined and so it is not 
possible to say if Super SIP was intended to even increase the possibility for lottizzazione.
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Oscar Mammi had many times announced as imminent. As Mammi s t a t e d , “// maggior 
scoglio da superare esula dal testo vero e proprio del disegno di legge ma politicamente è ad 
esso strettamente connesso: se si conviene sull 'opportunità di dar vita ad un ’unica società 
concessionaria per i servizi di telecomunicazione è possibile che si voglia anche sapere quale 
sard il suo assetto e in quale struttura essa si articolerd...L unificazione della gestione della 
rete è un bisogno del Paese, non la bizzarria di una stagione. Questo non esclude che la 
società concessionaria, che dovrd essere unica, possa articolarsi in più società controllate. 
La legge deve prevedere questa opzione, anche se non puo imporla'\
In December 1988, the Minister of State Holdings, Carlo Fracanzani, an MP 
belonging to the DC, explicitly suggested that Super STET was soon to be abandoned in 
favor of a solution that preserved the split-supplier system. According to the Minister, the 
split-supplier system appeared “more rational”. I t  should be added that the Super SIP plan 
started to receive also explicit endorsement from political parties. Silvio Lega, the Christian 
Democrat MP responsible for economic affairs, voiced his preference for a Super SIP plan.^^  ^
Gianni De Michelis, a key Socialist MP expressed disagreement towards Super STET.^^^
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See 11 sole 24 ore, 17.11.1988. most difficult hurdle goes beyond the actual text of the 
bill, but is closely linked to it: if  one agrees on the opportunity of having a single licensee for 
telecommunications services, it is possible that one also wants to know its organization ...the 
unification o f network management is a priority for the country and not a temporary wish. 
However, this does not mean that the licensee, which should be a single company, could not 
have subsidiary companies under its control. The law should envisage this option, even if it 
cannot impose i f \
See II sole 24 ore, 7.12.1988. According to the Minister: “5 / tratterà di vedere se dovrà 
esserci un unico organismo oppure, come appare più razionale, un ’unica fmanziaria da cui 
dipende un numéro ristretto di società operative, distinguendo l ’attività di servizio telefonico 
(eventualmente articolata in due distinte strutture per i servizi regolamentati e per quelli in 
concorrenza) da quelle manifatturiere e dell ’impiantistica’’ (emphasis supplied).
SQQÏlsole24 ore, 15.12.1988.
See II sole 24 ore, 28.10.1988. See also II sole 24 ore, 29.10.1988 ()Le ragioni del 
ripensamento, gid segnalato I ’altro ieri dal vicepresidente socialista del Consiglio, Gianni De 
Michelis, ma in atto anche ai vertici della DC, sono ... in larga parte dovute a più prosaiche 
logiche di spartizione partitica e a resistenze sindacali . . . In ogni caso, se matureranno i
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Furthermore, the Minister of State Holdings, Carlo Fracanzani attacked openly 
IRI/STET for its plan to create Super STET and opened an investigation with a view to 
ascertain whether IRI/STET was responsible of violations of financial regulation since the 
news of Super STET obviously affected the stock market. The move by Fracanzani 
seemed a sort of ‘vengeance’ by a faction of the Christian Democracy (the so called “left”) 
against Giuliano Graziosi and his plan to create Super STET.^^^
The differences between the Minister of State Holdings and his Super SIP plan and 
Super STET were resolved in a meeting held on Christmas eve of 1988 between the Minister 
of State Holdings, the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, the vice-secretary of the 
Christian Democratic party (Enzo Scotti), the head of the political secretary of the Christian 
Democratic Party (Giuseppe Gargani) and the heads of the trade unions (Franco Marini and 
Sergio D’Antoni).^^^ In an interview held shortly afterwards the meeting,^^^ the Minister of 
State Holdings stated that:
• the plan to re-organize the sector envisaged a financial holding with a limited 
number of controlled entities, with separate companies for regulated services 
and services opened to competition.
disegni che covano in casa dc e psi, qualche amministratore delle società ohginariamente 
destinate a fondersi in Superstet salverà la sua poltrona, la Cisl potra continuare a difendere 
il suo feudo sindacale dell ’Asst, ma anziché un gestore unico dei servzi di telecomunicazioni 
avremo un gruppo ramijicato in due o tre o forse quattro società operative. I piani di DC e 
Psi prevedono infatti I’attribuzione a una sola società (Telecom Italia) di una concessione 
unica del ministero delle Poste per la gestione dei servizi pubblici di telecomunicazioni, ma 
prevedono anche la distinta e concomitante permanenza della Stet ... nonché di due o più 
società controllate ... L ’idea che caldeggiano Piazza del Gesu e Via del Corso è di dividere 
la gestione dei servizi in concessione ... da quelli non regolamentati... e di parcheggiare 
transitoriamente VAsst in uno spazio autonomoper non scontentare la C is l...”).
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See II sole 24 ore, 23.12.1988.
See II sole 24 ore, 23.12.1988.
See II sole 24 ore, 24.12.1988. The costs of paying off ASST employees had escalated out of 
control, raising tension with the trade unions (see II sole 24 ore, 25.1.1989).
See II sole 24 ore, 29.12.1988.
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• The Minister also argued that this proposal was the most adequate to respond 
to the needs of rationality and efficiency and met EC law too.
• Finally, the Minister dismissed the criticism that this arrangement was made to 
favour the practice of “lottizzazione” and sternly rebuked those who argued 
the contrary.
Thus, at the beginning of 1989, increasing returns had already affected the future 
plans for the re-organization of the sector. The Super STET plan having been discarded, the 
future bill can already be assessed as a step along the well-trodden path of institutional 
development, based on the split-supplier system. In particular, increasing returns played an 
important role in determining the direction of institutional change. While Super STET would 
have meant a significant innovation, increasing returns conditioned institutional choices in 
favour of continuity with the past. Super SIP, with the continued fragmentation of suppliers, 
should therefore be seen against this background as a step along the Italian ‘path’ of 
telecommunications institutions.
The subsequent developments of the bill confirmed that the institutional direction was 
strongly influenced by increasing returns. In this respect, it is important to note that the bill 
was not approved by the council of ministers until the DC congress took place in 1989.^^  ^
This congress was an important appointment, as it was going to assign leadership of the 
party. The repercussions for the re-organization of the sector were potentially very 
significant, given that the ‘left’ faction of the DC was very keen to defend the status quo and.
See 11 sole 24 ore, 27.1.1989 { '^'Consiglio dei ministri rinvia I’esame Superstet”); 4.2.1989 
(“Per VASST alia Stet ancora fumata nera”). See 11 sole 24 ore, 18.1.1989 (“l a  sorte della 
Superstet si chiarira soltanto dopo il congresso democristiano ...”).
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in particular, ASST, as long as it could. After the congress confirmed Ciriaco De Mita’s 
leadership, the bill was approved by the Council of Ministers in March 1989.^^^
The bill provided a high degree of flexibility since it left intact the possibility for the 
continuation of the multi-supplier system, albeit under STET. Moreover, the bill delayed any 
effective choice to a separate decision to be made by Comitato Interministeriale per la 
Programmazione Economica (CIPB).^ "*® More precisely, it was envisaged that all public 
telecommunications services, save a few exceptions,^"*  ^ were going to be operated by a single 
licensee whose majority of shares were to be, directly or indirectly, in the hands of 
Crucially, this was without prejudice to the establishment of operating companies under the 
control of the single licensee.^"*  ^ The composition and the identity of the single licensee were 
deferred to an act of CIPE.
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See II sole 24 ore, 4.3.1989.
Disegno di legge n. 1685, Disposizioni per la riforma del settore delle telecomunicazioni, X 
Legislature, in Atti parlamentari - Disegni di Legge e Relazioni -  Documenti (Roma: 
Tipografia del Senato, 1989). Another bill regarding the reform of the Minister of Post and 
Telecommunications and in particular postal services was simultaneously laid before the 
Chamber of Deputies. See Disegno di legge n. 3805, Disposizioni per la riforma del 
Ministero delle Poste e delle Telecomunicazioni, X Legislature, in Disegni di Legge e 
Relazioni -  Documenti (Roma: Camera dei Deputati, 1989).
Article 1 excluded certain telecommunications services, especially telematics service carried 
out through post offices, certain radio transmission and maritime telecommunications (the 
latter, though, were to remain outside the scope of the single concession only temporarily).
Article 1, para. 1: '"''I servizi di telecomunicazioni ad uso pubblico, nonché I’installazione e 
I’esercizio dei relativi impianti, attualmente gestiti dalVAzienda di Stato per i servizi 
telefonici e dalVAmministrazione delle poste e delle telecomunicazioni, sono affidati in 
esclusiva, entro sei mesi dall’entrata in vigore della presente legge, ai sensi dell’articolo 196 
del codice postale e delle telecomunicazioni approvato con decreto del Présidente della 
Repubblica 29 marzo 1973 n. 156, d ’intesa con il Ministro delle partecipazioni statali, ad una 
Società concessionaria, la maggioranza delle cui azioni aventi diritto di voto sia posseduta 
direttamente o indirettamente dallTstituto per la ricostruzione industriale (IRl); la Società 
concessionaria svolge unitariamente tutti i servizi di telecomunicazioni ad uso pubblico . . .”.
Article 1, para. 2: '"'^ Qualora la Concessionaria, per lo svolgimento di parte dei servizi oggetto 
della concessione, intenda awalersi di altre società controllate o collegate all ’intemo dello 
stesso gruppo deve ottenere il preventivo assenso dei Ministeri delle poste e delle 
telecomunicazioni, del tesoro e delle partecipazioni statalP.
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The bill elicited positive reactions from the Vice President of the Council of Minister, 
the Socialist MP Gianni De Michelis, and the Minister of State Holdings, Carlo Fracanzani, 
both of whom restated their preference for the Super SIP plan, or the split-supplier system. 
Fracanzani repeated his preference for Super SIP several times.
Once they had secured the institutional direction -  which was settled around the split- 
supplier system "^*  ^ - political parties started to argue about “who should control what” in the 
newly designed order. The Christian Democrat Party and the Socialist Party thus entered into 
a skirmish. Each party had its own views as to how the re-organization should work. Both of 
them, though, acted on the basis of the desire to secure the maximum possible influence in
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See II sole 24 ore, 4.3.1989.
See II sole 24 ore, 8.4.1989 {"'^ Un’unica finanziaria con efficace potere di controllo e 
coordinamento da cui dipenda un numéro ristretto di società operative con specijiche 
missioni, distinguendo I’attivita di servizio telefonico (articolata a sua volta in due distinte 
strutture per i servizi regolamentati e per quelli in concorrenza) dalle attività manifatturiere e 
dall’impiantistica ...”); 11.5.1989 {“una società finanziaria «con efficaci poteri di controllo e 
di coordinamento e da cui dipenda un limitato numéro di società operative» e una 
concessionaria dei servizi telefonici regolamentati «responsabile delle infrastrutture di rete, 
eventualmente articolata nelle forme che dovessero apparire più opportune per il 
miglioramento dei servizi..»^y, 4.8.1989.
See II sole 24 ore, 28.2.1989 {“II Piano Superstet è tramontatd’’', “La délibéra del consiglio di 
amministrazione sulla Superstet deve essere, infatti, cancellata e riscritta secondo Massimo 
Fini (Psi) e Sergio Trauner (Pli), esponenti del comitato di presidenza delVIri ...«La 
razionalizzazione -  ha dichiarato Pini -pu o  awenire o secondo il vecchio schema [i.e. Super 
STET, nda], su cui non è più d ’accordo nessuno, o secondo Vipotesi della Democrazia 
Cristiana che mi sembra più intéressante, creando una holding dalla quale dipendano le 
società operative ...»”).
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the new s y s t e m H o l d i n g  a position that forced him to act as a super-partes arbitrator, the 
Prime Minister, Ciriaco De Mita tried to advance the passage of the bill.^ "^ *
In May 1989, though, a new government crisis took place, causing a stop in the 
Parliamentary work, including those concerning the bill. Under the new government, held 
by Giulio Andreotti, another key DC party leader, the contrasts over the future of the 
telecommunications sector continued. In particular, the DC factions appeared divided. This 
caused not only a further delay in the approval of the bill, but took also an institutional turn. 
Lacking an agreement on the reform of the sector, a third plan, other than Super STET and 
Super SIP was proposed. Francesco Tempestini, a Socialist MP serving as the undersecretary 
to the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications suggested that even Super SIP should be 
a b a n d o n e d . H e  called for the DC to solve its internal problems and voiced his preference 
for a situation whereby STET would hold a single licence, but the existing providers would 
continue to e x i s t . T h e  plan suggested by Tempestini represented yet another version of the
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See II sole 24 ore, 27.12.1989 {""Sulla Supersip si prépara una braccio di ferro Dc-Psi ... 
L ’iniziativa della Dc ... si fonda essenzialmente su tre pilastri: 1) trasferimento dei beni e dei 
servizi delVAsst dalla pubblica amministrazione direttamente al gruppo Stet ... attraverso la 
costituzione di un’apposita Spa che mantenga una sua autonoma identità per almeno tre 
anni; 2) attribuzione ... di un unica concessione-quadro ...alia Stet, che a sua voltaprowede 
a sub-concessionare a Sip, Italcable e Telespazio le missioni attualmente da esse svolte ed 
alia nuova società quelle oggi svolte da Asst ed Amministrazione P. V )
See II sole 24 ore, 11.2.1989 {""Nonostante Vappoggio del présidente del Consiglio, Ciriaco 
De Mita, il disegno di legge del ministro delle Poste, Oscar Mammi, non è stato approvato 
per I’opposizione manifestata dai socialisti (in particolare il vicepresidente del Consiglio 
Gianni De Michelis e il ministro del Lavoro Rino Formica) e dai ministri democristiani Paolo 
Cirino Pomicino e Carlo Donat Cattin ... Cirino Pomicino vuole rinviare ogni decisione a 
dopo il congresso democristiano ...”).
See II sole 24 ore, 25.8.1989 (“Sz decide sulle Tic: tramonta Supersip”).
Ibid. {""«Sul riassetto io credo che i punti di riferimento debbano essere sostanzialmente due: 
Vunità della rete e il riconoscimento che le società coinvolte nel processo di 
razionalizzazione dei servizi ... hanno un modo diverso di stare sul mercato» e quindi 
debbano mantenere una loro autonomia operativa...”). See also II sole 24 ore, 24.9.1989.
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split-supplier system, whose aim was to increase the PSI influence in the sector. 
Difference of opinions between DC and PSI arose.
In the meantime, Giuliano Graziosi put forward an alternative proposal.^^^ In order to 
bypass the political deadlock, Graziosi proposed a technical solution that, without prejudice 
to the bill, would see the creation of centre for network control to be operated jointly by 
ASST and SIP. This centre would ensure the single management of the network that was 
needed to improve efficiency. The solution proposed by Graziosi was based on sound 
technological reasons behind the institutional proposal to create a single supplier, namely the 
superiority from a technological point of view of a single network management over spit- 
supply. But this idea failed to obtain support from political parties.
The year 1990 did not see the bill making any substantial progress through 
Parliament. Fracanzani continued to defend Super SIP.^^  ^ Mammi worked to further amend 
the bill. The latest proposals envisaged several providers (as opposed to a singe licensee with 
freedom to set up other companies). This amendment was even more in tune with increasing
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See 11 sole 24 ore, 1.12.1989 (“/a commissione economica del Psi ha lanciato il suo forcing 
sulle telecomunicazioni con il duplice obiettivo di disincagliare la riforma dalle secche 
parlamentari e dalle sabbie mobili sindacali, ma anche di guadagnare spazio nella più ricca 
finanziaria delVIri (la Stet appunto), rinsaldando le sue posizioni al vertice della Sip ...L a  
sortita socialista è un siluro évidente ai postelegrafonici della Cisl ... che, grazie alia loro 
forza elettorale, su queste posizioni hanno Jinora inchiodato i dc del Senato dove la riforma è 
in discussione ... I socialisti fanno capire che la concessionaria unica deve essere la Sip ... 
(dove i socialisti sperano di rafforzare le posizioni del présidente Giannotta) ... è 
consenziente il doroteo Lega ..., che mira a consolidare il ruolo dei due amministratori 
delegati della Sip (Paolo Benzoni e Francesco Silvano) ... ma non sembra che le altre 
correnti DC e soprattutto il ministro Oscar Mammi la pensino alio stesso modo
Sqq II sole 24 ore, 7.3.1990 and 10.3.1990.
See II sole 24 ore, 14.2.1990 and 2.3.1990 (“... al vertice ci sard una finanziaria-cassaforte 
(Vattuale Stet) con il compito di controllo e coordinamento da cui dipenderd un numéro 
ristretto di societd operative in funzione delle effettive esigenze del mercato e degli utenti. La 
Sip diventerd I unica concessionaria dei servizi telefonici regolamentati e sard la sola 
resposabile delle infrastrutture di rete con la possibilitd di organizzarsi nei modi più 
opportuni ... Questa maxi-Sip sard a sua volta affiancata da una o più societd nel campo 
delle attivitd non regolamentate, ad esempio nei servizi a valore aggiunto ...”).
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returns. It moved further away from anything like a single supplier of telecommunications 
and in practice was even more reflective of the status quo, the only difference being the 
‘IRIzation’ of ASST, i.e. the incorporation of ASST within the IRJ group. The amendment 
certainly mitigated the concerns of those who saw the reform as a form of reduction of the 
spoils available.^^"^
These amendments notwithstanding, at the beginning of 1991, it was unsure whether 
the bill would ever be turned into law, as stated by the Minister of Posts of 
Telecommunications who had proposed the bill.^^  ^ Between April and May 1991, the march 
of the bill was paralyzed one more time. This was because, concurrently with its passage 
through Parliament, it was also the time to renew the top positions at SIP. As noted in the 
section above, the politics surrounding these appointments were a key part of the increasing 
returns mechanisms. No prospects of reform, however limited, could be conceivable without 
the solution as to whom would be the victorious contestant of this round of division of the 
spoils.
In May 1991, when Giulio Andreotti, who was Prime Minister for the T**’ time and 
held the post of Minister of State Holdings ad interim too, emerged as the clear winner from 
the appointments of the top positions at SIP, the progress of the bill could re-start. Before the 
Senate concluded its debates in July 1991, the bill was further amended in a direction, which 
was, once again, consistent with the continuation of the status quo and, therefore, with what 
one could expect on the basis of path dependence. Namely, the original version of the bill
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2 56
Sqq 11 sole 24 ore, 13.12.1990.
See II sole 24 ore, 6.3.1991 (“M/ auguro che ci sia una verijica morbida nei rapporti tra le 
forze politiche ma dura sui contenuti. Dalla verifica dovrebbe venir fuori la messa a fuoco di 
alcuni problemi e, per quanto mi riguarda, la conferma della volontà della maggioranza di 
portare avanti la riforma del ministero e il riassetto delle telecomunicazioni con il passaggio 
delVAsst alle Partecipazioni statair).
See II sole 24 ore, 4.2.1991.
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provided that ASST’s successor could remain in operation only for one year and forbade any 
extension of this time limit. The Senators dropped this limitation and replaced it by giving to 
the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications the power to set a deadline.^^^ In essence, this 
meant enhanced flexibility and a renewed opportunity to prolong the life of ASST (and of the 
split-supplier system) under IRI.
On July 19, 1991 the bill was ready to be sent to the Chamber of Deputies, which 
started its work on September 26, 1991.^^  ^ The discussion in the Chamber was very 
l i m i t e d . T h e  representatives of the parties in the ruling coalition, especially the Socialist 
party, the Christian Democrat party and the Republicans, urged the Chamber to approve the 
bill as it stood on the account that reforms had already been stalled for too long at that the bill 
was only a primo passa (first step).^^® The Minister of Posts and Telecommunications 
restated the same argument various times in subsequent hearings that took place before the 
Senate Committee in charge of examining the bill.^^’ Notwithstanding an opinion rendered 
by the Antitrust Authority in one of its first public interventions, whereby the Authority
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See II sole 24 ore, 19.7.1991.
See 11 sole 24 ore, 26.9.1991.
See debates held in the Senate on July 11, 1991 (Senate della Repubblica, 548 seduta 
(pomerid.) Assemblea -  Resoconto Stenografico giovedi 11 luglio 1991 -  Tipografia del 
Senate) and July 18, 1991 (Senate della Repubblica, 552 seduta (antimeridiana) Assemblea -  
Resecente Stenegrafice gievedi 18 luglie 1991 -  Tipografia del Senate); see also the debates 
in the Chamber of Deputies held on November 21, 1989 and on January 15 and 16, 1989 (X 
Legislatura - Atti Parlamentari -  Camera dei deputati- Discussieni, Resecente stenegrafice 
715,746 and 747).
See the debates in the Chamber of Deputies held on November 21, 1991 and on January 15 
and 16, 1992, when the vote on the bill took place (X Legislatura - Atti Parlamentari -  
Camera dei deputati- Discussieni, Resecente stenegrafice 715, 746 and 747).
See statement by the Minister of Pest and Telecommunications at a hearing held on May 10, 
1989 before the Senate Committee for Public Works and Communications (8“ Cemmissiene, 
Laveri Pubblici, Cemunicazieni); see also the statements by Senator Ando (Socialist Party) as 
the ruling coalition representative, at a hearing held on September 21, 1989 and by the 
Minister of State Holdings in a hearing held on November 23, 1989 before the same Senate 
Committee.
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raised doubts as to the compatibility of the bill with competition law/^^ the Chamber of 
Deputies passed the bill without any further amendments and it became law in January
1992^263
The provisions contained in law No. 58 of 1992 were much reduced in scope 
compared to the initial proposals. In terms of institutional reform, the law only provided for 
the winding -  up of and it detailed the procedure to be followed in order to transfer
ASST assets and staff from ASST to a new company. There were no provisions on the 
unification of all telecommunications operators into a single company and the restructuring of 
the sector. The law confined itself to laying down the steps to be followed in order to put 
such restructuring into effect. Namely, the law delegated to CIPE the task of setting out its 
main terms. CIPB’s deliberation was to take place on a proposal from the Minister of State 
Holdings, acting together with the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications.
IRI was also closely associated in the process, as it had to submit indications on the 
restructuring plan and, after CIPE deliberation, IRI was charged with the implementation of 
the plan within strict time limits set out in the law. The law also provided that the Minister of 
Posts and Telecommunications, if so required by CIPE deliberation, had the power to
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Segnalazione AS002, Riforma del settore delle telecomunicazioni, Bollettino 12/1991. This 
opinion was sent to the President of the Council of Ministers and to the Presidents of the two 
branches of Parliament on November 21, 1990. It was mentioned only in passing in the 
parliamentary debates held on January 15, 1991. The opinion expressed the Authority’s 
concerns with respect to the role of IRI, whose already prominent position was reinforced by 
the bill.
“Disposizioni per la riforma del settore delle telecomunicazioni” (GURI n. 29, 5.2.1992).
Article 1, para. 3: “T ’Azienda di Stato per i servizi telefonici, istituita con regio decreto-legge 
14giugno 1925, n. 884, convertito dalla legge 18 marzo 1926, n. 562, è soppressa . . .”.
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supplement existing licences as he saw fit. Finally, CIPE deliberation was also subject to the 
endorsement fi*om parliamentary committees.
Other provisions dealt with the transfer of staff and social security payments, 
without making substantial changes to the initial proposals. It is also noteworthy that the law 
was silent on the incorporation of the new company that was to be the successor of ASST, 
leaving the door open to maintaining ASST intact, although under the umbrella of 
IRI/STET.^ ^^
VI. CONCLUSION
The law of 1992 offers a vantage point to pause and assess the empirical evidence 
discussed in the chapter in light of path dependence and the research question.
First of all, the chapter established the existence of increasing returns in Italian 
telecommunications. The increasing returns stemmed from the relationships between elected
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Article 1, para. 4: “//  Ministro delle partecipazioni statali, di concerto con il Ministro delle 
poste e delle telecomunicazioni, entro novanta giorni dalla data di entrata in vigore della 
presente legge, présenta al Comitato interministeriale per la programmazione economica 
(CIPE), sulla base di indicazioni dell’IRl, una proposta di délibéra concernente i criteri 
generali di riassetto del settore delle telecomunicazionC. See also para. 6, “//  CIPE délibéra 
entro novanta giorni dal ricevimento della proposta di cui al comma 4 e I ’IRI, nei successivi 
centottanta giorni, provvede alia conseguente attuazione. Qualora la délibéra del CIPE lo 
richieda, il Ministro delle poste e delle telecomunicazioni emana appositi atti aggiuntivi alle 
concessioni dei servizi di telecomunicazioni ad uso pubblico in vigore e stipula atti integrativi 
alle annesse convenzioni. La délibéra del CIPE è trasmessa ai Presidenti della Camera dei 
deputati e del Senato della Repubblica ai fini del deferimento alle competenti commissioni 
permanente.
Articles 4 and 5. The law also addressed the problem of tariffs, entrusting to Comitato 
Interministeriale Prezzi (GIF), a committee of ministers in charge of setting prices, acting 
together with the Minister of the Treasury, the Minister of Economic Planning and the 
Minister of State Holdings, on a proposal from the Minister of Post and Telecommunications, 
the task of rebalancing tariffs, bringing them in line with costs and harmonizing them with the 
other Member States
In particular, the law set out that the new company acquiring ASST assets and staff was going 
to be a company under the sole control of IRI. The new company operated under a temporary 
concession whose main terms where laid down in the law. The company duration was ten 
years, however, the concession was going to last the time necessary to carry out the 
restmcturing of the sector and in any event no longer than one year, albeit with the possibility 
of renewal.
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politicians and telecommunications suppliers. The starting point of the chapter’s 
observations on these relationships is the financial crisis of SIP in 1979, which made the 
company greatly dependent on political parties to obtain state funds needed to continue to 
provide services and expand the network in compliance with the terms of its licence. 
Political parties divided between themselves the top posts (lottizzazione) and requested that 
‘loyal’ management carry out their instructions. Tariff increases, another vital component of 
SIP viability given that its revenues were entirely based on tariffs, were also in the hands of 
political parties, which used their power of approval to further condition SIP’s behaviour 
according to their needs.
In particular, SIP’s resources were used to hire staff, to make investments in 
depressed areas, to buy equipments from ‘friendly’ firms and in a variety of other ways that 
could boost power and influence for political parties and, ultimately, bring votes. A similar, 
if even more pronounced, relationship bound political parties and ASST. Being a central 
government administration, ASST was even more subject to political control and it was in 
fact a preferred vehicle to carry out politically oriented manoeuvres as its accounting rules 
allowed very little outside control.
But investment decisions made in the name of patronage politics dilapidated 
resources. SIP and ASST were burdened with inefficient expenses and so were permanently 
in need of fresh funds to continue to operate. Telecommunications providers thus had to go 
back, cap in hand, to the political parties to obtain new resources. The process then restarted 
and a new round of financing carried with it new conditions. This self-reinforcing feature 
gave a special force to the relationship between political parties and telecommunications, 
‘gluing’ together its protagonists. Thus, the chapter shows that the relationship between 
telecommunications providers and political parties generated a self-reinforcing sequence that
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embodies a case of increasing returns. It further shows that increasing returns accrued to 
political parties. This is an important specification and a novel contribution as path 
dependence studies often overlook the role of actors and, by the same token, to specify who 
are the beneficiaries of increasing returns. This specification also helps to understand how 
increasing returns were one of the factors responsible for Italy’s institutional trajectory.
Indeed, having several suppliers was instrumental to political parties’ appropriation of 
increasing returns. This is because with a multiplicity of providers, each political party, and 
different factions within the leading Christian Democratic party, could better divide resources 
between themselves. This explains why any attempt to alter the number of providers was 
rejected until 1987, when EU law imposed that ASST must end its roles as a supplier and a 
regulator. Crucially, though, the law passed in 1992 to wind up ASST did not state that the 
latter and the other operators were going to be merged into a single entity, the Telecom Italia 
of which STET CEO Giuliano Graziosi had dreamt.
On the contrary, the law of 1992 left intact the possibility that several suppliers could 
continue to divide among themselves the provision of telecommunications services in Italy 
and, even more tellingly, it could not be dismissed that ASST could be reborn under the guise 
of a company under IRJ/STET. The law of 1992, thus, continued the split-supplier albeit in 
an updated form. This outcome is consistent with path dependence since it shows that, 
present increasing returns, Italy followed a bounded-change trajectory and essentially 
continued on the same path as before. Thus, the chapter also shows how increasing returns 
shaped the institutional trajectory in a way that confirms path dependence’s claims.
Before undertaking the exploration of the following period, it is important to reflect 
on the overall logic of the Italian path. This is a fundamental step in the process of assessing 
Italy’s direction of institutional development so that one can be in a position to detect
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continuity or change in the various episodes of institutional alterations. In order to achieve 
this result, it is useful to benchmark Italy’s trajectory with that o f Britain by, first, comparing 
key institutional aspects as o f 1992, and then contrasting the logic o f the British path with 
Italy’s.
The table belcw summarizes key institutional arrangements.
Table 9 - Britain and Italy 1992
Number of providers
 ^ '■ Ownership
Degree of competition
Regulatory body
2/not predefined
Private/listed
Competition
OFTEL
Italy
State control
Monopoly
Ministers
Numbtr o f  providers. Since no one could provide telecommunications 
services without being entrusted to so by the state, the number o f providers 
was limited by law and in 1992 it included four entities, namely SIP, ASST, 
Italcabe and Telespazio. This can be usefully contrasted with Britain, where 
the progressive opening of the sector to competition meant that the 
BT/Mercury duopoly was temporary and that there was no predefined number 
of suppliers from 1992 onwards.
Ownership. By floating the majority o f its shares in BT, the government had 
relinquished ownership over the company. In Italy, the State controlled the 
providers either directly, such as in the case o f ASST, or indirectly, such as in 
the case o f the licensees.
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• Degree o f  competition. One of the key premises of the reform of the British 
sector was the introduction of competition in what used to be a closed 
monopoly. In Italy, the four existing suppliers enjoyed a monopoly protected 
by their exclusive licences.
• Allocation o f  regulatory power. Perhaps the starkest contrast between the two 
countries can be found in examining the differences in the arrangements 
concerning allocation of regulatory powers. By choosing to entrust to an IRA 
regulatory powers, Britain took a radical step. The Secretary of State lost the 
ability to control BT operations, whereas an independent body, free from 
governmental interference, became the repository of such an important power. 
Italy’s arrangements stood in direct contrast, as the Minister of Posts and 
Telecommunications and, indeed, elected politicians in general, enjoyed 
control over the suppliers. As shown by the discussion concerning the 
existence of increasing returns, political control was magnified through a self­
reinforcing relationship that embodies a case of increasing returns. This is the 
starting point to characterize the Italian logic of institutional development.
The changes that took place in Britain led to a path whose logic was characterized by 
the separation of suppliers from elected politicians. In Italy, on the contrary, elected 
politicians enjoyed control over suppliers to the extent that the former used the latter to foster 
their needs in a systematic way. This had several dimensions that can be examined to better 
appreciate the logic of the Italian path.
First of all, all pricing decisions were taken under the influence of elected politicians. 
In particular, tariff setting was formally in the hands of the Minister of Posts and 
Telecommunications and the Treasury. They used this power not only to foster goals of
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general economic policy, such as combating inflation, but also as a lever to cajole the 
suppliers in fulfilling tbeir instructions. Thus, SIP repeated claims for automatic tariff 
adjustment were consistently rejected. Elected politicians jealously guarded tbeir margin of 
discretion to ensure unfettered control over the suppliers. In contrast, once BT was 
privatized, all pricing matters fell within the sole discretion of the company, albeit acting in 
compliance with rules set by the IRA. In this respect, the suppliers were separate from 
elected politicians and only answered to Oftel for tbeir pricing behaviour.
Secondly, market structure in Italy was also tightly controlled by elected politicians. 
The chapter showed bow proposals for reform centered on the reduction of the number of 
suppliers and the merger of all operators into a single company. These proposals were long 
opposed because of the threat they posed to the workings of the political system. A reduced 
number of providers would have impaired political parties’ ability to divide between 
themselves the spoils, since it would have resulted into a fewer number of top positions. This 
eloquently shows the extent to which market structure was in the bands of elected politicians. 
Whereas in Britain joint venture agreements between BT and other companies or the disposal 
or reorganization of BT assets was again purely a matter for the company and the regulator, 
and, in any event, assessed on the basis of economic or technological reasons, in Italy the 
dominant considerations were increasing returns for elected politicians.
Third, given the high degree of control by political parties over suppliers, it is 
understandable that there was no discussion of having an Independent Regulatory Agency, 
hence there was no need for rules to allocate powers between the latter and elected 
politicians. Timid proposals advanced by academics and consultants were rejected out of 
band, as leading politicians asserted tbeir prerogatives over the suppliers undisturbed. An 
Italian Oftel was therefore unthinkable in those days.
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The foregoing shows that the overall logic of the Italian path was based on elected 
politicians’ control over suppliers. This relationship was an especially strong one due to its 
self-reinforcing character which represents a case of increasing returns. Given privatization, 
competition and regulation by independent agency in Britain, it is not surprising to see the 
two countries continuously diverging through time. Unexpectedly, though, the Italian logic 
was challenged by the events that took place after 1992.
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5. Increasing Returns and New Directions of Institutionai 
Development: Italian Telecommunications 1992-1997
I. INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses on the period between the adoption of law No. 58 of 1992 and 
1997, i.e. the period when major institutional reforms were introduced. Based on path 
dependence, one should have expected the continuation of a split-supplier system and a logic 
based on full control of telecommunications providers by political parties.
Yet on the contrary, this period experienced changes that are difficult to reconcile 
with the past trajectory. In 1994, all providers were merged into Telecom Italia. In 1995, a 
law was approved to create independent regulatory authorities to neutralize political 
interference in the day-to-day management of public utilities. In 1997, the law on the 
creation of a sector specific authority for telecommunications was approved and, shortly 
afterwards, Telecom Italia was privatized by a share offering while new rules on competition 
were enacted.
It should also be said that in 1992 very significant changes took place at the level of 
national politics that make 1992 a watershed in Italian history, so that it is common to hold 
that 1992 marked the end of what was called the ‘First Republic
268 For bibliographical references to studies on the end of the First Republic, see the review 
article by J. Bull, ‘The Roots of the Italian Crisis’, 1(1) South European Society and Politics 
(1996). For studies in English, see P. Ginsborg, ‘Explaining Italy’s Crisis’, in S. Gundle and 
S. Parker (eds.). The New Italian Republic: From the Fall o f the Berlin Wall to Berlusconi 
(London: Routledge, 2000); S. Koff and S. Koff, Italy, From the First to the Second Republic 
(Routledge: London, 2000); G. Pasquino and P. McCarthy (eds.). The End o f Post-War 
Politics in Italy-The Landmark 1992 Elections (Boulder: Westview, 1993). For academic 
works in Italian, see G. Sartori, Seconda Repubblica? Si, ma bene (Milano: Rizzoli, 1992); P. 
Barucci, L ’isola italiana del tesoro -  Ricordi di un naufragio evitato 1992-1994 (Milano: 
Rizzoli, 1995); Cafagna, La grande slavina; M. Cotta, La crisi del govemo di partito 
all’italiana’, in M. Cotta and P. Isemia (eds.), 11 gigante dai piedi d ’argilla (Bologna: II 
Mulino, 1996). See also M. Gilbert, The Italian Revolution-The End o f Politics Italian Style? 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). See also J. L. Newell, Parties and Democracies in Italy
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The period studied in this chapter thus poses a key question for path dependence. 
Given that increasing returns were present (as was established in the previous chapter), how 
is one to reconcile what ostensibly seems ‘off-path’ change with increasing returns? A 
common way out of this dilemma would be to call on a deus ex machina explanation. One 
could simply argue that path dependence has nothing to say about the changes in 
telecommunications institutions because, like an earthquake, the end of the First Republic 
changed everything, including telecommunications institutions. This would mean discarding 
increasing returns as irrelevant for the study of institutional reform of Italian 
telecommunications. The chapter refutes this contention. The central argument of the 
chapter is that when pressures are sufficient for change to happen, increasing returns remain 
fully relevant to studying institutional reform.
It is important to state at the outset that the increasing returns discussed in this chapter 
are the increasing returns detailed in the previous chapter. More specifically, this chapter 
relies on earlier findings about the mechanisms through which increasing returns arose in the 
pre-1992 period, i.e. the tight links between elected politicians and telecommunications 
suppliers. The present chapter shows that these links broke down in 1992-1993 because of 
developments at the national level caused by the mani pulite investigations and the end of the 
First Republic. By the same token, the increasing returns of the pre-1992 period also ceased 
to exist. In sum, one could say that the present chapter discusses increasing returns post­
mortem. But, far from being defunct, the chapter shows that increasing returns (or past 
increasing returns, for the sake of clarity) were very much alive in shaping the institutional 
trajectory.
(Ashgate: Aldershot, 2000), ch. 1 “^The Revolution in Italian politics’ and M. Rhodes, 
‘Financing Party Politics in Italy: A case of Systemic Corruption’, in M. Bull and M. Rhodes, 
Crisis and Transition in Italian Politics (London; Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 1997), 54.
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Indeed, the chapter shows that there are two intertwined ways in which past 
increasing returns affected institutional direction. First of all, increasing returns sparked a 
process of rejection. Some elected politicians dissatisfied by past increasing returns staged a 
reaction aimed at designing new institutions in such a way that increasing returns could not 
operate. They pressed for a logic inspired by the complete separation between suppliers and 
elected politicians, or a UK-style logic. Thus, these actors were notably in favour of 
delegation to IRA of sweeping regulatory powers and the creation of an Italian version of 
Oftel.
The second way in which increasing returns operated was through a counter-reaction 
to rejection of increasing returns as other elected officials tried to limit the push for 
embracing the UK-style logic. In particular, they tried to influence proposals for institutional 
reform in order to limit the loss of power that would have occurred if such a UK-style logic 
had been embraced in full in re-designing new institutions. In other words, they were in 
favour of more limited separation between elected politicians and suppliers than in the UK. 
Thus, through reactions and counter-reactions, the increasing returns shown in the previous 
chapter remained at the heart of the post-1992 institutional reforms.
It is worth stressing again that increasing returns means past increasing returns. That 
is, elected officials after 1992 did not try to resurrect the ‘old’ increasing returns or to 
reinstate the same pattern of relationships with suppliers that was the fabrics of past 
increasing returns. In this respect, when discussing ‘ counter-reactions ’ the thesis does not 
argue that elected officials who opposed a UK-style logic of separation claimed a wholesale 
return to the past. There is no evidence, for instance, that Senator Castelli, who complained 
that the political power was relinquishing too much power to A C C O M , t h o u g h t  that the
See infra. Section IV.
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Minister of Communications should be entitled to hire personnel to rewards ‘friends’. 
Rejection of increasing returns and counter reaction to this tendency thus share a common 
position in so far as both camps started from the premise that past increasing returns were 
ended.
However, such past increasing returns influenced both, since the lesson that one group 
took from their death was that there should be complete separation between suppliers and 
elected politicians, whereas the others opted for a more limited degree of separation.
The debate between these two groups played out differently on the different 
institutions that are used as the key units of observations:
• Number o f  providers. Past increasing returns centred on the fragmentation of 
suppliers. Rejection of increasing returns provided a strong and unequivocal 
impetus for unification. This reform was accomplished between 1992 and 
1994, when Telecom Italia was created as the single supplier.
• Ownership and allocation o f  regulatory powers. These two features became 
intertwined because privatization was subject to the creation of a sector 
specific regulator. The debate on the creation of an IRA was an essential 
component of rejection of increasing returns. Delegation of powers to an 
independent body was viewed as a way to impede the resurgence of new 
increasing returns. However, the degree of independence of the IRA was 
contested. Thus, the logic of institutional reform of Italian 
telecommunications did not become apparent in 1997. This justifies extending 
the inquiry beyond 1997. Privatization, though, occurred in 1997.
162
• Rules on competition. Past increasing returns concerned to a lesser degree 
rules on competition. Moreover, there were strong exogenous factors. Thus, 
the impact of past increasing returns on the direction of change was more 
limited. Institutional reforms were accomplished in 1997.
Taken together, these findings show a feature of increasing returns that has so far not 
received attention by the literature on path dependence, namely the fact that increasing 
returns can cause reactions by actors and counter reactions. This view can bring a much- 
needed dose of dynamism to the theory and dispel the tendency towards determinism that is 
often a criticism of path dependence . Thr ough  the case of Italian telecommunications, the 
chapter shows that increasing returns can have a far richer explanatory power. It encourages 
focusing more on the empirical evidence before assuming that increasing returns operate only 
to drive countries along a steady trajectory.
It is also important to clarify that actors’ reactions were connected with the end of the 
First Republic, or a macro-development at the level of national politics. Hence, the chapter 
shows interactions between different levels of decision making, although the task is not to 
explain the causes of the end of the First Republic. Rather, in keeping with the focus of the 
thesis, the present chapter continues to explore whether increasing returns at the national 
level affected the direction of institutional development and, if so, how and why such changes 
took place at the national level. The key finding in this respect is that sectoral increasing 
returns did affect the new direction of institutional development through a series of reactions 
and counter reactions by actors when major changes took place at the national level. To the 
extent that these reactions coincided with the end of the First Republic, the latter is relevant 
for the argument of the thesis.
See, for instance, Crouch and Farrell, ‘Breaking the Path of Institutional Development? 
Alternatives to the New Determinism’.
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This chapter is organized as follows. The first section below sets out the starting 
point, i.e. the situation of Italian telecommunications institutions at the beginning of the 
period studied, focusing on the aftermath of the adoption of Law No. 58 of 1992. The 
following sections trace the trajectory of institutional development and try to connect 
institutional developments to rejection of increasing returns and counter-reactions to such 
rejection.
II. THE STARTING POINT: LAW NO. 58 OF 1992 AND THE PREMISES FOR 
THE CONTINUATION OF THE SPLIT-SUPPLIER SYSTEM
When it was adopted in January 1992, Law No. 58 provided for the transfer of ASST 
to IRI, subject to a plan by the latter to be approved by CIPE. The IRI/CIPE plan was 
therefore the centrepiece of the new organization of the sector. Under Law No. 58 this plan 
could have envisaged several suppliers, i.e. a continuation of the split-supplier system that 
formed the backbone of the institutional path of Italian telecommunications until then. 
Indeed, between May and June 1992, the President of IRI (Franco Nobili) and the President 
of STET (Biagio Agnes) drew up a plan, which was based on a three-company structure. 
The companies were called with acronyms, Alfa, Beta and Gamma.
• Alfa coincided with SIP and was in charge of telecommunications services 
within Italy. Alfa could also spin off certain activities into separate 
companies, such as mobile telephony.
• Beta would be in charge of international and inter-continental telephony 
services. Beta, in essence, coincided with Italcable.
• Neither Alfa nor Beta included the networks. This was to be the main asset of 
company Gamma, which would inherit the assets of former ASST, of which it
271 See 11 sole 24 ore, 10.6.1992.
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would be a direct successor. Gamma would also encompass the satellites 
under the control of Telespazio, whereas other activities of Telespazio would 
be part of another company (Nuova Telespazio). Gamma’s shareholders 
would be Stet and the other two companies (Alfa and Beta), who would be the 
main users of Gamma’s infrastructure.
• Finally, the single management and planning of telecommunications services 
would be a central remit of Stet, to be exercised through its holding role.
As can be seen, the Nobili/Agnes plan left almost intact the organization of the sector: 
STET continued to exercise its holding role, while there continued to be at least three 
different suppliers; ASST would have been ‘reborn’ as company Gamma, albeit under the 
control of IRI/STET. In sum, the plan fitted very well in the overall trajectory of the Italian 
path.
As to the other relevant institutional features, it can be noted that there were plans 
about opening the supply of mobile telephony to a second operator, thus introducing a degree 
of competition. However, no concrete steps had been adopted. Moreover, in 1991, Prodi 
and Prosperetti (both writing in their capacity as representatives of Italian research centre 
NOMISMA) had advanced the idea of setting up a single regulatory authority for all public 
services, eminently with price-setting p o w e r s . A s  it was the case for the introduction of 
competition, these plans also did not yield any concrete result. Finally, privatization had not 
received consideration in terms of legislative process.
This was the institutional starting point at the beginning of the period studied.
See, e.g., II sole 24 ore, 18.1.1992.
See 11 sole 24 ore, 4.2.1991.
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III. THE REJECTION OF INCREASING RETURNS AND THE BIRTH OF
TELECOM ITALIA: 1992-1994
Elections held in April 1992 had returned an uncertain verdict for the ruling coalition. 
The DC was still the largest party, although it fell for the first time behind 30%. Moreover, 
the Socialist Party failed to make any advance relative to the results obtained five years 
before. By contrast, new political formations reaped a significant share of votes. In 
particular, the Northern League (Lega Nord) emerged as the fourth party on a national scale 
and the first party in certain areas of Northern Italy. These electoral results already showed 
signs of growing unease between the public about the traditional ruling coalition.
The uneasiness only increased with the ''mani pulite" investigations, which started in 
1992 with the arrest of a member of the PSI charged with corruption. A series of depositions 
by businessmen publicly accused leading political figures.^^"  ^ These investigations harmed 
mostly the Socialist Party and made its leader, Bettino Craxi, unsuitable to become prime 
minister. Bettino Craxi represented in many ways an embodiment of the increasing returns 
process.^^^ The pact signed between the socialist leader and Amaldo Forlani, the secretary of 
the DC, before the 1992 elections, to assign top posts in the government even before elections 
took place, was emblematic of the way in which political parties had taken control of the 
state.
Later on, ''mani pulite"" investigations led to the indictment of several protagonists of 
Italian telecommunications. In May 1993, the head of ASST, Giuseppe Parrella was arrested 
for having accepted bribes by companies involved with the construction of the telephone
274
275
A caveat is in order with reference to these investigations. The thesis does not discuss 
whether the people who were investigated were in fact guilty. It is well-known that, in some 
cases, people have been fully acquitted. The investigations are relevant for the thesis only in 
so far as they contributed to the rejection of increasing returns. Therefore, the mention of 
people being investigated does not imply any judgment as to their legal position.
S. Ando, La resa della Repubblica (Roma; Koine Nuove Edizioni, 2006).
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n e t w o r k . T h e  investigations uncovered how the money illegally received was then used to 
finance the electoral campaigns.^^^ Mr. Parrella apparently admitted that the money had been 
paid to the Socialist party, the Christian Democracy, the Republican Party and the 
Socialdemocratic Party.^^^ ASST’s role as the hub of a system, which was meant to drain 
resources from telecommunications in favor of political parties, came fully into light.
The investigations did not stop at ASST, though. The licensees’ managers became 
also involved. A manager of Italtel, a manufacturing company, was accused of bribes. 
Giuliano Graziosi too, a former head of STET, was placed under investigation.^^^ Vito 
Gamberale, one of the two C.E.O.s. of SIP was arrested, together with the secretary of the 
socialist party, Giulio Di Donato.^^* In May 1993, the President of IRI, Franco Nobili was 
also arrested.
The investigations did not spare the Ministry either. Oscar Mammi, a member of the 
Republican Party, who was Minister of Posts and Telecommunications between 1988 and 
1991 in the De Mita and Andreotti (VI) governments, came under investigation in May 
1993.^^  ^ Carlo Vizzini, a member of the Social-Democratic Party, who was Minister of Posts
2 7 6
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II sole 24 ore, 15.5.1993,
Sqq II sole 24 ore, 16.5.1994, 18.5.1993, 19.5.1993, and 22.5.1993.
See II sole 24 ore, 12.6.1993.
See II sole 24 ore, 4.6.1993.
See II sole 24 ore, 27.6.1993. Charges against Giuliano Graziosi have been dropped and he 
has been cleared of any wrongdoing.
See II sole 24 ore, 1.6.1992, 3.6.1993, 29.10.1993, 5.1.1994. Vito Gamberale was 
imprisoned. He was later released from prison and charges against him were dropped in their 
entirety. This was an unfortunate episode from the point of view of administration of justice. 
However, it is important to remember that the relevance of the episode for the thesis lies in 
the fact that Mr. Gamberale was considered an appointee of the PSI. This is an objective fact 
that is independent of any issue of criminal responsibility or lack thereof.
II sole 24 ore, 13.5.1993.
II sole 24 ore, 11. 5. 1993, 15. 5. 1993, 16. 5. 1993, 19. 5. 1993, 20. 5. 1993,22. 5. 1993, 
4.6.1993.
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and Telecommunications between 1991 and 1992 in the last Andreotti government, came 
under investigation in June 1993/^"*
The investigations thus exposed the misdemeanours of political parties and 
telecommunications companies. By discrediting all the protagonists of the ‘old’ path of 
Italian telecommunications, mani pulite ended elected politicians’ unfettered ability to use 
divisions of spoils {lottizzazione) and tariffs to foster their goals. The mechanisms that had 
generated the pre-1992 increasing returns ceased to operate. These developments in the 
telecommunications sector occurred at the same time as important events were taking place at 
the political level.
In 1992, President Scalfaro appointed one of Craxi’s closest collaborators, Giuliano 
Amato, as Prime Minister. The tenure of Giuliano Amato came at an especially critical time. 
Most of his ministers had to resign because they were caught in the '’mani pulite' 
investigations. Giuliano Amato had to face a very serious economic crisis, with public debt 
mounting out of control and Italy’s economy at risk of failing to meet the Maastricht 
c r i t e r i a . I n  addition, brutal mafia killings shocked public opinion when two magistrates 
were blown up in Sicily.
The extreme gravity of the situation and the weakening of traditional parties gave to 
Giuliano Amato an opportunity to introduce sweeping institutional reforms. As he stated 
upon his appointment, Giuliano Amato was determined: “/o change the rules" H i s
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See II sole 24 ore, 9.6.1993.
The Amato government used a vote of no-confidence to push through an emergency budget 
package worth a record L30,000bn. See Financial Times, 4.8.1992.
See P. Ginsborg, Italy and Its Discontents, 264-267.
See G. Amato, in a Financial Times interview, 16.7.1992. See also G. Amato, ‘Un govemo 
nella transizione. La mia esperienza di Présidente del Consiglio’, Quaderni Costituzionali, 3 
(1994).
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government immediately distanced himself from the traditional party-based allocations of 
charges when he chose to reduce the cabinet post from a record 32 to 24 portfolios and to 
appoint six ‘technocrats’, chosen for their competence and not for party affiliation, including 
Mr Piero Barucci, the managing director of Credito Italiano, who was given the Treasury 
Ministry.
The push for institutional reform was especially visible in the economic politics of the 
Amato government, where he sought to pursue simultaneously economic reform and to 
restore public m o r a l i t y . O n  economic reforms, Amato started an ambitious privatisation 
programme, whose first step was the transformation of state-owned holding companies, 
including IRI, in joint stock companies. In addition, Giuliano Amato decided to abolish 
committees and boards in state-controlled entities, including IRI, that were composed of up to 
15 political placemen, chosen to reflect the balance of power between the governing 
parties.^^ ^
Instead, the new board of IRI would comprise the existing, politically appointed, 
chairman, with reduced executive power, a new post of managing director (to be filled 
internally) and a senior civil servant. Future acquisitions, disposals or flotation were to be 
decided by shareholders’ meetings, thus giving the Treasury, as the leading shareholder, the 
ultimate say. Compared to the earlier situation of lottizzazione between political parties, this 
already meant a higher degree of separation between suppliers and political parties, since the 
Treasury was trusted for technical independence and, moreover, had a clear mandate to seek
See Financial Times, 29.6.1992. 
See Financial Times, 12.8.1992.
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privatization in order to allay Italy’s disastrous budget situation. It is understandable, 
therefore, that this move was hailed as ‘revolution’ and ‘earthquake’ by business circles.
The transformation of IRI into a joint stock company was meant as a facilitating 
device for privatisation of the operating companies controlled by these entities. As he would 
put it, this was “ ... a machine that will be forced towards privatisation’' T h e  privatization 
program that was launched was not only an answer to the financial problems of Italian 
economy, but was also a way to cut off state resources from the parties’ h a n d s . I n  other 
words, privatization was for Giuliano Amato a political solution to past problems. Taken 
together, these policies showed a rejection of increasing retums.^^^
The sale of public companies was intended as a source of ‘moralization’ in the 
political life because it sought to end the mechanisms that had permitted elected politicians to 
reap increasing returns and to make it impossible for them to spring up again. Privatization 
was thus conceived as an explicit reaction to the mechanisms of increasing returns that were 
common in the pre-1992 period (described in the previous chapter). Furthermore, 
privatization was part of a push to embrace a UK-style logic, based on separation between 
suppliers and elected politicians. In this respect, privatization represented a fundamental 
element in the attempt to substantially alter Italy’s trajectory of institutional development in a 
way that would have made it converge with Britain’s.
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Sqq Financial Times, 12.8.1992.
See G. Amato, in 2l Financial Times interview, 16.7.1992.
Personal interview senior legislator, April 2002.
See S. Cassese, ‘Le privatizzazioni: arretramento o riorganizzazione dello Stato ?’, Rivista 
Italiana di Diritto Pubblico Comunitario, (1996), 579-90, at 581-2; Cafagna, La grande 
slavina, “Le privatizzazioni, correttamente amministrate, sono non la chiave di volta, ma 
I’essenza stessa di una moralizzazione politica, unitamente a nuove norme di rigore 
concorrenziale ... non perché «non si rubi» ... ma perché non si possa più costruire la 
politica stessa sulla base delVeccitante possibilità di tasliessiare una base imponibile 
immensd" (emphasis in the original), 176.
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Consistent with this policy of rejection of increasing returns, Amato acted to end the 
split-supplier system too, which was an emblem of political parties’ grip over 
telecommunications institutions. On his appointment as Prime Minister in June 1992, 
Giuliano Amato took the rather unusual step of directly writing to IRI’s president, Nobili, to 
tell him to delay the plan of a three-company structure until the new government had been 
formed. Giuliano Amato considered that the three-company structure proposed by IRI was 
tainted by increasing retums.^^^ This structure was too closely modelled on the old system of 
split-suppliers, where each political party and factions was at home. In contrast, he saw a 
single supplier as a way to carry out precisely the reform that Giuliano Graziosi had declared 
impossible because of the opposition of political parties.
Giuliano Amato’s determination to create a single supplier as a way of carrying out 
the policy of rejection of increasing returns had to overcome several obstacles. First, 
Amato’s views were not unanimously shared by other members of his government. In 
particular, the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, Maurizio Pagani, a member of the 
Social Democratic Party, complained about Amato’s direct i n t e r v e n t i o n . I n d e e d ,  the 
Minister of Posts and Telecommunications was accused of deliberately trying to sabotage the 
incorporation of ASST into IRI because he would have lost control of a strategic project to 
create a dedicated network for business u s e r s . M a u r i z i o  Pagani promptly dismissed the 
speculations.^^^ However, the fact remained that the Minister of Posts and 
Telecommunications had an interest in keeping the funds relative to this project
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See II sole 24 ore, 25.6.1992. 
See 11 sole 24 ore, 17.5.1992. 
See II sole 24 ore, 30.7.1992. 
See II sole 24 ore, 2.12.1992. 
See II sole 24 ore, 4.12.1992.
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(approximately 1,500 billion lira) within his ministry, rather than surrender them to IRJ (and 
the Treasury Minister)/^^
Second, there was still significant resistance on the part of IRI to abandoning its 
original three-company structure. In September 1992, IRI put forward a new proposal, which 
was still based on a split-supplier model.^^^ The plan envisaged two companies, one of 
which would be in charge of services and the other would handle infrastructure. Eventually, 
though, IRI abandoned its resistance since the complete paralysis of the plan to merge ASST 
in IRI was putting in danger the latter’s shaky financial position. In fact, the Minister of the 
Treasury, Piero Barucci, pressed for a speedy transfer of ASST to IRI for reasons linked to 
the latter’s economic p o s i t i o n . Th u s ,  on December 18, 1992 Biagio Agnes called publicly 
on Giuliano Amato to take action and ease the deadlock that had halted any plan to 
reorganize the sector.
After an initial hesitation due to the opposition the plan met,^ ®^  on December 24, 1992 
the government declared that ASST had been transferred to IRI by means of the creation of a 
new company, IRITEL.^^"* This marked the definitive end of the split-supplier system as, in 
the government’s intention, the creation of IRITEL as the successor company of ASST was a
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See II sole 24 ore, 9.12.1992 and 16.12.1992.
See 11 sole 24 ore, 27.9.1992.
SeQ II sole 24 ore, 3.12.1992.
See II sole 24 ore, 18.12.1992.
The Amato government at first took steps to postpone the wind up of ASST. In drawing up 
the budget for 1993, it was forced to indicate ASST as a separate entity. This fuelled 
speculation as to the fact that the government was in fact trying to keep ASST alive (see II 
sole 24 ore, 2.10.1992).
See II sole 24 ore, 24.12.1993.
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procedural step towards the creation of a single supplier, by then baptized as “Telecom
Italia”.^ ’
The role played by rejection of increasing returns cannot be easily dismissed. IRI’s 
proposals based on separation between network and services were rejected because they 
would have reproduced the fragmentation of suppliers that was used during the previous 
period in order to deliver increasing returns for the different parties and factions. Indeed, 
increasing returns had found an ideal climate to grow in the split-supplier system. By the 
same token, the wind that turned against increasing returns in 1992 helped end any 
organization of the sector that was reminiscent of increasing returns. In fact, the single­
supplier model was part of the policy fostered by the Amato government of rejecting 
increasing returns.
The institutional turn was marked by the CIPE deliberation of April 1993, which, 
implementing Law No. 58 of 1992, drew up a plan for the re-organization of the system. 
Contrary to the premises that had generated Law No. 58, i.e. the continuation of the split- 
supplier system, CIPE’s deliberation led to the creation of Telecom Italia, the new single 
provider. According to the recitals of the deliberation, the creation of a single operator 
was an “indispensable step” to bring Italy in line with EC and world trends in the sector.
The CIPE resolution further considered that (i) there was a need to find a suitable 
institutional solution for the regulation of the sector; (ii) there should be a distinction between 
the ‘reserved’ telecommunications services and telecommunications services open to
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Sqq II sole 24 ore, 30.12.1993.
Comitato Interministeriale per la Programmazione Economica -  Deliberazione 2 aprile 1993 
'’''Determinazione dei criteri generali di riassetto del settore delle telecomunicazionr (GURI 
n. 85, 13.4.1993).
See third recital, lett. c) “[L] ’unificazione in un gestore unico delle società del gruppo IRI, 
attualmente concessionarie di servizi di telecomunicazione sia un passo indispensabile [...]”.
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competition; (iii) tariffs should be brought in line with costs through a price cap system; (iv) a 
separation between telecommunications operation and equipment manufacturing was 
indispensable; (v) finally CIPE also considered that the role of the state as the controlling 
shareholder, direct or indirect, in the company resulting from the merger of the existing 
licensees, had to decrease so that the State become a minority shareholder, although a 
“significant” one.^ ®^
Based on these premises, CIPE’s resolution called for a) a merger of all existing 
licensees, including the new company resulting from the winding-up of ASST, IRITEL 
S.pA;^^^ b) separation between telecommunications services operated under a concession 
and other telecommunications services; c) separation between telecommunications services 
and equipment manufacturing/ ^ ^
The CIPE resolution requested IRI, the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, 
the Minister of the Treasury, the Minister for the Reorganization of State Holdings,^'* the 
Minister of Economic Planning, and the commission in charge of the evaluation of ASST
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See recitals 4 - 8 ,  lett. d) -  e), h): “d) [I]« armonia a quanto verificatosi negli altri paesi 
europei, si debba dare una nuova defmizione del soggetto regolatore del sistema delle 
telecomunicazioni; e) [L]a gestione del servizi di telecomunicazione debba essere condotta in 
modo tale da consentire trasparenza tra le attività svolte in regime di concessione esclusiva e 
quelle svolte in altri regimi di autorizzazione o di concorrenza; [...]  h) \\J\a presenza dello 
Stato, diretta o indiretta, quale azionista di controllo del gestore unico debba gradualmente 
ridursi jino a restare minoritaria ma comunque significativd\
IRITEL S.p.A. formally began operating on January 1, 1993 pursuant to the terms of the 
licence granted by the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, as provided for by article 
1, para. 1, of law No. 58 of 1992. See Ministero delle Poste e delle Telecomunicazioni 
Decreto 29 dicembre 1992 ''''Concessione in esclusiva alia società Iritel dei servizi di 
telecomunicazioni ad uso pubblico attualmente gestiti dalVASST e dalVAmministrazione delle 
poste e delle telecomunicazioni ed approvazione della relativa convenzione tra il Ministero 
delle poste e delle telecomunicazioni e la società IriteC (GURI n. 306, 31.12.1992).
See CIPE Délibéra, nn. l)-3).
The Minister of State Holdings had been abolished by a referendum in 1993 (see II sole 24 
ore, 20.4.1993).
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assets under law No. 58 of 1992, to undertake the necessary steps to implement the above.^’^  
In furtherance of these provisions, on June 30, 1993 IRI S.p.A.^^^ proposed a plan for the 
unification of the existing providers, including IRITEL S.p.A. *^"^  The Minister of Posts and 
Telecommunications, acting together with the Minister of the Treasury, the Minister for the 
Reorganization of State Holdings and the Minister for Economic Planning approved IRI’s 
plan in August 1993, subject to the condition that the single concessionaire be privatized, so 
as to reduce state ownership below 51%, albeit retaining a golden share.
After the approval of the government, the boards of IRI, STET and the licensees 
worked to implement the m e r g e r . ^ I n  March 1994, the boards of the five concessionaires 
voted in favour of the m e r g e r . ^ Af te r  a slight delay for the shareholders meeting, all the 
necessary procedures were completed. On August 10, 1994, the Antitrust Authority gave its 
approval to the merger, however warning at the same time that the creation of a single 
operator had to be accompanied by an adequate re-regulation of the sector, aimed at the
3 )2
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“[II Cipe invita] a) II Ministro del tesoro, in quanto azionista unico dell’IRI S.p.A., a far si 
che tale piano di riassetto sia presentato entro il 30 giugno 1993; b) il Ministro delle poste e 
delle telecomunicazioni, d ’intesa con il Ministro del tesoro, con il Ministro per le funzioni 
connesse con il riordino delle partecipazioni statali e con il Ministro del hilancio e della 
programmazione economica, ad accertare, entro i trenta giomi successivi, la rispondenza di 
tale piano alle condizioni espresse nella délibéra stessa; c) la commissione di cui all ’articolo 
3, comma 2, della citata legge 29 gennaio 1992, n. 58, ad anticipare al 31 dicembre 1993 il 
termine previsto per la valutazione dejinitiva del complesso aziendale ex Azienda di Stato per 
i servizi telefonici (ASST) e amministrazione PPTT, oggetto di trasferimento della società 
control lata totalitariamente dall’lR I ... ”.
See 11 sole 24 ore, 1.7.1993.
Taking into account that the implementation of the measures contained in the deliberation was 
going to carry on until 1994, CIPE also invited the Minister of Post and Telecommunications 
to prolong IRITEL concession, which was due to expire at the end of 1993. With a decree 
dated December 22, 1993 “Proroga della concessione per I’affidamento in esclusiva alia 
Iritel S.p.A. dei servizi di telecomunicazioni ad uso pubblico e approvazione della relativa 
convenzione tra il Ministero delle poste e delle telecomunicazioni e la società IriteF (GURI 
n. 305, 30.12.1993), the Minister complied with CIPE deliberation, renewing the concession 
until December 31, 1994.
SQQllsole24 ore 7.9.1993, 10.9.1993, and 11.9.1993.
See II sole 24 ore 20.3.1994.
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creation of a level-playing field.^’^  On August 18, 1994, the shares of Telecom Italia began 
trading on the stock exchange.^
IV. REACTIONS AND COUNTER REACTIONS: THE LAW ON INDEPENDENT
AGENCIES (1995) AND THE BIRTH OF ACCOM (1997)
The creation of a single provider was the first step in a more general plan bom out of 
rejection of increasing returns, aimed at changing the direction of Italy’s institutional 
trajectory according to a UK-style logic. Another key component of this plan was the 
creation of IRAs.^*^ By being separated from government and removed from political 
pressures, these agencies were seen as a complement to privatization in the attempt to cut off 
parties’ hands from telecommunications providers’ resources.^^® Together with privatization, 
the reform to create a single supplier and the plans to create an IRA formed the cornerstones 
of a transition to a different logic of institutional development so much changed from the 
previous one that it envisaged a convergence with Britain, whose logic had been at cross­
purposes with Italy’s until then.
Plans to create IRAs were already aired during the Amato government. The Amato 
government, though, ended in April 1993 and was replaced by a government led by Carlo
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See the decision approving the merger. No. C l454, Costituzione Telecom Italia and the 
advice sent to the President of the Council of Ministers and the Minister of Posts and 
Telecommunications on the same subject, No. AS27, Gestore Unico Telefonia, both 
published in Bollettino 32-33/1994.
See 11 sole 24 ore, 20.3.1994.
S e e //sole 24 ore, 9.4.1993 and 14.4.1993.
See S. Cassese, hearing before the I Commission of the Chamber of Deputies on March 24, 
1999, Inquiry on Independent Administrative Authorities (available through the Chamber’s 
web site
http://legislature.camera.it/chioschetto.asp?content=/ dati/leg 13/lavori/stencomm/tabindag.ht 
m). See also S. Cassese, ‘Chi ha paura delle Autorité indipendenti?’, 1(3) Mercato 
Concorrenza Regole (1999), 471-3, at 472, where he argued that independent regulatory 
authorities were the product of the rejection against the appetite of political parties (“z partiti 
piglia-tuttd").
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Azeglio Ciampi, the governor of the bank of I t a l y T h e  appointment of Carlo Azeglio 
Ciampi in itself was a ‘revolution’ of sorts. Carlo Azeglio Ciampi was the first prime 
minister to be a non-parlamentarian. Contrary to the long respected custom of holding 
meetings with party leaders, President Scalfaro appointed Carlo Azeglio Ciampi with no prior 
consultation with political parties.
On being appointed, he stated that his government would try to respond to the desire 
for change that Italy had showed through the referenda held in 1993.^^  ^ The referenda were 
another sign of rejection of increasing returns. They were promoted by Mario Segni, a 
member of the DC and the son of a former president of the Republic. Segni broke ranks with 
its former party and championed a movement of reform. This movement promoted referenda 
as a way to give a direct voice to the citizens. The movement capitalized on the sense of 
uneasiness against the established power of political parties and the way in which they used 
state resources.
Segni’s Pact mobilized an heterogeneous coalition (Liberals, Republicans, Radicals 
and Communists as well as associations of civil society, including the Italian Association of 
Christian Workers, the National Association of Women Electors, the Italian Catholic 
University). The amalgam between the various constituencies was indeed the reaction
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In 1994, Giuliano Amato became president of the Italian Antitrust Authority. During his 
tenure, lasting until 1997, the Authority was extremely active in investigating Telecom 
Italia’s behaviour (3 investigation for abuse o f dominant position were opened in 1995, 
another one was opened in 1996 alongside one for a cartel offence; in 1997, other two 
important abuse of dominant position cases were opened). Furthermore, the Authority issued 
several advices to the government on the implementation of the European regulatory 
framework and the promotion of competition. See AGCM Annual Reports.
See II sole 24 ore, 27.4.1993.
See II sole 24 ore, 27.4.1993.
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against increasing returns 'Vo remove the sources o f  patronage, and undercut the pow er  
bases, o f  the established political parties'"?^^
324
325
The referenda included, inter alia, the following: 325
•  The reform of the electoral law. The electoral law then in force was based on 
the proportionality principles. The referendum campaign characterized the 
proportional system as one of the chief causes for increasing returns. By 
preventing the emergence of a clear majority, the proportional system was 
conducive to coalition governments, based on unstable alliances, which came 
at the price of intensive use of state resources to preserve electoral base. 
Therefore, the promoters of the referendum saw a majoritarian system as 
antidote to increasing returns.
•  The financing of political parties. This issue was at the heart of increasing 
returns. The public outcry that surrounded the abuses of political parties 
fuelled much of the campaign. The referendum proponents vehemently 
campaigned for the abolition of the existing laws.
•  The abolition of the Ministry o f State Holdings. Finally, the abolition of the 
Ministry for State Holdings is very relevant for increasing returns rejection. 
This Ministry was formally charged with the mission of managing the state 
participations in limited liability companies such as the licensees. As such, it 
was one of the key ‘infrastructures’ of increasing returns. Through this 
ministry, political parties controlled directly state resources and could direct
See Bull, Parties and Democracy in Italy, 96. 
There were eight referenda in total.
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investments to their ends. The abolition of this Ministry by a ‘yes’ vote was 
therefore part and parcel of the broad movement against increasing returns.
The popular verdict on these issues was, therefore, an occasion to ‘moralize’ public 
life, embrace change and to denounce the old system based on increasing r e t u r n s . T h e  
results exceeded even the most optimistic expectations of the pro-change front (i.e. the yes 
movement). The average turnout was 77%. The referendum on the electoral law saw the yes 
reaching 82.7%. The majority for ending state subsidies to political parties was higher still: 
90.3%. This was perhaps the most open condemnation of increasing returns. The result was 
interpreted unambiguously as ‘punishment’ for the past practices and in particular for the use 
of state resources through control of state-owned companies. Finally, the referendum on the 
abolition of the Ministry of State holdings also obtained an overwhelming 90%.
Probably one of the most eloquent testimonies on the meaning of the referenda for the 
mechanism of increasing returns which had prevailed in the period until 1992 was Giuliano 
Amato’s speech to the Chamber of Deputies on April 22, 1993. As he tendered his 
resignation, Giuliano Amato asserted that the referenda had brought to an end the party-state 
model that had been in force in Italy since 50 years.
At the same time, the "mani pulite' investigations reached a climax. In October 1993, 
the first hearing in the judgment against Sergio Cusani was televised and it obtained a record 
share of audience. The judgment concerned an alleged bribe paid by the Enimont group to
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See J. Newell and M. Bull, ‘The Italian referenda of April 1993: real change at last?’, Western 
European Politics, (1993), 607-615; P. Corbetta and A. Parisi, ‘The refererendum on the 
electoral law for the Senate: another momentous April’, in C. Mershon and G. Pasquino 
(eds.), Italian Politics-Ending the First Republic (1995), 88.
The Amato government ended on April 28, 1993.
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political parties and an impressive number of political leaders were called to testify (Craxi, 
Forlani, Altissimo, La Malfa, Martelli, Vizzini, and Cirino Pomicino).^^^
The Ciampi government therefore took place at a time of rejection of increasing 
returns and continued the efforts to this effect started by the Amato government. The budget 
was approved by the council of ministers “without any party intermediation”, as the Prime 
Minister s t a t e d , a n d  one of the key points in the Ciampi government’s economic policy 
was the privatization programme. This involved by and large IRI’s companies. Due to its 
level of indebtedness, the State was forced to inject new financial resources into IRI. 
However, this action attracted criticism from the European Commission, which regarded the 
contributions as illegal aid prohibited under the EC Treaty. In July 1993, the then Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Beniamino Andreatta and European Commissioner for Competition, Karel 
Van Miert, agreed on a compromise solution which involved a privatization plan that had a 
large impact on IRI’s holdings and specifically included the privatization of IRI’s 
telecommunications business, besides an obligation on the Italian government to report at 
periodic intervals on the debt level and action taken to lower the state involvement.
The tenure of the Ciampi government saw the first signs of a counter reaction against 
rejection of increasing returns that limited change in the institutional trajectory and, more 
precisely, opposed the creation of IRAs. It should be stated that pre-1992 mechanisms of 
increasing returns had been completely discredited and no one advocated a wholesale 
restoration of lottizzazione. However, at a time of institutional reform, the push for a UK- 
style design of the new institutions brought forward by the Amato government met with
See, e.g., 11 sole 24 ore, 7.12.1994. See also P. Pamparana, II processo Cusani (Milano: 
Mondadori, 1994).
See 11 corriere della sera, 6.9.1993.
See 11 sole 24 ore 30.7.1993, 11.1.1994. See also Thatcher, Internationalisation and 
Economic Institutions, 193 and 195.
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opposition from those who stood to lose from this change. It is worth recalling that a few 
days after passing the 1993 CIPE resolution on the merger of telecommunications providers, 
the council of ministers presided by Giuliano Amato had approved a bill to create 
independent regulatory authorities.^^*
However, ministerial bureaucracies saw the new authorities as a direct threat to their 
powers.^^^ Ministerial bureaucracies thus reacted against the proposal to create independent 
regulatory authorities, representing a counter reaction to rejection of increasing returns. The 
Industry Minister, Paolo Savona, openly opposed the creation of independent regulatory 
authorities to govern tariff setting. He rather preferred to see his ministry officials continue 
to handle this m a t t e r . I n  addition, the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications also
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See 11 sole 24 ore, 21.4.1993.
See II sole 24 ore, 21.4.1993 (“... E non é un caso se le resistenze a un approccio più 
radicale si sono faite sentire fino alVultimo proprio da parte delle nomenklature ministeriali 
(primafra tutte quella del ministero delVIndustria ... Esce cosî ridimensionato il ruolo delle 
Autorità rispetto alVoriginario disegno del Govemo Amato: dovevano Jissare e aggiomare <i 
parametri di riferimento per la valutazione délia congruità dei prezzi e delle tariffe>, ma si 
limiteranno piii genericamente a <valutare le condizioni generali di contratto>. 
Garantiranno la tutela degli interessi degli utenti, la qualità delle prestazioni erogate, 
Veffettiva competitività allargando il mercato ove possibile, maggiore efficienza, sviluppo di 
nuove tecnologie. Sono disegnate più come un osservatorio per la trasparenza che come un 
vero regolatore con poteri di intervento”).
See II sole 24 ore, 16.10.1993 ( “ L û t  rivoluzione nel sistema tariffario per i servizi pubblici ha 
Jinora diviso il Governo: il présidente del Consiglio conferma l'orientamento espresso già 
nelVintesa del 3 luglio, ma il titolare delVIndustria ha più volte osteggiato la scelta di creare 
un 'authority estema per governare le dinamiche tariffarie e, quindi, anche il meccanismo del 
price cap (che lega Vincremento di prezzo a precisi andamenti délia produttività e délia 
qualità e non solo, come è sempre awenuto in passato con il sistema dei rimborsi a piè di 
lista per i diversi gestori, alVandamento delVinflazione puro e semplice). Per Paolo Savona 
meslio sarebbe utilizzare la struttura interna al ministero senza abolirla del tutto. Un 
emendamento alla legge finanziaria prevede Vintroduzione del price cap, mentre per la 
costituzione dell'authority é in atto una mediazione délia commissione Attività produttive 
délia Cawera”-emphasis supplied). See also II sole 24 ore 11.10.1993 and 26.9.1993 (“//  
titolare delVIndustria, pur precisando che una decisione finale in materia sarà presa dai 
ministri competenti entro un mese, non ha nascosto la sua contrarietà alVistituzione di 
Authority di controllo dei servizi a rete nel timore che d o  possa dar luogo a una duplicazione 
delle strutture e ha invece caldeggiato il rafforzamento delle competenze delVAntitrust e 
Vorganizzazione, nei diversi ministeri, di unità di vigilanza sulla qualità e le tariffe dei 
servizf).
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opposed this proposal and entrusted to a group of his officials the task of reviewing tariffs. 
Thus, during the Ciampi government the creation of independent regulatory authorities did 
not move forward, in spite of the fact that a law approved on December 24, 1993 gave to the 
government delegated powers to set up '"'‘organismi indipendenti per la regolazione dei servizi 
di rilevante intéressépubblicd’\^^^
Although plans to create an IRA were adamantly opposed from ministerial 
bureaucracies, this was a case of turf-war within the public administration. From the point of 
view of increasing returns, it is more important to examine the opposition that was brought by 
elected politicians.
General elections took place in 1994 that saw a victory for Silvio Berlusconi’s new 
political creation, the Forza Italia party. The victory of Forza Italia and the rise of the Lega 
Nord also show the extent of rejection of increasing returns in political life. The 1994 
general elections were the first elections after the end of the First Republic and the referenda 
of 1993. Old political parties, i.e. the protagonists of increasing returns, disappeared from the 
scene completely. On the other hand, the victory of Forza Italia, Silvio Berlusconi’s party, 
can also be interpreted as a sign of rejection of increasing returns.
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See II sole 24 ore, 1.10.1993 (‘7/2 questo spirito il Governo Amato aveva presentato un 
progetto di legge che istituiva le cosidette <Authority>. E in questo spirito Ciampi, nelle 
dichiarazioni programmatiche, aveva parlato su questo tema di una <continuità d'azione> 
con il Govemo precedente. Ma contro questo spirito il ministro delVIndustria, Paolo Savona, 
sostiene, senza essere smentito da Palazzo Chisi. di preferire soluzioni "ministeriali". E 
contro questo spirito il ministro delle Poste Maurizio Pasani ha messo in cantiere una 
resolamentazione delle tariffe telefoniche affidata a un orsano /w//2z,y/er/<3/e”-empahsis 
supplied).
See Law No. 537 of 1993, Interventi Correttivi di Finanza Pubblica, '’'’Art. 1 (Organizzazione 
Della Pubblica Amministrazione). 1 . II governo è delegato a emanare, entro nove mesi dalla 
data di entrata in vigore della presente legge, uno o più decreti legislativi diretti a: a) 
riordinare, sopprimere e fondere i ministeri, nonché le amministrazioni ad ordinamento 
autonomo; b) istituire organismi indipendenti per la regolazione dei servizi di rilevante 
intéressé pubblico e prevedere la possibilità di attribuire funzioni omogenee a nuove persone 
giuridiche . ..” (GURI n. 303, 28.12.1993).
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In his first speech as Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi underlined how his 
government stood for change and renewal. As Silvio Berlusconi stated: “z7 rispetto p e r  la 
tradizione repubblicana ... non deve essere usato impropriamente come un freno a 
queiropera di profondo cambiamento e rinnovamento che la nostra gente ci chiede con 
urgenza e passione e che i cittadini hanno tutto il diritto di aspettarsi da chi li rappresenta 
nel governo della nazione ... Una delle fondamentali caratteristiche della maggioranza che 
oggi dà vita alia nuova compagine ministeriale è sotto g li occhi di tutti: le forze che 
sostengono questo governo non stanno insieme p er  una qualche alleanza o alchimia decisa  
nelle sedi dei partiti,. Al nostro stato d ’animo é quello di persone che, esperte p iù  della vita e 
delle sue durezze che non delle malizie della politica di palazzo, sanno tuttavia che le 
istituzioni e lo Stato sono la casa in cui si specchia la societa’\^^^
Furthermore, the success of Forza Italia cannot be explained without reference to the 
‘1992 Revolution’. As McCarthy has argued, ^Ahe Berlusconi phenomenon cannot be 
reduced to a television B litzkrieg’ ... Rather it reflects the response to the crumbling o f  the 
state  ... In a crisis caused by the political c la ss’s invasion o f  economic territory, a 
businessman won out by boldly invading the territory o f  politics
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See S. Berlusconi, Discorsi per la democrazia (Milano: Mondadori, 2001), speech of May 16, 
2004, 18. “Respect for the republican tradition ... should not be used improperly as a brake 
on the process of deep change and renewal that our people demand with urgency and passion 
from us and that citizens can rightfully expect from their representatives in the govern of the 
nation ... One of the fundamental characteristics of the majority that today takes government 
responsibility is before everybody’s eyes: the forces that back this government are not bound 
together by alchemy or alliance decided in the seat of political parties ... our attitude is that of 
people that, expert more about life and its hardships than about the cunningness of palace 
politics, are aware of the fact that the institutions and the State are the home in which our 
society is mirrored”.
P. McCarthy, ‘Forza Italia-The new politics and old values of a changing Italy’, in S. Gundle 
and S. Parker (eds.). The New Italian Republic (London: Routledge, 1996), 133-4.
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The ability to capitalize on distrust of old parties by new formations is also of the key 
factors behind Lega Nord’s success. Lega Nord’s main political claim was a rebellion 
against old parties, an open condemnation of the systemic corruption and a call to the 
electorate to break this system. Lega Nord identified the North of Italy with the “healthy” 
part of the country, where people produced and contributed actively to Italy’s prosperity. In 
contrast, it pitted the ‘good’ North against the ‘bad’ South, and most importantly, against the 
political parties based in Rome, bent on squandering tax payers’ money, i.e., according to the 
Lega, the money of the industrious people of the North.^ "^ ®
With his characteristic belligerence, in 1993, Lega leader Umberto Bossi wrote in the 
introduction to his book “La rivoluzione”: “//  regime dei partiti sta crollando, la rivoluzione 
è alle porte. La Lega si batterà p er  una svolta pacifica, ma molto dipende dalle scelte  
deiroligarchia che dopo mezzo secolo di dominio incontrastato su ll’intero Paese è ancora 
asserragliata nei palazzi del potere, come la corte francese alia vigilia del 1789 . . .La  Lega  
N ord ... ha aperto la strada ai magistrati ed  ha reso possibile una prim a bonifica della  
nomenklatura . . .La  notte è scesa sulla Prima Repubblica e del buio approfittano trasformisti 
di tutte le risme, cascami della partitocrazia abbattuta
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On the Lega, see, e.g., T. Gould, The Lega Nord and Contemporary Politics in Italy (London: 
Palgrave, 2003).
See Cafagna, La grande slavina, 135.
See Bull, Parties and Democracy in Italy, '"'‘By claiming that the larger proportion o f the total 
tax take needed to finance public expenditure necessarily came from the richer North, and by 
blaming the inefficiency of public services on the efforts o f a corrupt, party-dominated 
bureaucracy in far-away Rome to maintain its clientele-based power in an underdeveloped 
South, the League was able to tie small-business discontents firmly to its own autonomist 
concerns'''’ (77-8).
See U. Bossi, La rivoluzione (Milano: Sperling&Kuper, 1993), 1. “The parties’ regime is 
about to collapse, revolution is at the doorstep. Lega will fight for a peaceful transition, but 
this depends on the oligarchy that after half a century of unchallenged domination over the 
entire country is still holding on in the palaces of power, like the French court on the eve of 
1789 ... Lega Nord ... has opened the way to magistrates and made possible a first cleansing
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He then went on to describe the ‘moribound’ old guard and how the Lega vindicated 
the right of Italians, or, in his own words, how la Lega liquidd i vecchi gerarchi del 
regime only to conclude that tutto questo [the end of the First Republic] é awenuto  
grazie alia Legd'?^^
Finally, he portrayed the Lega has the force that could bring about a pacific revolution 
and so lead to a complete demise of increasing returns, not without using a menacing tone 
and warning that ""coloro che rendono impossibile una rivoluzione pacifica, renderanno 
inevitabile una rivoluzione violentd'?^^ In terms of economic policy, it is interesting to note 
that Bossi sided with the policy of privatization of the Amato government. He saw ‘the retreat 
of the State’ as a policy of the Lega because of its ‘moralizing’ effects on the way in which
1 3 4 4the economy was run.
In spite of the fact that rejection of increasing returns played a prominent role in the 
1994 elections, the period that followed saw a strong counter reaction to rejection of 
increasing returns by elected politicians. As shown in the previous chapter, in the pre-1992 
period, elected politicians used telecommunications companies to enjoy increasing returns. 
The means through which they obtained this result, such as lottizzazione, became the object 
of public scorn and were ended. At the time of re-designing the new institutions for the 
telecommunications sector, while some elected politicians, such as Giuliano Amato, were in 
favour of severing all links between elected politicians and suppliers, other elected politicians 
disliked this proposal and pressed for the introduction of new means through which they 
could control suppliers. When the law on creation of IRAs in Italy was discussed, the
of the nomenklatura ... The night has fallen on the First Republic and in the dark
transformists of all kinds, the remains of the old partitocracy, try to take advantage”.
Ibid., 3 and 5.
Ibid., 17.
Ibid., 185-187.
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contrast between proponents of separation between elected politicians and suppliers and those 
who sought to retain a degree of control emerged.
IRAs were the centrepiece of the attempt that had started during the Amato 
government to bring about change in Italy’s institutional trajectory by embracing a UK-style 
logic, based on full separation between suppliers and elected politicians. They were the 
embodiment of this new logic, since their mandate was premised on delegation from elected 
politicians, which thus ended the latter’s involvement with the day-to-day operation of 
suppliers. In contrast, some elected politicians pressed for retaining a measure of political 
control over IRAs. They therefore tried to push through amendments to the UK-style model 
of IRA independence. This can be shown by tracing closely the passage of the bill to create 
independent agencies through Parliament between 1994 and 1995.
After the 1994 elections, the Berlusconi government took office on May 10, 1994 and 
promised to carry on the economic reforms that had been initiated by the Amato and Ciampi 
governments. However, this government envisaged a reduced role for independent agencies. 
In particular, the Berlusconi government favoured the ministerial appointment of the 
authorities’ heads and asserted the government’s prerogative over t a r i f f s . Mo r e ov e r ,  one 
of the parties, which formed the ruling coalition, Alleanza Nazionale, saw a very limited role 
for independent agencies. Gaetano Rasi, Alleanza Nazionale’s representative in charge of 
economic affairs, maintained that independent agencies should focus on consumer 
satisfaction and not on tariff setting.
See 11 sole 24 ore, 2.9.1994. 
See IIsole 24 ore, 13.10.1994.
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The Berlusconi government attempted to push through the bill on independent 
agencies through delegated legislation/"^^ but there were significant delays/"^^ By law, the 
creation of regulatory agencies was a legal condition for privatization. This is because under 
law No. 474 of 1994, sale of shares in company under state control that supply public utility 
services -  defined as '‘'‘defence, transports, telecommunications, sources o f  energy, and other 
public services"" - were subject to the set up of independent bodies vested with the task of 
setting tariffs and overseeing quality of s e r v i c e s . T h e  delay in the legislative process 
concerning regulatory authorities was therefore particularly unwelcome for its impact on the 
privatization plan. In particular, these delays prevented the long-awaited privatization of 
Enel and Stet, whose proceeds were regarded as a very important element in the plan to cut 
the deficit. The government therefore opted for a different route. Namely, it sponsored a bill 
introduced by Filippo Cavazzuti in June 1994, a senator belonging to the o p p o s i t i o n . T h i s  
initiative shows that the coalition promoting rejection of increasing returns was 
heterogeneous and, most importantly, subject to sudden shifts. Indeed, it would seem a rather 
odd course of action for the government to back a bill proposed by a member of the party in
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See II sole 24 ore, 2.9.1994.
See II sole 24 ore, 17.11.1994. In 1993, the bill was effectively introduced at the same time 
as the privatization process {disegno di legge n. 2579). The relevant Committees in the 
Chamber of Deputies (Commissione 9^  and Commissione 10^ ) carried out a number of 
meetings and adopted a text in November 1993. However, during the passage of the 1994 
budget, the Parliament approved a measure that empowered the government to pass 
legislation with a view to set up “independent authorities for the regulation o f services of 
relevant public interest and assign functions to new legal entities"" (para. 1). Once approved 
as law n. 537 of 1993, this provision superseded the bill and therefore the Committees 
stopped their work.
GURI n. 177, 30.7.1994. See Article 1-bis: “Le dismissioni delle partecipazioni azionarie 
dello Stato e degli enti pubblici nelle società di cui all'articolo 2 sono subordinate alia 
creazione di organismi indipendenti per la regolarizzazione delle tariffe e il controllo della 
qualità dei servizi di rilevante intéressé pubblico''.
Senato della Repubblica -  XII Legislatura, Disegno di legge Cavazzuti e a., n. 359, “Norme 
per la concorrenza e la regolazione dei servizi di pubblica utilité. Istituzione dell’Agenza di 
regolazione dei servizi di pubblica utilité”, June 1, 1994.
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opposition. Yet, the alignments on the issue of increasing returns were different from party 
allegiances.
The bill by Senator Cavazzuti envisaged three authorities (energy, 
telecommunications and transport). Each authority would be a collegial body, composed of 
three members. The power of appointment of the members was the bone of contention 
between those who pursued rejection of increasing returns and the coalition who sought to 
preserve the power of elected politicians. Under a UK-style logic of separation, IRAs should 
be as distant from government as possible in order to guarantee effective independence from 
political power. In this respect, it can be noted that in 1994 Sabino Cassese, speaking about 
Consob’s independence,^^^ underlined that it is essential that the government does not hold 
the power of appointment to ensure that the authority is really independent from political 
influence. A solution in line with this principle, Cassese argued, was the one adopted for the 
Italian Competition Authority. Under Law No. 287 of 1990, the President and the 
Commissioners are appointed by the head of the two chambers. In spite of being elected 
politicians, the presidents of the two chambers are regarded as figures commanding high 
respect to be acceptable to both the majority and the opposition. They can therefore be 
trusted to act in furtherance of objective criteria. To entrust appointment in their hands was 
thought as a way to guarantee a high measure of independence. On the contrary, the 
opponents of rejection of increasing returns favoured giving the power of appointment to the 
government as the ideal avenue through which the government could continue to control an 
important policy outlet.
The Cavazzuti bill was already a compromise between these two tendencies. On the 
one hand, the Industry Minister had the power to appoint IRA’s members, acting upon a
See II sole 24 ore, 8.6.1994.
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binding opinion from Parliamentary committees, voting with a two-third majority.^^^ On the 
other hand, IRA’s members could not hold office as elected officials nor serve in political 
parties. In any event, the progress of the bill was halted by a government crisis. Silvio 
Berlusconi tendered his resignation and a new government presided by Lamberto Dini took 
over on January 17, 1995. Lamberto Dini, who had served as Treasury Minister in the 
Berlusconi government, announced the government’s intention to accelerate privatizations.^^^ 
Given the link between privatization and authorities, this meant that the government would 
press for speedy approval of the law on independent agencies. However, the bill would only 
become law in November 1995.
There were several reasons for the long and tortuous march of the bill (no less than 
three thousand amendments were made).^ "^  ^ First of all, being opposed in principle to 
privatization, Rifondazione Comunista staged a ferocious opposition against the bill, 
engaging in deliberate obstruct ionism.Secondly,  the original bill was meant to include not 
only telecommunications, but also media among the regulated sectors. Forza Italia, Silvio 
Berlusconi’s party, was against anything, which could impinge on the stakes of Silvio 
Berlusconi in the media sector and therefore also opposed the bill. Thirdly, it should not be 
forgotten that the Dini government was an emergency government. It was not backed by a 
solid parliamentary majority. In fact, it derived its support from the losers of the 1994
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See II sole 24 ore, 24.11.1994 and 27.11.1994.
See II sole 24 ore, 24.2.1995.
See II sole 24 ore, 10.11.1995.
The main reason behind Rifondazione’s opposition was precisely the fact that the bill paved 
the way for privatization of public utilities companies, a policy that run against 
Rifondazione’s vision on how to best protect the interest of consumers. Rifondazione 
Comunista tabled hundreds of amendments and consistently antagonised with the government 
and the rest of the ruling coalition on privatisation. See II sole 24 ore, 2.3.1995, 16.3.1995,
17.5.1995, 18.5.1995, 29.6.1995, 30.6.1995, 20.7.1995, 1.8.1995, 5.8.1995, 6.8.1995,
7.9.1995, and 9.9.1995.
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elections. Its duration was therefore limited and so was its mandate and its ability to push 
through reforms.
There was only very little conflict during the first reading of the bill in the Senate. 
The only significant amendment in this respect was presented by Senator Franco Debendetti, 
a member of the left-wing PDS party. The amendment reinforced the Parliament’s control 
over privatization. The passage of the bill through the Chamber of Deputies was 
significantly longer and more d i f f i c u l t . W h a t ’s more, at several instances the conflict 
surfaced between the proponents of a UK-style logic and those who militated in favour of a 
more limited separation between suppliers and elected politicians.
In particular, amendments were tabled to protect the interests of elected officials, such 
as an amendment by a Forza Italia deputy to render the authorities akin to consumer 
protection’s b o d i e s . F u r t h e r ,  the conflict between the two logics became clear when the 
debate in the Chamber focused on the power of a p p o i n t m e n t . T h e  two options before the 
deputies, i.e. appointment by the presidents of the two chambers or a mechanism, which 
would give power to the government after a binding opinion from Parliament, represented 
well the different sides. On the one side stood those who had in mind the UK-style logic of 
separation and hence preferred to see an IRA as independent as possible from elected
356
357
358
359
360
The Dini government ended with the 1996 elections, which saw a victory for the centre-left 
coalition. Romano Prodi became prime minister and held his post until 1998.
II sole 24 ore, 14.3.1995, 15.3.1995 and 16.3.1995.
One of the reasons for this delay was due to the fact that bill also concerned the powers of the 
telecommunications regulator, whose set up was to follow shortly after that of the energy one 
(already provided for by the bill), over the media. Forza Italia MPs, together with members 
of another centre-right party (the Centro Cristiano Democratico) requested that provisions on 
the media sector be carved out and dealt with separately from telecommunications (See II sole 
24 ore, 30.4.1995). The same request, albeit for different reasons, also came from Giorgio 
Napolitano, a member of the PDS party, who chaired a commission entrusted with an inquiry 
into the media sector.
See/ /sole 24 ore, 7.4.1995 and 8.4.1995.
See II sole 24 ore, 27.4.1995.
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officials. On the other side were those jealous of elected politicians’ powers, who sought to 
retain a sizeable share of those powers, thus promoting a more limited solution in contrast to 
the UK logic.
The latter option had the backing of the centre-left, Lega and Rifondazione Comunista 
and was inserted in the bill.^^’ In contrast, appointment by the presidents of the two 
chambers was favoured by Alessandro Rubino and Sante Perticaro, both Forza Italia’s 
deputies.^^^ This further underscores that the divisions between those who pursued rejection 
of increasing returns and those who tried to keep powers of elected politicians were 
continuously shifting and sometimes varied from one deputy to another. The conflict 
increased and Alleanza Nazionale also joined the fray. Alleanza Nazionale MPs argued that 
the authorities were a useless duplication since ministries were already equipped to carry out 
the tasks that were supposedly to be entrusted to a u t h o r i t i e s . A l l e a n z a  Nazionale 
intervention brought into the debate the other source of conflict, i.e. that of ministerial 
bureaucracies, and showed the full impact of the forces that militated against the rejection of 
increasing returns and how they could derail the institutional trajectory.
The debate continued for several months and when the bill returned to the Senate for 
the second reading, the Senate adopted new amendments. On balance, the Senate 
amendments reflected a group that was more favourable to rejection of increasing returns. 
For instance, an amendment proposed to extend the authorities’ mandate to eight years (up 
from seven) in an effort to keep their life-cycle more separate from that of Parliament (five
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11 sole 24 ore, 12.5.1995.
In any event, appointment by the government, with a binding opinion by Parliament was 
criticized by the Parliamentary Commission for constitutional affairs. The binding opinion of 
the parliament over a decision by the government was a hybrid that run contrary to the 
autonomy of Parliament. This argument was aired several times during the debate (See II sole 
24 ore, 17.5.1995).
See II sole 24 ore, 20.6.1995.
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years). Moreover, the government’s power to veto the authority’s decision was to be subject 
to a stringent requirement (only for very serious reasons of national interest).
In October 1995, the bill eventually moved forward when the government decided to 
ask the Senate for a vote of confidence on the bill.^^  ^ The bill was thus approved by the 
Senate (although without the provisions relating to telecommunications and media which 
were enshrined in a separate act).^^  ^ Moreover, to allay concerns over control of Parliament 
over the privatization process, the bill conceded that Parliament had the power to review and 
approve the government’s privatization plans in the public utilities sector.
The bill became law in November 1995.^^  ^ The final provisions bore the scars of the 
conflict between the two logics and, on balance, showed that Italy’s trajectory had failed to 
embrace a UK-style logic in full. Instead, Law No. 481 of 1995 represented a compromise 
solution. For instance, the law set out:
• a provision on the power of the Parliament to oversee privatization of public 
utilities (Article 1.2);
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See 11 sole 24 ore, 13.9.1995. See also II sole 24 ore, 23.9.1995, 25.9.1995, 26.9.1995 and
27.9.1995.
See II sole 24 ore, 5.10.1995, and 7.11.1995.
See parliamentary debate held on March 14, 1995. As a result of the compromise reached, 
the law provided for the set up of the energy regulator, while deferring to a separate act the 
creation of the telecommunications regulator.
See II sole 24 ore, 6.10.1995. See para. 1, section 2, '"''Per la privatizzazione dei servizi di 
pubblica utilità, ivi compreso ai soli fini del presente comma I'esercizio del crédita, il 
Governo dejinisce i criteri per la privatizzazione di ciascuna impresa e le relative modalità di 
dismissione e li trasmette al Parlamento ai fini delVespressione del parere da parte delle 
competenti Commissioni parlamentarf\
Law No. 481 of 1995, '’’Norme per la concorrenza e la regolazione dei servizi di pubblica 
utilità. Istituzione delle Autorità di regolazione dei servizi di pubblica utilità ’^ (GURI n. 216, 
14.9.1996).
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• a provision that conferred power of appointment on the government and the 
Parliament (Article 2.7);^^^
• a provision on members’ tenure (seven years) (Article 2.8); and
• a provision on eligibility requirements, forbidding those holding charges in 
political parties from becoming commissioners (Article 2.8).^^ ®
The approval of Law No. 481 of 1995 marked an important point in Italy’s trajectory. 
By providing a framework for the law on the sector specific regulator for 
telecommunications, it already determined the extent of delegation that could be enjoyed by 
this body. In other words, the conflict between the two logics not only affected Law No. 481 
of 1995, but went beyond this piece of legislation and was relevant for related legislation 
such as the bill on the Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni (ACCOM).
In July 1996, Antonio Maccanico, announced that he would soon present a bill with a 
view to reform the sector, including media. The bill relied on the works of the Napolitano 
commission, which had been set up under the Berlusconi government and whose work ended 
in February 1995, at the same time as Parliament was discussing the bill on regulatory 
agencies. The Napolitano Commission had recommended the regulation of 
telecommunications and television together given the expected convergence between these 
two media. Furthermore, the Napolitano commission recommended the creation of an 
“Autorità per le garanzie nelle comunicazioni”, an independent regulator.
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"’Ciascuna Autorità è organa collégiale costituito dal présidente e da due membri, nominati 
con decreto del Présidente della Repubblica, previa deliberazione del Consiglio dei Ministri 
su proposta del Ministro compétente. Le designazioni effettuate dal Govemo sono 
previamente sottoposte al parere delle competenti Commissioni parlamentari. In nessun caso 
le nomine possono essere effettuate in mancanza del parere favorevole espresso dalle 
predette Commissioni a maggioranza dei due terzi dei componenti. ...”.
See Article 2.8.
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However, a bill aimed at regulating media as well was going to attract lengthy 
parliamentary discussions because of the peculiar situation of the sector in Italy. By contrast, 
the Treasury Minister (Carlo Azeglio Ciampi) pressed for a speedy approval of the rules on 
the independent regulator since this was a condition for privatization of Telecom Italia, 
whose proceeds were a very significant part of the plans to improve the budget. In order to 
meet these concerns, two bills were proposed, of which one dealt only with the creation of the 
Autorità per le garanzie nelle comunicazioni in order to improve the changes of a speedier 
approval, while the other dealt with media and was going to be debated separately.
The passage of the bill in Parliament shows again how the conflict between the two 
logics had an impact on the direction of institutional development. As was the case for Law 
No. 481 of 1995, the power of appointment constituted a bone of c o n t e n t i o n . T w o  models 
were available: on the one hand, the model followed for the appointment of the head of the 
Competition Authority, which, by giving power to the presidents of the two chambers of 
Parliament, was seen as more in tune with the UK-style logic of separation and obeyed the 
desire towards rejection of increasing returns in so far as it provided for more independence 
from government. On the other hand. Law No. 481 of 1995 lent itself well to be the model of 
a different logic, whereby, even if an IRA was set up with powers over tariffs, the 
government still enjoyed the power of appointment, thus retaining a way to control the IRA 
and lessen its independence.
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Sqq II sole 24 ore, 3.7.1996 and 5.7.1996, and 6.7.1996.
See disegno di legge A. S. 1021 “Istituzione dell’Autorità per le garanzie nelle comunicazioni 
e norme sul sistema radiotelevisivo” (XIII Legislatura, Dossier Prowedimento, giugno 1997), 
concerning the creation of a regulatory authority for telecommunications. The other bill was 
A. S. 1138 (“Disciplina del sistema delle comunicazioni”). For more information on the 
passage of the bill, see http://www.senato.it/leg/13/BGT/Schede/Ddliter/7794.htm.
The majority of the Parliamentary time was absorbed by debates on media ownership and the 
anti-concentrative measures that would have required Mediaset and Rai to each lose a 
channel. See Maccanico, IIgrande cambiamento, 37-38.
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The debates in Parliament underscored that the appointment of the members of 
ACCOM did not uphold a UK-style logic. Indeed, the complaints from the centre-right 
opposition did not try to extol the virtues of having a truly independent regulator, free from 
political direction. Instead, the opposition complained that they could not carry an equal 
weight, because the rules under discussion left the power to appoint the president of ACCOM 
to the government (hence to the ruling coalition). As a matter of fact, it is worth 
remembering that Antonio Maccanico, the proponent of the bill, had already stated that his 
personal view was that it would be up to the government to appoint the commissioners,^^"^ 
thus indicating that the bill took it for granted that ACCOM’s independence was to be 
limited.
Further, during the debates in the Senate, Senator Castelli, a senator belonging to 
Lega Nord, complained that the political power was relinquishing too much power to 
ACCOM and thereby expressed concerns on behalf of his party.^^^ Senator Baldini, a Forza 
Italia senator, also voiced concerns about the “enormous” powers wielded by A C C O M . I n
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See Maccanico, II grande cambiamento, 18.
See Legislatura 13® - Aula - Resoconto stenografico della seduta n. 190, May 22, 1997 (“É 
stata areata un' Authority che - a mio modesto parere - ha poteri che vanno molto al di là di 
quelli conferiti normalmente alle altre Autorità di questo genere. Qui infatti non siamo di 
fronte semplicemente ad una Autorità antitrust, sia pure importantissima anche se avesse 
soltanto questo compito, ma abbiamo creato un ente regolatore che perô determinerà anche 
il mercato, visto il grandissimo potere che ha di assegnare o togliere le frequenze. Questo é 
un punto su cui noi esprimiamo le più grandi preoccupazioni. Dal momenta che noi, come 
potere politico, non siamo stati in grado di risolvere e riformare questo aspetto 
importantissima della materia di cui ci stiamo occupando, lo abbiamo demandato 
air Authority; in sostanza, abbiamo sorvolato il problema, abbiamo perô creato un ente 
potentissimo. Ed allora, come tutte le armi potentissime, si tratterà di capire come verrà 
usata. Se questa potenza e questa grande capacità di intervento saranno usate in modo 
virtuoso, allora tutto andrà bene; ma se cio non accadrà allora nasceranno grandissime 
preoccupazioni. Per questo noi abbiamo insistito moltissimo sulle questioni delle nomine, 
cioé su chi sarà chiamato a comporre questo consesso'''’).
Ibid. {"'’Cosa dire poi dell' Authority ? Proprio per il fatto che é un'Autorità dotata di un 
potere enorme nel settore delle televisioni e delle telecomunicazioni avremmo preferito, come 
é già stato detto da altri senatori, che il sistema di elezione fosse diverso da quello previsto 
dal disegno di legge. Indubbiamente, attraverso il meccanismo di elezione individuato si
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addition, Baldini questioned the ‘compromise’ solution that inspired the rules on power of 
appointment.
According to what would later become Article 1.3 of the Law, ACCOM is composed 
of eight members. The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate appoint four members each. 
This solution guaranteed that the majority and opposition had each half of the members. 
However, the President was to be appointed by the President of the Council of Ministers, on a 
recommendation from the Minister of Communications, and after having received a 
favourable opinion from the Parliamentary commi t t ee .Accord ing  to Baldini, this solution 
rendered ACCOM too dependent on the parliamentary majority. Similar criticism surfaced 
also in the debate that took place afterwards in the Chamber o f Deputies. Italo Bocchino, a 
deputy belonging to Alleanza Nazionale, the right wing party, stated that the appointment
arrivera anche qui alla composizione di un'Autorità che sarà espressione di una maggioranza 
politica, quindi fortemente condizionata da una maggioranza politica; un'Autorità che 
risentirà necessariamente dei condizionamenti della maggioranza politica di cui é 
espressione. Anche in questo caso avremmo dovuto trovare dei meccanismi di elezione per 
consentire una maggiore obiettività, una maggiore indipendenza ed autonomia di un'Autorità 
in un settore cost importante, quale quello delle televisioni e delle telecomunicazioni).
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See Art. 1.3 “[I]/ Senato della Repubblica e la Camera dei deputati eleggono quattro 
commissari ciascuno, i quali vengono nominati con decreto del Présidente della Repubblica. 
Ciascun senatore e ciascun deputato esprime il voto indicando due nominativi, uno per la 
commissione per le infrastrutture e le reti, I'altro per la commissione per i servizi e i prodotti. 
... 11 présidente deU'Autorità é nominato con decreto del Présidente della Repubblica su 
proposta del Présidente del Consiglio dei Ministri d'intesa con il Ministro delle 
comunicazioni. La designazione del nominativo del présidente deU'Autorità é previamente 
sottoposta al parere delle competenti Commissioni parlamentari ai sensi dell'articolo 2 della 
legge 14 novembre 1995, n. 481”.
See Parliamentary reports, July 9, 1997, available through the camera website (“... questa 
authority nasce monca perché, se nei principi generali stabiliti dall'articolo 1 è prevista la 
sua plena autonomia ed indipendenza di giudizio, non vengono poi stabiliti sistemi di nomina 
ed organizzativi, legislativamente previsti, che ne garantiscano la plena autonomia e 
I'indipendenza di giudizio e di valutazione. Creare una authority senza questi requisiti non ha 
alcun senso. Sarebbe bastato il Ministero delle poste e delle telecomunicazioni, con le sue 
competenze, o il garante per la radiodiffusione e I'editoria, con le sue competenze. Avevamo 
avanzato proposte che, a nostro giudizio, andavano verso la plena autonomia, perché 
tendevano a creare un sistema diverso di nomina del présidente dell'authority. Siamo convinti 
che oggi in Italia la nomina da parte dell'esecutivo, seppure ricalca esperienze di altri paesi, 
visti i precedenti di «occupazione» che il Govemo Prodi ha creato in questi mesi, non offre 
elementi di tranquillità.”).
196
of ACCOM president by the government was a matter of concern, given that the Prodi 
government seemed bent on “occupying” strategic positions, filling the posts with loyal 
appointees.
Interestingly, however, Alleanza Nazionale’s proposal was not to increase ACCOM’s 
independence from the government and, in general, from political oversight, as one would 
have expected under a logic of rejection of increasing returns. Alleanza Nazionale senators 
were in favour of an organizational solution that envisaged a secretary general, such role to 
be intended as a check against the power of the President and presumably allotted to the 
opposition. In other words, the opposition parties did not press for independence of ACCOM, 
but rather for a solution that enabled a fair representation of political forces at all levels. This 
can be seen also in the remarks of another AN senator, Adolfo Urso. Urso stated his 
preference for a system whereby the eight components appoint their president instead of the 
power of appointment by the g ov e r n m e n t . T h i s  solution would have produced a president 
acceptable to both majority and opposition, i.e. an ideal compromise solution.
Ernesto Stajano, a Forza Italia senator who was the rapporteur for the bill, defended 
the choice made by describing it as fine eq u i l i b r i u m. B u t ,  Stajano was an isolated voice
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Ibid. {“Si puo firmare una pace quando ci si riconosce nel proprio spazio, nel proprio 
territorio, nella propria comodità con pari dignità. Cosî non è. ... in altri paesi la nomina è 
tutta govemativa, perché diverso è il rapporto ira la politica e Veconomia: non vi è 
un’economia soggetta alia politica e non c'è una politica che, di fatto, occupa Veconomia, la 
indirizza, la promuove, la utilizza ... Avremmo preferito che il présidente fosse stato 
anch'esso nominato dagli otto componenti oppure, in subordine, che le decisioni deU'autorità 
fossero prese a maggioranza dei due terzi. Questo avrebbe assicurato reciproche garanzie 
alle due coalizioni che si fronteggiano come in ogni democrazia occidentale ed avrebbe fatto 
si che i primi passi lungo la strada della liberalizzazione e della privatizzazione di settori cosi 
determinanti per gli sviluppi economici, sociali e tecnologici del paese venissero compiuti 
nella reciproca fiducia tra le due coalizioni che, in quel modo si, avrebbero siglato una vera 
pace, disarmando entrambi gli eserciti ed evitando che una mantenga un «deterrente 
nucleare» che Valtra non ha: la possibilità di determinare la propria maggioranza, anche al 
di là dell'esistenza di una maggioranza in Parlamento^’).
Ibid., (“Per quel che attiene infine alia questione relativa alVauthority - ne parlo per ultimo, 
anche perché ne ha già parlato, come ho detto, Vonorevole Giulietti -, vorrei far presente,
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praising the bill because it showed that political parties were able to relinquish power in favor 
of an independent entity, thus underscoring an aspect that can be seen as interpreting a 
philosophy of rejection of increasing returns/^ ^
Stajano’s voice remained an exception in the ensuing debates. Complaints continued 
on the power left to the government and on how the Prodi government was not to be trusted 
to use these powers in pursuit of the common good.^^^ Romani, a senator for Forza Italia,
anche per respingere molte delle critiche che sono state mosse al prowedimento nel corso 
delle Commissioni riunite VII e IX, che il meccanismo adottato relativamente all'indicazione 
dei componenti della commissione mi pare risponda ad una logica di condivisibile equilibrio. 
Quando ad un organismo come I’authority per le telecomunicazioni si attribuiscono 
competenze cosi vaste, è évidente che non si puo non considerare, accanto alia dimensione di 
professionalita tecnica, anche una dimensione lato sensu politica. E in questo senso, mi pare 
sia perfettamente giustijicato Vajfidamento alle Camere della scelta degli otto componenti 
dell'authority, nelle sue due articolazioni. La scelta del présidente affidata al Govemo ma 
con il parere delle Commissioni parlamentari compléta questo iter di responsabilité 
istituzionale e caratterizza perfettamente ed in modo omogeneo e coerente la struttura di un 
organo che, ripeto, ha competenze vastissime, non solo amministrative, ma anche normative, 
sia pure a livello regolamentare, ed infine relativamente all'irrogazione di sanzioni, anch'esse 
amministrative. Quindi, era indubbiamente necessario ottenere un livello di qualificazione 
che discendesse dal massimo organo depositario della sovranità popolare e cioè dal 
Parlamento nella sua complessità, sia pure nell’ambito di questa articolata strutturazione”).
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Ibid. (“II fatto che il Governo ed il Parlamento abbiano scelto di affidare ad un soggetto 
terzo, in qualche misura estraneo alia sfera delle determinazioni politiche in senso stretto, 
questi cosi larghi compiti rappresenta, a mio awiso, il senso ed il segno di una nuova 
politica, di una politica in cui coloro che sono eletti dal popolo, coloro che portano la 
responsabilité del govemo del paese sono anche capaci di dismettere potere, di dismetterlo 
nei confronti delle regioni, nell’ambito di un più ampio disegno costituzionale, e di 
dismetterlo, in specie, nei confronti di un organismo autonomo di garanzia. Ed è bello poter 
constatare con soddisfazione che oggi con questa legge noi porremo un'altra valida pietra 
nella costruzione di una nuova immagine dello Stato: uno Stato che non è più occhiuto 
difensore della sua sfera di competenze ma che è in grado di valutare, volta per volta, quali 
sono gli strumenti più idonei per risolvere i problemi dei cittadini. In tal senso vorrei 
ricordare che a questa authority (e questo è un altro segno dei tempi, dei buoni tempi che 
viviamo pur in mezzo a tante diffîcolté) potranno rivolgersi tutti i cittadini per poter vedere 
riconosciuti i loro interessi...”).
Ibid., see the intervention by Mario Landolfi, an MP belonging to Alleanza Nazionale (“Si 
puo immaginare di parlare di fine della guerra, onorevole Giulietti e onorevole Stajano, nel 
momento in cui si predispone un meccanismo di nomina della presidenza dell'authority, 
mettendola nelle mani del Govemo, dell'esecutivo, che dovré nominare il vertice di un 
organismo che tutti riteniamo imparziale? E noi dovremmo credere all'imparzialité di questo 
futuro présidente quando i precedenti di questo Governo, anche in materia, fanno pensare il 
contrario? Dovremmo credere all'imparzialité del vertice dell'autorité nominata da questo 
Govemo quando lo stesso Governo e la maggioranza hanno nominato Siciliano alia RAI, 
Chicco Testa all'ENEL e Guido Rossi alia STET? Un militante intellettuale e due ex
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also expressed disappointment with the power granted to the government, alluding to the fact
that his party would have preferred ‘a more balanced solution”, not a stronger AGCOM. 383
In any event, the passage of the bill was long.^ "^^  This also led to the privatization of 
Stet-Telecom Italia being delayed too, amidst criticism from the European Commission, 
which saw the sale as a chief remedy to comply with the obligation to reduce IRI’s 
i n d e b t e d n e s s . I n  the end, the solution chosen for the power of appointment was 
significantly different from the UK-style of independence.
AGCOM is composed of two Committees and a President. Each committee is a 
collegiate body of four members. The eight Commissioners are elected by Parliament. Each 
deputy and senator must designate two people, one for each Committee. Candidates are 
elected based on the number of votes. As a consequence, AGCOM Commissioners replicate 
the relative weight of political parties in Parliament, to the extent that some commentators 
speak of AGCOM as a “mini-Parliament”.^ ^^  The President is appointed by a decree from 
the Prime Minister in accordance with the Minister of Communications, which has been
parlamentari del partito di maggioranza relativa installati prontamente al vertice di enti e di 
istituzioni che dovrebbero restare terze rispetto alia dialettica, al confronto ed alio scontro 
ira le forze politicher). Landolfi was also the proponent of an amendment to change the rules 
on appointment and entrust this power to Parliament.
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Ibid. Ç^Peccato perd, signor ministro, per la disposizione sul présidente. Nella Commissione 
Napolitano avevamo definito un meccanismo di elezione che ci sembrava più equilibrato. Si è 
voluto invece prevedere un sistema che sostanzialmente delega al Govemo la possibilita di 
nomina del présidente; quindi il consiglio è dispari: otto più uno. Ci auguriamo che la 
persona che verra indicata -  mi sembra che su questo vi sia un impegno del ministro 
Maccanico - sia equilibrata, forte, autorevole, imparziale").
See the parliamentary debate held on November 28, 1996 (Senato della Repubblica, XIII 
Legislatura, 90 Seduta Pubblica, Resoconto Stenografico). See also II sole 24 ore, 19.9.1996, 
and 30.10.1996. In addition, there was criticism from the Antitrust Authority on the division 
of competencies in the sector, see Segnalazione AS 75, Riforma del settore delle 
telecomunicazioni (Bollettino 34-35/1996).
See II sole 24 ore, 10.9.1996, and 11.9.1996.
See N. Longobardi, ‘Les autorités administratives, laboratoires d’un nouveau droit 
administratif. Les Petites Affiches, 172 (1999), 6.
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approved by a parliamentary committee. Both the appointment of the Commissioners and 
that of the President shows that elected politicians pushing for limitation of a UK-style logic 
of separation obtained significant results. Indeed, Law No. 249 of 1997 has been criticized 
for giving too much power to elected politicians, thus leading to a ’’'dangerous promiscuity 
with politics'" The significance of this development for Italy’s overall trajectory, however, 
justifies extending the enquiry to the period after 1997. Before undertaking this task, it 
should not be forgotten that, when the AGCOM bill eventually became law in July 1997, 
Telecom Italia was privatized through a public sale. The IPO of shares held by the Treasury 
took place between October 20 and 24, \991?^^ This marked the birth of Italy’s first public 
company with widespread public share ownership, although the Treasury Minister retained a 
3.5% stake and a golden share.
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See Verdier, ‘Audiovisual and Telecommunications in Italy’, 277.
After Telecom Italia’s floatation in November 1997, the Treasury continued to own 5.17% of 
the outstanding shares and 0.62% of the outstanding savings shares of Telecom Italia, but in 
1999, the Treasury’s holdings had been reduced to 3.46%. In 1999, an hostile bid saw a 
change of control in Telecom Italia, with Olivetti becoming the leading shareholder. See 
OLIVETTI/TELECOM ITALIA, Case IV/M.1496, Commission decision of April 22, 1999 
(available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competi tion/mergers/cases/decisions/m 1496_it.pdf).
See Telecom Italia 20F 2000, 167 (available at
http://www.telecomitalia.eom/TIPortale/docs/investor/form20f_2000.pdf ). A decree issued 
on February 11, 2000 (the “Golden Share Decree”), set forth terms and conditions for the 
exercise by the Italian Government of special powers granted by golden shares. Pursuant to 
the Golden Share Decree, the Italian Government could use its special powers to protect the 
vital interests of the State and respond to indispensable reasons of general interest, including 
public law and order, public security, public health and national defense. The Italian 
Government is authorized to exercise such special powers in compliance with the principles 
of Italian and European Community laws, and in any case in line with the objectives of the 
privatization process, and the protection of competition and the market and having regard for 
non-discrimination principles. Such powers must be suitable and proportional to achieving the 
indispensable objectives of general interest described above. The Golden Share Decree 
provides that the Italian Government may exercise its special powers to prevent acquisitions 
of shares of privatized companies if such acquisitions (i) are not transparent and would not 
ensure full disclosure with respect to controlling share ownerships of the companies whose 
shares are being acquired and the objectives and industrial plans proposed by the buyers of 
the target companies; (ii) compromise the liberalization and market competition or are not in 
line with the company’s privatization goals, or entails situations of conflict of interests which 
could compromise the company’s mission with respect to the objectives of public interest; 
(iii) entail objective risks of being affected by criminal organizations, or involve the company
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V. THE CHANGE IN THE RULES ON COMPETITION AND INCREASING
RETURNS: THE CASE OF THE AWARD OF THE GSM MOBILE
LICENSES (1994-1997)
Last but not least, this Section considers the impact of past increasing returns on the 
changes that took place in the rules on competition. It is important to define at the outset the 
institutional aspects that are of relevance. This is because the rules on competition 
encompass a potentially very broad number of rules, for instance the rule enshrined in the 
antitrust legislation, i.e. Law No. 287 of 1990.^^ ®
For the purposes of assessing the impact of increasing returns on institutional reforms, 
though, it is submitted that one should focus on the rules that concern access to the market 
and, more specifically, the rules on the award of licenses. This is due to the importance of 
these rules as instruments through which political parties could control suppliers.
At the beginning of the period studied in this chapter, the State retained the right to 
reserve for itself the provision of telecommunications services.^^* It could do so either 
directly, as it was the case for ASST, or indirectly, by the grant of a license. SIP, Italcable 
and Telespazio, as noted, were all operating under a license. Therefore, licenses afforded to 
political parties an important avenue to control suppliers. For instance, as noted for the case 
of the license renewal for SIP in 1984 described in the previous chapter, the definition of the 
scope of a license could be used as an important part of relationships binding together
in unlawful activities; (iv) jeopardize conservation of the special powers of the State; or (v) 
represent a considerable risk of serious harm to the vital interests of the State described 
above, including the supply of essential raw materials and goods, the supply of essential 
public services and the security of related installations and networks and, further, the 
development of advanced technological sectors.
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“Norme per la tutela della concorrenza e del mercato” (GURI n. 240, 13.10.1990).
See N. Rangone, ‘Le Telecomunicazioni’, in S. Cassese (ed.), Diritto amministrativo 
Spéciale, Tomo III (Milano: Giuffrè, 2003), 2931 et seq.
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suppliers and political parties. This meant that the grant of a license and its renewal formed 
an integral part of the increasing returns process.
Rejection of increasing returns had important consequences for license awarding 
procedures. It meant that political intermediation should be rejected and that licenses should 
be awarded based exclusively on objective criteria, i.e. that reasons of economic efficiency 
should be the chief rationale for awarding a tender and not the reward of ‘friends’. Thus, 
rejection of increasing returns supported a direction of institutional change in the rules on 
competition based on the prevalence of market criteria.
Between 1994 and 1997, rejection of increasing returns coupled with an important 
exogenous factor with respect to the institutional aspect at issue, namely the EU. The case of 
the award of the second GSM license to Omnitel (later part of the Vodafone group) is 
illustrative of the role of increasing returns in shaping the direction of change and of the 
extent to which a broad push for reform based on domestic factors coupled with an 
exogenous force.
The procedure for the award of the license started in December 1993 and was 
concluded a year later on December 2, 1994.^^  ^ Thus, the procedure spanned the Ciampi and 
the first Berlusconi governments, both of which were strongly influenced by rejection of 
increasing returns. Indeed, the tender process was carefully prepared by a group of experts 
{Gmppo di Lavoro sulle Telecomunicazioni)^ chaired by Maurizio Pinnaro, a professor and 
senior lawyer, whose mandate was to design the tender rules in a way that made them 
consistent with the objective of liberalization and free competition. There was no attempt to 
use this process as a way to gain votes or power as it would have been the case in the pre- 
1992 period.
See S. Cassese, La crisi della State (Bari : Laterza, 2002), 102.
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The tender rules, however, were criticized by the Commission because they presented 
a strong asymmetry in favor of the incumbent, Telecom Italia. In particular, in a decision 
issued in October 1995,^^  ^ the Commission held that "''the competitive disadvantage in the 
form o f the initial payment imposed on the second operator alone fo r  its concession to 
operate a GSM network in Italy constitutes an infringement o f  Article 90 (1) o f  the Treaty, 
read in conjunction with Article 56” and it therefore imposed on the Italian Republic and 
obligation to re-establish a level-playing field.
Before discussing the measures of compliance and how the Commission acted in this 
phase, it is important to discuss the reasons for the asymmetry in favour of the incumbent. 
Indeed, one might be tempted to link the asymmetry to the old patterns of relationships 
between suppliers and political parties. In fact, as senior Vodafone representatives 
e x p la in ed , th e  origin of the asymmetry lies elsewhere, namely in a form of early ‘capture’ 
by the regulator.
At the time of the award of the second license, Telecom Italia supplied to the Ministry 
the expertise necessary to run the sector. It was not uncommon that senior ministerial posts 
were held by people who also occupied senior positions within Telecom Italia. On the other 
hand, the award of the second license for GSM telephony did not take place within a 
framework of rules which guaranteed equality of opportunity and access to the market. In 
fact, mobile telephony was a pioneering experiment in the sector. As a consequence, the only 
rules available to promote competition were in fact the rules of the license. Under these 
circumstances, Telecom Italia tried to take advantage of its position and influenced the design 
of the rules in a way that was favourable to itself.
Commission Decision of 4 October 1995 concerning the conditions imposed on the second 
operator of GSM radiotelephony services in Italy (OJ 1995 L 280/49).
Interview, Director of Public and Legal Affairs.
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The way in which this influence took place, though, is very different from the past 
increasing returns. The asymmetry was not in return for any ‘favour’ Telecom Italia had 
made to the ruling coalition, but can be attributed to the relative inexperience with regulating 
for competition and the powerful clout that Telecom Italia as the incumbent operator enjoyed.
Indeed, the attempts to redress the situation provide a broad confirmation of the extent 
to which (i) rejection of increasing returns was important in supporting change in the design 
of rules on the award of licenses; and (ii) pressure from rejection of increasing returns 
coupled with a powerful external source of change, the Commission.
According to senior Vodafone representa t ives , a f te r  the decision by the 
Commission in October 1995, the Minister of Telecommunications took a very active role in 
defense of the new entrant. For instance, in a crucial meeting between Omnitel and Telecom 
Italia representatives, the Minister threatened expressly the Telecom Italia representative (Mr 
Gamberale) with a revocation of the license unless Telecom Italia complied with the revised 
terms and conditions, as they needed to be imposed to bring Italy in line with the 
Commission decision.
Afterwards, the Minister and the Commission worked together to ensure compliance. 
In p a r t i c u l a r , o n  December 21, 1995 -i.e. after the meeting where the Minister threatened 
Telecom Italia with revocation of its GSM license -  the two operators and the Minister 
agreed to a solution to compensate Omnitel. This solution was notified to the Commission on 
January 18, 1996, which, on February 9, 1996, informed that the solution was an adequate 
response to comply with its decision of October 1995. Nevertheless, the compliance by 
Telecom Italia was only partial and the Commission issued several requests for information.
Interview, Director of Public and Legal Affairs. 
See Cassese, La crisi dello Stato, 103 et seq.
204
urging the Italian State to remedy the asymmetry in full. In particular, the Commission wrote 
to the Italian government on
• July 18, 1996;
• August?, 1996;
• September 4, 1996; and
• January 15,1997.
On September 9, 1997, faced with continued non-compliance, the Commission 
threatened the opening of infringement proceedings against Italy. On October 15, 1997 the 
operators and the Minister reached a new agreement and on December 10, 1997 the 
Commission closed its proceedings.
The case of the second GSM license shows that rejection of increasing returns played 
a very important role in reshaping the rules on the award of licenses, hence of the rules on 
competition. Tendering procedures were designed in a way diametrically opposite to the one 
that was informed by past increasing returns. Objective criteria, not political patronage, were 
the criteria for adjudication. At the same time, the broad push for institutional change left 
open several gaps. A powerful external source of change, the Commission, stepped in to fill 
those gaps and Vodafone, as a regulatee, found itself in a position to benefit from the 
European dimension that the licensing rules had taken.
The role of the EU in fostering institutional change with respect to the rules of 
competition did not end with the second GSM license, either. In 1997, Presidential Decree 
No. 318 of 197 was passed, an act whose purpose was to transpose EC Directives and to 
implement re-regulation of Italian telecommunications.^^^ Its provisions marked a complete
See Decree of the President of the Republic No. 318 of 1997 {"'’Regolamento per I’attuazione 
di direttive comvnitarie nel settore delle telecomunicazionf\ GURI n. 221, 22.9.1997). Other
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turnaround in the legal framework of the sector.^^^ DPR 318 ended all exclusive and special 
rights in the provision of all telecommunications services and provided for full competition, 
also establishing guidelines for interconnection, licensing, universal service, numbering and 
rights of way.^^^ In particular, as mandated by EU law,"^ ®^  DPR 318 provided for the 
abolition of all monopoly rights by January 1, 1998.
The adoption of DPR 318 shows once more that, with respect to rules on competition, 
the pressure for change stemming from rejection of increasing returns combined with the re­
regulation of the sector at the EU level. The two factors combined to reshape the rules on
important measures included Ministerial Decrees of July 1, 1997 and February 27, 1998 on 
numbering {^ ’'Normativa tecnica sulla numerazione delle telecomunicazionr and ’‘Disciplina 
della numerazione nel settore delle telecomunicazionr, GURI n. 175, 29.7.1997 and n. 67, 
21.3.1998); a Ministerial Decree of November 25, 1997 on the procedures for the granting of 
licenses {“‘Disposizioni per il rilascio delle licenze individuali nel settore delle 
telecomunicazionr, GURI n. 283, 4.12.1997); a Ministerial Decree of March 10, 1998 on 
universal service Ç’Finanziamento del servizio universale nel settore delle 
telecomunicazionr, GURI n, 100, 14.5.1998); and a Ministerial Decree of April 23, 1998 on 
interconnection (“Disposizioni in materia di interconnessione nel settore delle 
telecomunicazionr, G\JR[ n, 133, 10.6.1998).
See S. Cassese, ‘La liberalizzazione delle telecomunicazioni’, in F. Bonelli and S. Cassese 
(eds,), La disciplina giuridica delle telecomunicazioni (Milano: Giuffrè, 1999).
Article 2 further establishes the withdrawal of all exclusive and special rights, defined as 
follows: (i) exclusive rights: the rights that are granted by a Member State to one undertaking 
through any legislative, regulatory or administrative instrument, reserving it the right to 
provide a telecommunication service or undertake an activity within a given geographical 
area.; (ii) special rights means the rights that are granted by a Member State to a limited 
number of undertakings through any legislative, regulatory or administrative instrument 
which, within a given geographical area,
limits to two or more the number of such undertakings authorized to provide a service or 
undertake an activity, otherwise than according to objective, proportional and non 
discriminatory criteria, or
- designates, otherwise than according to such criteria, several competing undertakings as 
being authorized to provide a service or undertake an activity, or
- confers on any undertaking or undertakings, otherwise than according to such criteria, 
legal or regulatory advantages which substantially affect the ability of any other 
undertaking to provide the same telecommunications service or to undertake the same 
activity in the same geographical area under substantially equivalent conditions.
See Commission Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996 amending Directive 90/388/EEC with 
regard to the implementation of full competition in telecommunications markets (OJ 1996 L 
74/13), Article 1.2, which provides that “ ... Member States may maintain special and 
exclusive rights until 1 January 1998 for voice telephony and for the establishment and 
provision o f public telecommunications networks . ..”,
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competition, but while rejection of increasing returns provided a general underlying support, 
EU rules gave precise and concrete meaning to it.
It is also important to realize that enforcement of national telecommunications 
regulation was entrusted principally to AGCOM and to note the difference between rules on 
competition and rules on institutional design of AGCOM. While EU rules introduced a 
detailed level of substantive provisions, which were then transposed into national law, the 
situation was the reverse with respect to institutional design. EU law largely left this aspect 
to national law. Thus, for instance, there were no EU provisions a to whether the regulator 
should be a collegial or a mono-cratic body or who should have the power of appointment. 
Similarly, the powers of the regulators were defined at the national level.
ACCOM’s powers included the issuing of licences to telecommunications providers 
and adjudication of interconnection disputes. With respect to pricing decisions, following 
liberalization of telecommunications services, operators autonomously set prices and need 
only inform AGCOM of any changes therein. Only those operators named by AGCOM as 
having significant market power were subject to price regulation. In those cases, AGCOM 
could modify tariffs and interconnection fees set by the operator. Finally, AGCOM was also 
given powers to regulate the broadcasting sector.
The differences between rules on competition and the rules on the allocation of 
regulatory powers also explain the different role played by the EU and the somewhat 
uncertain direction of institutional change besetting AGCOM, which will be explored in the 
following chapter.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The empirical evidence collected in this chapter brings about important aspects of 
increasing returns that have the potential to refine path dependence. While the previous 
chapter confirmed the role of increasing returns in driving countries along a trajectory of 
bounded change, the present one shows that increasing returns have the ability to explain not 
only continuity (or ‘on-path’ change), but also radical change (or ‘off-path’ change). This is 
a key finding insofar as it uncovers a feature of increasing returns that has so far escaped 
attention, namely their ability to cause institutional reform through actors’ reaction. It adds a 
new dimension to increasing returns and to path dependence theory because it opens up the 
menu of institutional outcomes that are possible under path dependence, whilst so far the 
latter had been able to cater solely for bounded change.
In addition, the chapter shows that increasing returns had a different impact in shaping 
the direction of institutional change on different institutions. Once the old path ended 
because of the developments at the national level, policy-makers were confronted with the 
task of designing new institutions. In so doing, some of them sought to design institutions in 
opposition to the past increasing returns, by pushing for full separation between suppliers and 
elected politicians. Rejection of past increasing returns was therefore the principle behind the 
end of the split-supplier system in favour of the merger of all providers.
As far as the rules on competition are concerned, the chapter demonstrated that 
rejection of increasing returns provided a strong basis for change, but the precise institutional 
choices were then the result of a coupling of domestic and supranational factors, through the 
involvement of the Commission.
With respect to the design of the IRA, some policy-makers opposed a logic of full 
separation and pushed to retain a measure of control over telecommunications suppliers. The
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chapter uncovered the conflict between these two logics through tracing o f the legislative 
processes that brought about, first, the framework law on IRA (Law No. 481 o f 1995), and 
then the law on AGCOM (Law No. 249 o f 1997). It shows that, on the one hand, there were 
those who pushed for a UK-style logic o f separation, hence delegation to IRA. On the other 
hand, there was pressure to adopt a logic based on limited separation between elected 
politicians and suppliers. In order to understand the outcome o f this conflict in terms of 
Italy’s overall institutional trajectory it is necessary to ‘benchmark’ Italy against the UK.
The table below shows key institutional features in the two countries at 1993 and 
1997, providing comparative information on the extent o f change that took place in Italy 
relative to the UK.
Table 10 - British and Italian institutions 1993 - 1997
No, of suppliers
Ownership
1993 1997
UK Not predetermined Not predetermined
Italy Not predetermined
Private/listed^
Italy State control Private/listed
Degree of competition
■■■■; t e r : ,  : . - . r  - r
Competition
M onopoly/Split supply Competition
N  OETEL.'OFT I LAllocation of
Ministers AGCOM
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•  Number of suppliers. First of all, it can be noted that, by opening up the 
sector to competition, Italy too had stopped having a pre-determined number 
of operators. Besides Telecom Italia, any new entrant could start to supply 
services after receiving a licence from AGCOM.
•  Ownership. Second, the privatization of Telecom Italian in 1997 also marked 
a significant convergence with Britain, whereby BT had been likewise 
privatized through a share issue and flotation on the stock exchange.
•  Degree of competition. In compliance with EU law, since January 1, 1998 all 
exclusive rights had to stop. There was therefore a rule of ‘full competition’ 
in both Italy and the UK.
•  Allocation of regulatory powers. By entrusting regulatory powers to 
AGCOM, including price regulation and licensing, Italy managed to create an 
Oftel-like regulator. In fact, since AGCOM also has jurisdiction over 
broadcasting, the Italian design upstaged Oftel, whose powers were limited to 
telecommunications (later expanded with Ofcom in 2000).
The foregoing shows that by 1997 Italy and the UK had come to share key 
institutional features to a very significant extent. The degree of convergence bears witness to 
the fact that Italy’s trajectory in 1997 was a new path compared to 1992, when the two 
countries significantly differed.
However, it is more difficult to assess the direction of Italy’s new path. In particular, 
the question is whether the convergence of formal institutions also meant a convergence in 
terms of the respective logics of the two trajectories. The findings of the chapter have in fact
210
provided evidence of the opposition to a UK-style logic in Italy. The impact of such conflict 
on Italy’s trajectory deserves a careful examination of several dimensions.
First of all, it is true that powers to set prices were removed from the hands of elected 
politicians. With the advent of full competition, in principle prices were set as a result of 
market forces by providers acting autonomously. AGCOM had price-setting powers under 
well-defined circumstances. Elected politicians thus lost the ability to set prices as in the 
past. This element is a point in common with the UK logic.
Secondly, power to affect market structure, in particular ownership and number of 
suppliers, was also lost to elected politicians following the privatization of Telecom Italia. In 
addition, it was up to AGCOM to license new suppliers that could then enter the market. 
This also was a point in common with the UK logic.
Thirdly, though, the rules governing the relationships between elected politicians and 
the regulator reflected a different position. By providing for a proportional system, whereby 
each major party could express an AGCOM Commissioner and the ruling party had the 
power to appoint the President, AGCOM remained closely linked to elected officials. In spite 
of the fact that important regulatory powers were allocated to the IRA, thus fostering a degree 
of separation between suppliers and elected politicians, this separation was at best 
incomplete, given that elected politicians had the power to control appointments to AGCOM. 
The chapter’s findings about the opposition against a UK-style further show the inherent 
tension that beset the Italian path.
Thus, the overall logic of the Italian path in 1997 can be characterized as one of
conflict between proponents of full separation between suppliers and elected politicians and
those who argued for continued control over suppliers. The result was a trajectory that,
although tracing closely the UK one in several respects, presented some notable elements of
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difference. Further, being open to contestation, this trajectory was far from stable. In fact, in 
1997 it reflected the state of play of the conflicts between the two logics. Further adjustment 
was likely, though, and thus justifies extending the research to the events that took place after 
1997.
Before undertaking this task, a word is in order on the extent to which this complex 
pattern of reaction and counter-reaction to increasing returns affects path dependence. The 
role of increasing returns in fostering ‘off-path’ change has already been discussed. The 
counter-reactions confirm this important finding. After 1992, policy makers considered how 
to re-build the institutional architecture. The experience of past increasing returns was the 
common point of departure in the institutional choices that were made. But the lessons that 
policy makers drew from past increasing returns were different. Some were determined to 
cut all links between elected politicians and suppliers, others thought that elected politicians 
should retain a measure of control over suppliers. Both concurred, though, in taking past 
increasing returns as the defining element that shaped their position.
Increasing returns thus were at the origin of a complex process of reaction and 
counter-reaction by elected politicians, i.e. those to whom past increasing returns previously 
accrued. This further buttresses the point that was made earlier about the need to specify to 
whom increasing returns accrue as a necessary pre-condition to broaden the reach of path 
dependence in explaining cases of institutional change. Indeed, the findings of the chapter 
point towards an higher-than-expected ability of increasing returns to provide a useful lenses 
through which one can better understand institutional trajectories, well beyond ‘simple’ 
bounded change.
The fact that increasing returns discussed in this chapter were past increasing returns 
in no way affects this finding. It may be an Italian specificity that increasing returns had
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ended before new institutions were designed. The fact remains that, through actors’ rejection, 
increasing returns fostered ‘off-path’ change. Their ability to do so even ‘after death’ may 
only mean that, a fortiori, they are capable of engendering a similar reaction by actors when 
they are ‘alive’.
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6. The New Italian Path 1997-2007
I. INTRODUCTION
This chapter analyzes the development of Italy’s institutional trajectory after 1997. 
The previous chapter showed that, when making institutional choices on the design of 
telecommunications institutions after 1992, some policy-makers favoured a UK-style logic of 
separation between suppliers and elected politicians, while others favoured a less pronounced 
separation. The outcome was a situation of conflict that was reflected in the charter of 
AGCOM. The task of this chapter is to review the empirical evidence concerning the period 
after 1997 to understand how this conflict played out in the subsequent years and how it 
shaped Italy’s path between 1997 and 2007. In particular, this chapter answer the question of 
the direction of Italy’s new path that remained ambiguous in 1997 due to the opposition to a 
UK-style logic in Italy.
Some clarifications are in order before undertaking this task. First, as in the previous 
chapter, increasing returns are past increasing returns (i.e. the increasing returns pre 1992 that 
were described in chapter 4). Conflicts after 1997 centered on the differences between the 
ways in which elected politicians conceived new institutions in relation to ‘old’ increasing 
returns, some of them being in favour of total rejection through complete separation between 
suppliers and politicians, while others had a preference for a solution that implied a degree of 
control in their hands. By contrast, the chapter does not argue that there are ‘new’ increasing 
returns arising in Italy’s new path and therefore there is no attempt to link the developments 
described below to the new type of relationships between suppliers, elected politicians and 
the regulator. This is connected with a second clarification.
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The period after 1997 is of course very rich in developments. The presence of 
AGCOM means that ‘regulatory games’ are being played and that the arena of 
telecommunications has become substantially different than the period until 1997. However, 
the chapter’s task focuses on institutional reform and whether and how the conflict between 
the two logics described earlier played out in terms of ACCOM’s institutional design. In this 
respect, AGCOM remains the explanandum, and its relationships with elected politicians and 
regulatees fall outside the scope of the thesis. In other words, the chapter is intended as a 
supplement to answer the research question to the extent the previous chapter ending at 1997 
had left some ambiguity in the answer still. In trying to capture the impact of increasing 
returns on institutional reform, the chapter is thus written with a view to understand how past 
developments affected Italy’s trajectory.
The caveat on the scope of the materials covered explains how, in terms of 
institutional reform, in truth the period after 1997 is one of relative stability. The key 
empirical evidence reviewed in this chapter concerns mainly two legislative measures that 
were passed in 2001 by the Amato government and in 2003 by the Berlusconi government 
affecting institutional design. This does not mean that relationships between elected 
politicians and AGCOM or the approach of elected politicians to telecommunications are 
ignored altogether. The context in which these legislative measures were passed is described 
to interpret the relevance of these measures and to what extent they reveal the outcome of the 
conflict between the two logics. In this connection, the chapter also describes the changing 
nature of political intervention in Italian telecommunications.
The evidence reviewed shows that, as Sabino Cassese argued, there was a steady 
erosion of ACCOM’s powers and, more generally, an attempt to rein in the powers of
Coen, ‘Business-Regulatory Relations: Learning to Play Regulatory Games’.
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IRAs/^^ Even earlier proponents of the adoption of a UK-style logic such as Giuliano 
Amato, later approved legislative measures that transferred powers to the Ministry. Based on 
this evidence, the chapter argues that, while Italy has adopted some formal institutions that 
are similar to that of Britain, there are key differences in the allocation of regulatory powers 
and the overall logic of the paths. As a consequence, there is a new Italian path emerging that 
is based on a logic of limited separation between suppliers and elected politicians.
The chapter is organized as follows. The first section deals with the law of 2001 on 
the transfer of licensing powers from AGCOM to the Ministry. The following section 
reviews the climate of open hostility towards IRA that followed, the legislative measures of 
2003 to expand the Ministry’s regulatory powers and developments occurred in 2007, when 
the Prodi government put forward a bill to strengthen regulatory agencies’ independence,"^®  ^
which has been however halted by the fall of the Prodi government in 2008 following general 
elections.
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See AGCOM Conference on “Funzionamento e organizzazione delle authorities: esperienze a 
confronto”, Rome, May 10, 2004. ''‘'[N]eirordinamento italiano, le autorité indipendenti ... 
sono nate negli anni novanta del XX secolo e sono il frutto di quel fenomeno che lo storico 
Cafagna ha chiamato la «quarantena della politica». È indubbio, infatti, che in Italia le 
autorité indipendenti siano riuscite ad affermarsi in conseguenza della profonda crisi che, 
proprio in quegli anni, ha colpito i maggiori partiti politici italiani. E in questo particolare 
contesto che si sono potute radicare formule organizzative estranee alia tradizione del nostro 
paese. Quanto i due fenomeni siano legati tra loro è dimostrato dal fatto che quando il 
sistema fondato sui partiti si è stabilizzato, è iniziata una fase di progressiva erosione dei 
poteri delle autorité'’'. (“In the Italian legal system, independent authorities ... were bom in 
the 1990s century and they are the product of what historian Luciano Cafagna has called «the 
quarantine of politics ». There is no doubt that in Italy independent authorities succeeded 
thanks to the profound crisis that in those years stmck the most important political parties. 
This specific context has been conducive to the establishment of administrative structures that 
were otherwise foreign to our legal tradition. The extent to which these two phenomena are 
intertwined can be showed by the circumstance that, when the system based on political 
parties was stabilized, independent authorities have become subject to a progressive erosion 
of their powers”).
See 11 sole 24 ore, 2.2.2007 {“Energia, trasporti e tic: via al riordino delle Authority per la 
tutela dei consumatorf). The bill was introduced in the Senate on March 5, 2007. See 
Disegno di Legge AS 1366, “Disposizioni in materia di regolazione e vigilanza sui mercati e 
di funzionamento delle Autorité indipendenti preposte ai medesimi”. More information is 
available through the website of the Senate (www.senato.it).
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II. ‘*NON C’E PIU VOGLIA PI AUTORITA”: THE LAW TO TRANSFER
LICENSING POWERS TO THE MINISTRY (2001)
AGCOM was bom in 1997 amidst a conflict between elected officials wishing to 
follow the UK version of Oftel and those who pressed for a more limited scope of delegation. 
In the period after 1997, conflicts continued and proponents of an Italian-style version of an 
IRA gained important results also due to a climate of general hostility against independent 
agencies, in spite of the fact that AGCOM had received praise for the work carried out in the 
initial phase of its operations from the European Commission in 1999'*^ '^  and OECD in 
2001."^ ^^
The hostility towards IRAs surfaced through public statements by, for instance, the 
President of the Republic, Oscar Luigi Scalfaro, who launched a public debate on 
independent regulatory authorities in 1998,"^ ®^  questioning their number, their powers and 
their diversity and, moreover, showing concern for the fact that these authorities were not 
accountable to Parliament. Franco Bassanini, the minister of public administration of the 
centre-left coalition, also voiced concern about the proliferation of authorities in 1998."^ °^  
The same attitude informed a speech by the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Luciano 
Violante (a deputy belonging to the Partito Democratico della Sinistra (PDS)), also raising
4 04
405
4 0 6
407
See COM (1999)537, Fifth Report on the Implementation o f the Telecommunications 
Regulatory Package (November 11, 1999), Annex 3, 13 (available at
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicv/5th-en.pdf), : '"'‘the NRA has issued a number 
of important decisions in the telecommunications sector ... contributing to the effective 
implementation o f the regulatory framework”. Likewise, in 2000 Commissioner Monti stated 
that Italy had done in one year what Oftel had achieved in five (see II sole 24 ore, 16.2.2000 
“E Monti elogia I Italia: <Tariffe liberalizzate>”).
OCED Reviews of Regulatory Reform, ch. 6.
Sqq II sole 24 ore, 1.5.1998.
See II sole 24 ore, 13.1.1998.
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general concerns about the authorities’ role and how, through the authorities. Parliament was 
eschewing its responsibilities/^^
In 1999, the First Committee of the Chambers of Deputies started an inquiry into 
independent authorities,"*^  ^ debating whether and how regulatory authorities should have a 
framework law in order to better define their powers. Although the final report confined 
itself to limited suggestions, such as introducing specific provisions in the Constitution, 
passing a framework law, improving links with Parliament and cooperation with ministries, 
by the end of 2000 there was a general climate of hostility against IRAs.
In this context, a law in 2001 explicitly stated that the power to assign licences in the 
telecommunications sector, originally under ACCOM’s sole responsibility under Law No. 
249, was to be transferred back to the Ministry of Communications"**® (which had been 
reconstituted by Law Decree No. 217 of 2001, later confirmed by Law No. 317 of 2001,"*** 
after having been temporarily abolished hy a law passed and envisaging its incorporation 
within the newly designed Minister of Economic Activities)."**^
408 See II sole 24 ore, 13.5.2000.
Available through the Italian Parliament website at
http://legislature.camera.it/chioschetto.asp7contentW_dati/legl3/lavori/stencomm/tabindag.ht
m
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See Law No. 66 of 2001. Article 2-bis stated: "... Le autorizzazioni e le licenze di cui agli 
articoli 2, comma 13, e 4, commi 1 e 3, della legge 31 luglio 1997, n. 249 [Article 4(1) 
referred to licenses and authorizations needed to operate in the telecoms sector] sono 
rilasciate dal Ministero delle comunicazionf’.
See Law No. 317 of 2001, “Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del decreto-legge 12 
giugno 2001, n. 217, recante modificazioni al decreto legislativo 30 luglio 1999, n. 300, 
nonché alla legge 23 agosto 1988, n. 400, in materia di organizzazione del Govemo”.
See Legislative Decree No. 300 of 1999. Article 55 stated that: "... 4^ decorrere dalla data del 
decreto di nomina del primo governo costituito a seguito delle prime elezioni politiche 
successive all'entrata in vigore del presente decreto legislativo e salvo che non sia 
diversamente dispos to dalle norme del presente decreto: ... b) sono soppressi: ... - il 
ministero delle comunicazioni...”.
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In addition, the law of 2001 re-instating the Ministry of Communications also granted 
the latter new powers. These were phrased in very general terms, including the power to 
monitor compliance with universal service obligations, to monitor more generally compliance 
with sector specific regulation {"'vigilanza sulla osservanza delle normative di settore'^) and 
market monitoring powers {"sorveglianza sul m e r c a t o ' ' ) No further indication was given 
in the law as to what was the scope of these powers and how they related with ACCOM’s 
existing powers. This confusion was deliberate, as the Ministry could later claim a broader 
interpretation of these provisions in furtherance of its goals.
The extent to which these provisions show that the institutional trajectory was steered 
towards an Italian-style logic of limited separation can be better appreciated when one thinks 
that in 2001 the Ministry already carried out some regulatory tasks and that this power- 
sharing was strongly criticized by the operators as a source of confusion. Starting from 1997, 
when AGCOM was formally created, but was still in its infancy, the Ministry had accepted to 
carry out some of ACCOM’s regulatory tasks. This undertaking had given rise to a
413 See Article 6 of Law Decree No. 217 of 2001 that stated: “7. II Ministero svolge in 
particolare le funzioni e i compiti di spettanza statale nelle seguenti aree funzionali: a) [there 
is no letter b, nda] comunicazioni e tecnologie dell'informazione: politiche nel settore delle 
comunicazioni, adeguamento periodico del servizio universale delle telecomunicazioni; piano 
nazionale di ripartizione delle frequenze e relativo coordinamento intemazionale, 
radiodiffusione sonora e televisiva e telecomunicazioni, con particolare riguardo alia 
concessione del servizio pubblico radiotelevisivo ed ai rapporti con il concessionario, alia 
disciplina del settore delle telecomunicazioni, al rilascio delle concessioni, delle 
autorizzazioni e delle licenze, alia verifica degli obblighi di servizio universale nel settore 
delle telecomunicazioni, alia vigilanza sulla osservanza delle normative di settore e sulle 
emissioni radioelettriche ed alia emanazione delle norme di impiego dei relativi apparati, 
alia sorveglianza sul mercato; servizi postali e bancoposta, con particolare riferimento alia 
regolamentazione del settore, ai contratti di programma e di servizio con le Poste Italiane, 
allé concessioni ed autorizzazioni nel settore dei servizi postali, alia emissione delle carte 
valori, alia vigilanza sul settore e sul rispetto degli obblighi di servizio universale; produzioni 
multimediali, con particolare riferimento alle iniziative volte alia trasformazione su supporti 
innovativi e con tecniche interattive delle produzioni tradizionali, ferme restando le 
competenze deU'Autorità per le garanzie nelle comunicazioni; tecnologie dell'informazione, 
con particolare riferimento alle funzioni di normazione tecnica, standardizzazione, 
accreditamento, certificazione ed omologazione nel settore, coordinamento della ricerca 
applicata per le tecnologie innovative nel settore delle telecomunicazioni e per I'adozione e 
I'implementazione dei nuovi standard".
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cooperation agreement between the two. The agreement was originally intended as a ‘one- 
o ff  measure to help AGCOM start its own activities.'^''*
Nevertheless, the European Commission and the Italian Antitrust Authority criticized 
this cooperation agreement. According to the Commission, market players had reported “a 
degree o f  confusion as regards some specific areas (licensing, numbering and frequency). 
With regard to licensing, concerns can be attributed to the fact that applications were still 
being processed by Ministry personnel, since the NRA has not yet completely taken over this 
function. In relation to frequencies, while the NRA is responsible fo r  frequency allocation 
and planning, the Ministry has retained responsibility fo r  frequency assignmenf\^^^ The 
Italian Antitrust Authority likewise argued that the Minister should not enjoy powers to issue 
regulatory measures of a general character.'*'^ In 2000, the Commission further voiced 
operators’ discontent and the friction between the latter and Italian authorities.'*'^ The same 
criticism was reported by OECD in 2001, which stated that '^this regulatory power-sharing ...
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See "’Accordo di collaborazione tra il Ministero delle comunicazioni e I’Autorita per le 
garanzie nelle comunicazioni del 2 luglio 1998, published in the ACCOM’s bulletin of 1998 
(available at http://www.agcom.it/b u 98/pdf/acc 020798.pdf). The 1998 agreement was set 
to expire in 1999, but could be renewed.
See COM (1999) 537, Annex 3, 13.
See Parere AS 120, Operatività deU'Autorità per le garanzie nelle comunicazioni, of February 
5, 1998 {Bollettino 4/1998) (“a/ Ministero non debbano attenere compiti relativi 
aU'emanazione di misure regolamentari generali che, in ragione della loro complessità e 
delicatezza, andrebbero esercitati dall'autorità settoriale, configurata dal nostro ordinamento 
come organismo con caratteristiche di autonomia e indipendenza”).
See COM(2000)814, Sixth Report on the Implementation o f the Telecommunications 
Regulatory Package (December 7, 2000), Annex 2, (available at
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicv/implrep6/Annex2-en.pdf). According to the 
Commission: “[0]pera?or5 say that the NRA is not yet fully operational in all its functions, 
and it is not clear which functions have not yet been transferredfrom the Ministry to the NRA. 
The Italian authorities contend, however, that the distribution of tasks between the two is 
clearly defined by the relevant agreement, and that cooperation between the two authorities 
works well (as in the case o f 3G systems) . ..” ( 176).
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created confusion fo r  market players in trying to determine which is the relevant regulatory 
body
The cooperation agreement was nonetheless tolerated because of its temporary 
nature/*^ However, at the end of 1998 the agreement was renewed for 1999"^ ^^  and in March 
1999, Law No. 78 enabled the continuation of power sharing until ACCOM’s recruitment 
process had been completed."*^’ Thus, the law of 2001 on the transfer of licensing powers 
from AGCOM to the Ministry exacerbated a situation of discontent and sub-optimal
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See OCED, Reviews of Regulatory Reform, ch. 6, at 92. See also COM(2001) 706, Seventh 
Report on the Implementation o f the Telecommunications Regulatory Package (November 28, 
2001), Annex 3, (available at
http://europa.eu.int/information society/topics/telecoms/implementation/annual report/7repor 
t/documents/finalannex2.pdf), “[T]/ie distribution o f tasks between the NRA (AGCOM) and 
the Ministry o f Communications as regards licensing is not entirely clear following the 
adoption of legislation '^* (207).
See COM (539) 1999, “[TJ/ze concerns expressed ... arise mainly from a lack o f human 
resources in the NRA, according to market players. Recruitment is ongoing and fewer than 
half o f the total staff have been hired so far (113 out o f 260). However, about half o f the 
existing staff are involved in regulatory work (50 people) and, according to the NRA, the 
majority o f its future staff should also be assigned to regulatory issues. The major difficulty 
with regard to recruitment concerns the selection ofpersonnel who have been working for the 
Ministry (approximately 1500 applications for about 100 jobs), which is expected to be 
completed by December 1999. The NRA plans to complete recruiting by the beginning of 
2000, by which time it is expected to have 320 staff members - including both permanent and 
temporary contracts - and should be sufficiently resourced*.
See Relazione Annuale 1999 sulTattività svolta e sui programmi di lavoro, para. 5 “[A]//a 
naturale scadenza del 31 dicembre 1998, Vaccordo è stato prorogato fino al 30 giugno 1999, 
con le modificazioni ritenute utili per massimizzare i signijicativi risultati già conseguiti nella 
prima fase attuativd*.
See Article 3-bis of Law No. 78 of 1999, which stated: Autorité per le garanzie nelle
comunicazioni, per lo svolgimento delle funzioni di propria competenza, continua ad 
avvalersi, in conformité agli accordi stipulati con il Ministero delle comunicazioni, delle 
strutture centrali e periferiche del Ministero stesso fino alia data di effettiva immissione in 
servizio del personate indicato nelTarticolo 1. comma 17, della lesse 31 luslio 1997, n. 249 
[a provision which concerned ACCOM’s staff, set at 260 officers]. Restano validi gli atti e i 
prowedimenti adottati, nonché le attivité poste in essere, dal Ministero delle comunicazioni 
sulla base di intese e accordi di collaborazione stipulati anche ai sensi degli articoli 11 e 15 
délia legge 7 agosto 1990, n. 241, e successive modifcazionf* (emphasis added).
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institutional arrangements (for competition) that had already prompted operators to raise their 
voice and demanded a swift solution in light of the delays the confusion was causing/^^
The transfer of regulatory powers to the Ministry in 2001 marked a first step towards 
the consolidation of an Italian path, whereby elected politicians enjoyed a degree of control 
over suppliers. In other words, after the creation of AGCOM as an IRA had seen already 
conflicts between a UK-style logic of separation and a different understanding of the 
relationships between elected politicians and suppliers, in 2001 the proponents of an Italian- 
style regulation emerged as strong contestants. It is noteworthy that the 2001 law was passed 
under a government held by Giuliano Amato. This indicates that even one of the leading 
figures in favour of ‘cutting o ff the links between political parties and suppliers was not able 
to resist pressures to change course.
Furthermore, by AGCOM Resolution No. 61 of 2001, its structure was modified to 
include a Secretary G e n e r a l . A s  can be recalled, during the passage of the bill, the 
opposition had demanded that a Secretary General post be created to counter-balance the pre­
eminent position of AGCOM’s president, whose appointment was decided by the Prime 
Minister. On February 14, 2001, Antonio Catricalà was appointed as Secretary General,"^ "^^  
whom Silvio Berlusconi would later appoint as Secretary General of the office of the Prime 
Minister. This further confirms that, at the same time when AGCOM was losing powers in 
favour of the Ministry, its independence from elected politicians was further weakened by the 
creation of a new post that should further enhance the ability of politicians to control 
ACCOM’s actions. Later developments would confirm that this trend was indeed going to
See II sole 24 ore, 7.4.2001, '"''Licenze tv, lite Ministero-Authority -  Tic- Per il conflitto di 
competenze sospesa la gara sul <wireless local loop>'\
See Gazzetta Ufficiale del 23 marzo 2001, n. 69.
See press release (http://www.agcom.it/comunicati/cs_140201.htm).
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become well-settled, giving rise to a new Italian path of limited separation between elected 
politicians and suppliers.
III. THE NEW ITALIAN PATH 2001-2007
The transfer of licensing powers from AGCOM to the Ministry was followed by a 
string of episodes where the Italian-style logic of incomplete delegation to AGCOM saw 
important advances. Legislative initiatives to reduce the power of independent regulators, 
including AGCOM, started in 2001, when the Minister for the Public Administration, Franco 
Frattini, formed a commission of experts to study a reform of independent agencies. The 
main goal of the reform was to reduce the powers of regulatory authorities, including the 
abolition of the energy authority and the transfer of its powers to the Industry Ministry."*^^
The opposition denounced the government intention to ‘re-ministerialize’ 
regulation."^^  ^ Enrico Letta, former minister of Industry, and Giuliano Amato put forward a 
bill to oppose the government attempt. Franco Frattini reacted by calling on the opposition to 
act for the common good."^ ^^  The ruling coalition split and by 2002, there were several bills 
already in Parliament to reform independent agencies, including a bill by Forza Italia deputy 
Raffaele Costa which called for the outright abolition of all authorities and a bill by Bruno 
Tabacci, a CCD deputy acting as the head of the Committee for Industry in the Chamber of 
Deputies, and Pietro Armani, of Alleanza Nazionale, that was in support of the authorities’ 
independence.
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See 11 sole 24 ore, 23.11.2001.
See//so le 24 ore, 25.11.2001.
See 11 sole 24 ore, 11.12.2001 { \^S>'\arebbe auspicabile che un tema cosi delicato venisse 
affrontato in base al senso dello Stato e del bene comune e non come una battaglia politica 
qualsiasi di inizio legislatura, o, peggio, come confronto tra chi vuole migliorare I'assetto 
delVordinamento e chi vuole conservare qualche spazio che, colpevolmente, la politica ed i 
governi avevano abbandonato negli scorsi annf).
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The conflicts within the ruling coalition continued in 2002, when the commission set 
up by Franco Frattini presented a study on the reform of independent agencies, which called 
for a framework law,"^ ^^  whereas Bruno Tabacci was rather supportive of leaving independent 
agencies’ role intact."^^  ^ Franco Frattini announced that he aimed at presenting a version of 
the bill for approval by the government by October 2002/^^ In November 2002, Franco 
Frattini was appointed as a Minister of Foreign Affairs and Luigi Mazzella took over as 
minister of the public administration.
Luigi Mazzella continued in the footsteps of his predecessor and in March 2003 
announced that the bill on the reform of the authorities was ready to be presented at the 
council of ministers."*^  ^ The bill envisaged that AGCOM should lose powers over price 
controls. Moreover, it placed the energy authority under the direct control of the government. 
Finally, authorities’ heads were to be appointed by Parliament, acting upon a choice made by 
the government.
The ruling coalition split again over this version of the bill. Luigi Mazzella’s under 
secretary, Learco Saporito, a deputy of Alleanza Nazionale, was against the plan to abolish 
the energy authority and so was his fellow party member Stefano Saglia."^^  ^ Gianfranco Fini, 
the leader of the Alleanza Nazionale’s party, was also against. Luigi Mazzella decided to
428
4 2 9
4 30
431
432
433
See 11 sole 24 ore, 24.1.2002.
See II sole 24 ore, 3.5.2002.
See II sole 24 ore, 21.9.2002, 7.10.2002. The bill concerned a framework law, aimed at 
laying down uniform provisions on the appointment of the authorities’ heads as well as their 
powers. The bill distinguished between authorities that were created to guarantee 
constitutional rights (“authority di primo livello”) from those, which had monitoring powers, 
the latter category notably including the energy authority, which, the Minister argued, should 
become a simple office of regulation within the Industry Ministry.
See II sole 24 ore, 11.3.2003.
See II sole 24 ore, 12.3.2004.
See II sole 24 ore, 13.3.2003.
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write a letter to the newspapers with the aim of clarifying matters/^"^ Furthermore, in an 
effort to stave off criticism, a new version of the bill was prepared. This new version 
envisaged that the Presidents of the authorities were to be appointed by the government and 
the energy authority was not been abolished/^^ Other differences in the ruling coalition also 
ensued, following the issue of a decree to freeze tariffs, including electricity tariffs, which 
were under the control of the energy authority."^^^
Perhaps even more serious criticism attracted the choices over the appointments at the 
helm of the Antitrust Authority of Giorgio Guazzaloca and Antonio Pilati, against which 
consumer associations threatened legal action, while the opposition argued that their only 
merit was party affiliation and that their choice was a serious blow to the Antitrust 
Authority’s prestige."^^  ^ According to Mario Monti, former EU Competition Commissioner, 
the new Antitrust Authority Commissioners ^^did not seem the result o f  an effort aimed at 
identifying the best the country can offer in terms o f competence and independence'\'^^^ With 
respect to AGCOM, at the end of its mandate, Enzo Cheli, ACCOM’s first president, stated 
that AGCOM needed “wore resources, more powers and more independence from vested 
interests'\^^^
Legal changes to further limit ACCOM’s independence took place when Italy had to 
implement the EU legislative package approved to replace the first generation of 
liberalization directive and, in particular. Directive 2002/21 that set out certain provisions
434
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See II sole 24 ore, 26.3.2003.
See II sole 24 ore, 16.4.2003.
See Law Decree of September 4,2002, No. 193 and II sole 24 ore, 4.9.2002. 
See II sole 24 ore, 31.12.2004.
See II sole 24 ore, 4.1.2005 and 19.2.2005.
See II sole 24 ore, 4.12.2004.
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concerning the role of independent r e g u l a t o r s I n  the preparatory works,"^* the 
Commission criticized the split of competences between regulatory authorities and Ministries 
and urged Member States to grant more powers to the f o r m e r M o r e o v e r ,  the rules on the
4 4 0
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See Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on 
a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services 
(Framework Directive) (OJ 2002, L 108/33), Article 3, according to which "... Member 
States shall guarantee the independence o f national regulatory authorities by ensuring that 
they are legally distinct from and functionally independent o f all organisations providing 
electronic communications networks, equipment or services. Member States that retain 
ownership or control o f undertakings providing electronic communications networks and/or 
services shall ensure effective structural separation o f the regulatory function from activities 
associated with ownership or control. Member States shall ensure that national regulatory 
authorities exercise their powers impartially and transparently. Member States shall publish 
the tasks to be undertaken by national regulatory authorities in an easily accessible form, in 
particular where those tasks are assigned to more than one body. Member States shall 
ensure, where appropriate, consultation and cooperation between those authorities, and 
between those authorities and national authorities entrusted with the implementation of 
competition law and national authorities entrusted with the implementation o f consumer law, 
on matters o f common interest. Where more than one authority has competence to address 
such matters. Member States shall ensure that the respective tasks o f each authority are 
published in an easily accessible form. National regulatory authorities and national 
competition authorities shall provide each other with the information necessary for the 
application o f the provisions o f this Directive and the Specific Directives. In respect o f the 
information exchanged, the receiving authority shall ensure the same level o f confidentiality 
as the originating authority. Member States shall notify to the Commission all national 
regulatory authorities assigned tasks under this Directive and the Specific Directives, and 
their respective responsibilities".
See COM (1999) 539, Towards a new framework for Electronic Communications 
infrastructure and associated services - The 1999 Communications Review.
See COM (1999) 539, cit., '‘‘'Community legislation recognises that the functions of a national 
regulatory authority may be undertaken by more than one body, and in most Member States 
these functions are shared between the independent national regulator and the relevant 
Ministry, and in some cases a separate body for spectrum aspects. The Commission 
continues to have a number o f concerns with resard to the effectiveness o f some o f these 
arransements, and will strengthen existing lesal provisions to ensure that:
the independent national regulator can undertake its role o f supervision o f the market free 
from political interference, without prejudice to the government's responsibility for national 
policy;
allocation o f NRA responsibilities to different bodies does not lead to delays and duplication 
of decision making;
where sector-specific regulators and national competition authorities are both involved in 
issues related to communications infrastructure and associated services, there is effective co­
operation between the two bodies and that NRAs ensure that their decisions are compatible 
with Community competition law;
the decision-making procedures at national level are transparent" (para. 4.8.2; emphasis 
added).
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strengthening of regulators’ independence and the definition of ‘regulatory body’ provided in 
the decision to set up a regulators’ group as part of its drive to improve coordination between 
national regulators and the Commission/"^^ show that EU legislation favoured an independent 
regulatory agency over a ministerial department."^
In spite of these EU directives, the implementation of the EU law provisions led to a 
further loss of ACCOM’s powers and a corresponding accretion in the role of the Ministry. 
The implementation of these provisions took place in two stages: in 2002 the Parliament 
approved a law containing general principles of implementation and delegating to the 
government the adoption of a legislative decree; in 2003 the government then adopted a 
legislative decree in order to comply with the deadline for implementation, i.e. July 24, 
2003."*"^  ^ In particular. Law No. 166 of 2002,"*"^  ^ containing general principles of 
implementation, stated that the AGCOM and the Ministry should maintain the same
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See Commission Decision of July 29, 2002 establishing the European Regulators Group for 
Electronic Communications Networks and Services (OJ 2002, L 200/38). Article 2 states: 
“ ‘relevant national regulatory authority' means the public authority established in each 
Member State to oversee the day-to-day interpretation and application o f the provisions of the 
Directives relating to electronic communications network and services
See S. Cassese, T1 concerto regolamentare europeo delle telecomunicazioni’, Giornale di 
diritto amministrativo, 2002, 689 ss. {“L ’apposita decisione della Commissione ... preso atto 
che in tutti sli Stati membri vi sono Autorité indipendenti dai sovemi ... istituisce il Gruppo 
...” (emphasis added)). See also R. Perez, Telecomunicazioni e concorrenza (Milano: 
Giuffrè, 2002), 131. ‘’‘L'allargamento [of the Ministry’s competences] è in contrasto con la 
normativa comunitaria. E ’ vero che la normativa comunitaria ... vuole stringere i controlli 
sull ’attività di regolazione degli Stati, ma si tratta, comunque, di una ‘stretta ’ da esercitare 
su di un organo neutrale ed indipendente”.
See Article 28, ‘‘Member States shall adopt and publish the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive not later than 24 July 2003. 
They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof They shall apply those measures from 25 
July 200T\
See “Disposizioni in materia di infrastrutture e trasporti” (GURI 2002, 3.8.2002, n. 181).
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competencies as provided by existing legislation, which was tantamount to perpetuating the
situation of confusion then existing. 447
Based on these principles, in 2003 AGCOM and the Ministry entered into a new 
bilateral ag re em en t , wh i ch  provided for the creation of a joint committee to handle the 
allocation of tasks. For instance, this meant that AGCOM and the Ministry had to coordinate 
in their relationships with the European Commission. It was indeed an elementary 
requirement that the European Commission be met with a single position coming from Italian 
authorities. Nevertheless, AGCOM and the Ministry often failed to do so and submitted 
documents independent of each other, sometimes expressing conflicting views.
In August 2003, Legislative Decree No. 259 reiterated the same provisions as Law 
No. 166 of 2 0 0 2 . Moreover, a new law adopted in December 2003 also granted to the
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See art. 41, para.2, n. 6) {^ '‘affidamento alVAutorità per le garanzie nelle comunicazioni delle 
funzioni di vigilanza, controllo e garanzia sulVattuazione delle politiche di regolamentazione 
del Ministero delle comunicazioni, fatte salve le competenze di cui alia legge 31 luglio 1997, 
n. 249, e successive modificazioni, al decreto-legge 23 gennaio 2001, n. 5, convertito, con 
modificazioni, dalla legge 20 marzo 2001, n. 66, ed al decreto-legge 12 giugno 2001, n. 217, 
convertito, con modificazioni, dalla legge 3 agosto 2001, n. 3IT').
See 2003 AGCOM Report, “7/ nuovo accordo di collaborazione fra il Ministero delle 
comunicazioni e VAutorità, sottoscritto in data 28 gennaio 2003, discende dalla comune 
sensibilità verso le importanti innovazioni che gli interventi normativi in itinere produrranno: 
essi, infatti, investendo I ’intero quadro normative sia del settore audiovisivo che del settore 
delle telecomunicazioni influenzeranno signijicativamente Vattività di cooperazione e di 
raccordo tra Ministero ed Autorité. In particolare, Vaccordo prevede I’istituzione di un 
comitato permanente, coordinate altemativamente dai componenti appositamente designati, 
quali componenti del comitato stesso, dal Ministre e dal Présidente delVAutorité. 11 Comitato 
si riunisce, di norma, con cadenza bimestrale ed ha il compito di risolvere eventuali problemi 
sorti in sede di applicazioni dell’accorde stesso, nonché di valutare questioni attinenti la 
coerente azione dei due organismi in materie di intéressé comune che coinvolgono le 
rispettive competenze, al fine di individuare ed avanzare proposte anche di tipo 
organizzativo. Anche nel corse di quest’anno, infine, l ’attivité consultiva svolta dall’Autorité, 
su richiesta del Ministero, è stata considerevole ed ha riguardato, tra I’altro, il décrété di 
recepimento del nuovo quadro regolamentare europeo" (available at 
http://www.agcom.it/rel 03/index.htm).
See Article 7: “7. 11 Ministero esercita le competenze derivanti dal decreto legislative 30 
luglio 1999, n. 300 come modificato dal decreto legge 12 giugno 2001, n. 217, convertito con 
modificazioni dalla legge 3 agosto 2001, n. 317, dal decreto legge 2 gennaio 2001, n. 5, 
convertito con modificazioni dalla legge 20 marzo 2001, n. 66, e dalla legge 16 gennaio
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Ministry the powers to issues sanctions when deciding whether an infringement had been 
committed in one of its areas of competences/^^ as listed in the law itself. Besides licences 
and authorizations, the catalogue comprised, among others, market monitoring powers 
including the power to issue fines {I) controllo del mercato, vigilanza sul rispetto delle 
normative di settore e applicazione delle sanzioni); and update of universal service obligation 
and powers to monitor compliance (m) adeguamento periodico del servizio universale nel 
campo delle comunicazioni; n) verifica degli obblighi di servizio universale nei settori delle 
c o m u n ic a z io n i) .Again, these powers were described in very general terms, without
2003, n. 3. 2. L ’Autorità è Autorità nazionale di regolamentazione ed esercita le competenze 
derivanti dalla legge 14 novembre 1995, n. 481, non derogate da leggi successive, dalla legge 
31 luglio 1997, n. 249, come modificata dal decreto legge 2 gennaio 2001, n. 5, convertito 
con modificazioni dalla legge 20 marzo 2001, n. 66, e dalla legge 16 gennaio 2003, n. 3. 3. 
L ’Autorità, in quanto Autorità nazionale di regolamentazione, ed il Ministero, per la parte di 
propria competenza, adottano le misure espressamente previste dal Codice intese a 
conseguire gli obiettivi di cui agli articoli 4 e 13, nel rispetto dei principi di ragionevolezza e 
proporzionalità. Le competenze del Ministero, cosi come quelle dell’Autorità, sono notificate 
alia Commissione europea e sono rese pubbliche sui rispettivi Bollettini ufficiali e siti 
Internet".
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See Legislative Decree No. 366 of 2003 {Modifiche ed integrazioni al decreto legislativo 30 
luglio 1999, n. 300, concernenti le funzioni e la struttura organizzativa del Ministero delle 
comunicazioni, a norma delVarticolo 1 della legge 6 luglio 2002, n. 137). Article 2, (2) '’’Nelle 
materie proprie del Ministero delle comunicazioni I'accertamento delle violazioni e 
I'applicazione delle relative sanzioni amministrative sono espletati dagli uffici centrali e 
periferici del Ministero stesso, nell'ambito delle rispettive competenze, ferme restando le 
funzioni spettanti agli organi di polizia. L 'ordinanza - ingiunzione, di cui al secondo comma 
delVarticolo 18 della legge 24 novembre 1981, n. 689, e ’ adottata nel termine di 180 giorni 
dalla scadenza del termine indicato nel primo comma delVarticolo 16 della medesima legge".
See Article 2(1) of Legislative Decree No. 366 of 2003 {^ '’L'articolo 32-ter del decreto 
legislativo 30 luglio 1999, n. 300, come introdotto dalVarticolo 6, comma 2, del decreto-legge 
12 giugno 2001, n. 217, convertito, con modificazioni, dalla legge 3 agosto 2001, n. 317, e' 
sostituito dal seguente: «Art. 32-ter (Funzioni). - 1.11 Ministero svolge in particolare funzioni 
e compiti di spettanza statale nelle seguenti aree funzionali, tramite gli organi centrali e gli 
Ispettorati territoriali: a) politiche nel settore delle comunicazioni; b) rapporti con VUnione 
europea e con le organizzazioni e le agenzie intemazionali nel settore delle comunicazioni, 
ferme restando le competenze del Présidente del Consiglio dei Ministri di cui al decreto 
legislativo 30 luglio 1999, n. 303, e del Ministro degli affari esteri; c) disciplina del settore 
delle comunicazioni elettroniche; d) gestione nazionale di programmi comunitari in materia 
di comunicazioni elettroniche; e) radiodijfusione sonora e televisiva pubblica e privata anche 
nelle forme evolutive; f) regolamentazione dei servizi postali, con particolare riferimento al 
contratto di programma con il fomitore del servizio universale; g) emissione delle carte 
valori postali; h) formazione e addestramento professionale anche tramite la Scuola 
superiore di specializzazione in telecomunicazioni; i) concessioni, licenze e autorizzazioni nei 
settori delle comunicazioni; I) controllo del mercato, vigilanza sul rispetto delle normative di
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providing any further clarification of their scope and possible coordination with ACCOM’s 
powers with a view to giving the Ministry the maximum possible latitude in interpreting these 
provisions. The allocation of competences between AGCOM and Ministry was published on 
the AGCOM website, pursuant to Legislative Decree No. 259."^ ^^
However, in 2004 AGCOM and Ministry still operated through a bilateral agreement 
and a joint c o m m i t t e e . I n  2006, AGCOM annual report mentioned that the two bodies 
continued their cooperation with a view to dispel the uncertainty surrounding the allocation 
of t a s k s . S i m i l a r l y ,  in 2007 AGCOM annual report stated that “è proseguita l ’attività di
settore e applicazione delle sanzioni; m) adeguamento periodico del servizio universale nel 
campo delle comunicazioni; n) verifica degli obblighi di servizio universale nei settori delle 
comunicazioni; o) tutela delle comunicazioni; p) piano nazionale di ripartizione delle 
frequenze e relativa attività intemazionale; q) gestione degli accordi intemazionali in 
materia di assegnazione dei diritti d'uso delle frequenze e delle reti ed orbite dei sistemi 
satellitari e notifica aWUnione intemazionale delle telecomunicazioni;r) assegnazione dei 
diritti d'uso delle frequenze e delle numerazioni; s) controllo delle emissioni radioelettriche e 
delle inteiferenze; t) tecnologie dell'informazione; sicurezza delle reti; studi e ricerca 
scientifica nei settori delle comunicazioni e delle tecnologie dell'informazione (ICT); 
normazione tecnica, ivi compresi gli aspetti inerenti alia numerazione, standardizzazione, 
anche quale organismo nazionale di standardizzazione (NSO), accreditamento, certificazione 
ed omologazione nei settori dell'ICT; definizione degli standard di qualita' dei servizi nei 
settori deU'ICT; coordinamento della ricerca applicata per le tecnologie innovative nei 
settori dell'ICT e per I'adozione e I'implementazione di nuovi standard. Restano ferme le 
competenze e le funzioni attribuite al Présidente del Consiglio dei Ministri e al Ministro per 
I'innovazione e le tecnologie; u) servizi multimediali, con particolare riferimento alle 
iniziative volte alia trasformazione su supporti innovativi e con tecniche interattive delle 
produzioni tradizionali; v) certificazione per i prodotti e i sistemi informatici commerciali; z) 
adozione delle regole di impiego degli apparati radioelettrici; aa) espletamento di prestazioni 
per conto terzi; bb) rilascio dei titoli di abilitazione all'esercizio delle stazioni 
radioelettriche; cc) attività di collaudo ed ispezione delle apparecchiature radioelettriche di 
bordo; dd) vigilanza e controllo sugli enti operanti nell'ambito delle comunicazioni; ee) 
agevolazioni alTeditoria, ferme restando le competenze del Dipartimento per Tinformazione 
e I'editoria della Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri e del Ministero delle attivita' 
produttive”).
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See httt)://www.agcom.it/operatori/operatori competenze.htm, last accessed on December 10, 
2007.
See http://www.ma.it/doc/agcom/20040630 accordo MINCOM AGCOM.pdf
See 2006 Annual Report, para. 3.3 (“L<2 collaborazione con il Ministero delle comunicazioni, 
che la complessità del quadro normativo del sistema delle comunicazioni rende necessaria e 
opportuna, ha proseguito nel corso dell’ultimo anno, al fine di assicurare coerenza e 
continuità nelVazione dei due organismi e anche di dissipare le incertezze nei confronti dei 
consumatori e desli utenti relativamente all ’attribuzione delle syecifiche e differenti
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collaborazione istituzionale e di confronto tra VAutorità e il Ministero delle comunicazioni 
nell ’amhito delle rispettive competenze e del rispetto del complesso sistema normativo'\*^^
New developments occurred under the Prodi government that indicate the limited 
separation existing between elected politicians and suppliers. First of all, in September 2006, 
the government openly condemned Telecom Italia decision to re-organize its business, 
including the sale of its mobile telephony business."^^  ^ Romano Prodi stated that he would 
consider action to keep the company in Italian hands. Later, when disagreements ensued with 
Telecom Italia chairman, Marco Tronchetti Provera, the government disclosed that Romano 
Prodi had requested that control over Telecom Italia should remain in Italian hands."*^  ^
Opposition leader Gianfranco Fini also agreed on this position.
Secondly, in February 2007 the government recognized in a bill to reform 
independent agencies that the current regulatory system in Italy is weak because powers 
originally entrusted to authorities have been transferred back to Ministries."*^  ^ The bill 
therefore aimed to strengthen the regulatory system by reinforcing their powers.
competenze” -  emphasis addedd). See also F. Bruno and G. Nava (eds.), 11 nuovo 
ordinamento delle comunicazioni (Milano: Giuffrè, 2006), ch. I.I.3.3, “I rischi per 
I’indipendenza delle Autorità” (88).
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See 2007 Annual Report, para. 3.3.
See II sole 24 ore, 11.9.2006, 14.9.2006 and 19.9.2006. See also Financial Times, 13.9.2006.
See the press release published on the government website on September 13, 2006 
(http ://www. govemo.it/Presidente/Comunicati/dettaglio. asp?d^29118).
See II sole 24 ore, 14.9.2007.
See Relazione al disegno di legge (“... il sistema è debole; alcune prerogative 
originariamente attribuite alle Autorità istituite sono state ritrasferite, nel corso della scorsa 
legislatura, ad organismi govemativi, riducendone cost Vambito di intervento e i poteri, e 
sono stati introdotti poteri abnormi di ingerenza che minacciano I’indipendenza delle 
Autorità; altre competenze, invece, sono risultate poco efficaci per mancanza o insujjficienza 
di risorse o di strumenti, in particolare, sanzionatorV).
Ibidem (“... risulta improcrastinabile un intervento in materia di Autorità di regolazione e di 
vigilanza dei mercati, volto a rafforzame funzioni, poteri e capacità d ’azione ... il disegno di 
legge interviene in materia di Autorità di regolazione dei servizi di pubblica utilità 
rafforzando ipoteri di regolazione ...”).
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Furthermore, the bill sought to change the rules on appointments of authorities’ members in 
order to end appointment criteria based on political party allegiance/^^ This would have 
important consequences for AGCOM.
The bill envisaged that AGCOM (like all other authorities) would have four 
commissioners only. The proposed rules on appointments envisaged appointment by a 
decree of the President of the Republic, upon a resolution from the Council of Ministers. 
More precisely. Article 16 of the bill provided that the Council of Minister would adopt a 
resolution to designate the appointees."^^  ^ The resolution is adopted on the basis of a proposal
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Ibidem (“... Innanzitutto, il numéro dei componenti è Jissato a cinque per ciascuna Autorità, 
COSÎ rendendo piu efficiente il processo decisionale e abbandonando criteri di rappresentanza 
politicd'').
Article 16 states: “7. Ogni Autorità di cui alia presente legge è organo collégiale composto 
dal Présidente e da quattro membri. 2. II Présidente e i membri sono nominati con decreto 
del Présidente della Repubblica, previa deliberazione del Consiglio dei Ministri, su proposta 
del Présidente del Consiglio dei ministri, al termine della procedura di cui al comma 3. 3. 
Possono essere designati con deliberazione del Consiglio dei Ministri, su proposta dei 
Ministri competenti per materia, nel rispetto delVequilibrio di genere, soltanto soggetti che 
abbiano presentato la loro candidatura nell’ambito di una apposita procedura di 
sollecitazione pubblica awiata con la pubblicazione nella Gazzetta Ufficiale di un apposito 
bando predisposto dalla Presidenza del Consiglio. Le designazioni del Governo sono 
sottoposte al parere vincolante della Commissione parlamentare di cui a ll’articolo 21, 
espresso a maggioranza di due terzi dei componenti, previa pubblicazione del curriculum 
vitae e audizione delle persone designate. La procedura di nomina dei componenti delle 
Autorità è awiata centoventi giorni prima della scadenza del mandate dei componenti delle 
Autorità in carica con la pubblicazione del bando di cui al presente comma. 4. I componenti 
delle Autorità sono scelti tra persone di indiscussa moralità e indipendenza e di comprovata 
professionalità e competenza nei settori in cui operano le medesime Autorità. Non possono 
essere nominati componenti coloro che nelVanno precedente alia nomina hanno ricoperto 
incarichi elettivi politici o che, in relazione alle cariche assunte nell’anno precedente alia 
nomina nelle imprese regolate o vigilate, permangano portatori di interessi in conflitto con 
I’esercizio della funzione di regolazione o di vigilanza, nonché coloro che sono stati 
componenti del Collegio di altra Autorità indipendente. Restano ferme altresî le 
incompatibilità per i titolari di cariche di Govemo previste dalla normativa vigente. I 
componenti delle Autorità sono nominati per un periodo di sette anni e non possono essere 
confermati nella carica. In caso di dimissioni o impedimenta del Présidente o di un membro 
delle Autorità, si procédé alla sostituzione secondo le regole ordinarie previste per la nomina 
dei componenti dell’Autorità, la loro dur ata in carica e la non rinnovabilità del mandata. Fer 
le Autorità di nuova istituzione, due dei componenti sono nominati per un periodo di cinque 
anni, cosi da evitare il rinnovo contestuale dell’intero collegio. 5. In caso di gravi e 
persistenti violazioni délia legge istitutiva, di impossibilità di funzionamento o di prolungata 
inattività, il Consiglio dei Ministri, su proposta del Présidente del Consiglio dei ministri, puô 
deliberare, previo parere favorevole espresso a maggioranza di due terzi dei componenti
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from the Ministers who have the competence by subject matter (e.g., the Minister of 
Communications will make a proposal for AGCOM). The appointees must receive approvals 
from a special committee that is formed by members of the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Senate (the Commissione parlamentare per le politiche della concorrenza e i rapporti con le 
Autorità di regolazione, vigilanza e garanzia dei mercati)^^^ This Committee will vote and
dalla Commissione parlamentare di cui a ll’articolo 21, la revoca motivata del Collegio, che 
viene disposta con decreto del Présidente della Repubblica. 6. Per I’intera durata 
dell’incarico i componenti delle Autorità non possono esercitare, a pena di decadenza, 
alcuna attività professionale o di consulenza, essere amministratori o dipendenti di soggetti 
pubblici o privati, né ricoprire altri uffici pubblici di qualsiasi natura, compresi gli incarichi 
elettivi o di rappresentanza nei partiti politici, né avere interessi nelle imprese operanti nei 
settori di competenza delle Autorità. AlVatto di accettazione della nomina, i componenti delle 
Autorità sono collocati fuori ruolo o in posizioni analoghe, se dipendenti di pubbliche 
amministrazioni. NelVanno successivo alia cessazione dalVincarico, i componenti delle 
Autorità non possono intrattenere, direttamente o indirettamente, rapporti di collaborazione, 
di consulenza o di impiego con imprese nei cui confronti sono state adottate misure 
regolatorie specijiche o aperte istruttorie di vigilanza del VAutorità presso cui hanno svolto il 
mandato, né esercitarvi funzioni societarie. La violazione di tale divieto è punita, ferma 
restando la responsabilità penale ove il fatto costituisca reato, con una sanzione pecuniaria 
pari nel minimo a 25.000 euro e nel massimo alia maggiore somma tra 250.000 euro e 
Vimporto del corrispettivo percepito. Ferme restando le altre disposizioni previste dagli 
ordinamenti di settore, all ’imprenditore che abbia violato tale divieto si applicano le sanzioni 
previste dalVarticolo 2, comma 9, della legge 14 novembre 1995, n. 481. 1 valori delle 
predette sanzioni sono rivalutati, ogni due anni, in base alia variazione delVindice dei prezzi 
al consumo per le famiglie di opérai e impiegati calcolato dalVIstituto nazionale di statistica. 
7. 1 componenti e i funzionari delle Autorità, nelVesercizio delle proprie funzioni, sono 
pubblici ufficiali e sono tenuti al segreto d ’ufficio. Restano ferme le disposizioni in materia di 
segreto d ’ufficio e di scambio di informazioni previste dalle leggi speciali per le Autorità di 
cui al Capo 111. Con apposito regolamento, le Autorità adottano il proprio codice 
deontologico, che stabilisée le regole di condotta dei componenti, dei dirigenti e del 
personale, anche con previsioni relative al biennio successivo alia cessazione del mandato o 
del rapporto di impiego. 8. Le disposizioni dei commi 1, 2, 3, 4 e 5 non si applicano alia 
Banca d ’Italia. 9. In via transitoria, fino a quando le funzioni in materia di conflitto di 
interessi dei titolari di incarichi di Govemo non siano trasferite ad altro ente o organo, la 
nomina del Présidente e dei componenti delVAutorità garante della concorrenza e del 
mercato è effettuata dai Presidenti delle Camere nell’ambito di una rosa pari ad almeno al 
doppio dei soggetti nominandi, selezionata dalla Commissione bicamerale di cui all ’articolo 
21, secondo le procedure di candidatura di cui al comma 3. In via transitoria, fino a quando 
le funzioni in materia di conflitto di interessi dei titolari di incarichi di Govemo non siano 
trasferite ad altro ente o organo, la disposizione di cui al comma 5 non si applica alVAutorità 
garante della concorrenza e del mercato. 10. Le disposizioni del presente articolo trovano 
applicazione alle nomine successive alia data di entrata in vigore della presente legge. La 
riduzione a cinque del numéro dei componenti dell ’Autorità Garante della concorrenza e del 
mercato opera a partire dalla scadenza del mandato delVattuale consiliatura”.
463 See Article 21 (“7. È istituita la Commissione parlamentare bicamerale per le politiche della 
concorrenza e i rapporti con le Autorità indipendenti di regolazione, vigilanza e garanzia dei 
mercati. 2. La Commissione: a) esprime il parere vincolante sulle nomine di cui a ll’articolo
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candidates will need a two third majority. The Committee vote is biding on the Council of 
Ministers. Eligibility rules exclude people who have obtained electoral charges in the year 
prior to the appointment. The appointees need to respond to a public tender, published in the 
official journal. In any event, the bill did not proceed forward because the Prodi government 
fell in 2008 and lost the ensuing general elections.
Finally, in April 2007, America Movil, a Mexican telecommunications carrier, and 
AT&T, the US telecommunications provider, started negotiations to acquire control over 
Telecom Italia."^^ The government put pressure to stop the deal, threatening regulatory 
action, such as a measure to oblige Telecom Italia to sell its n e t w o r k . T h i s  wasn’t the first 
time that, after its privatization, the government took an active stance in ownership over 
Telecom Italia. In 1999, when Telecom Italia was the object of a hostile takeover in 1999, 
the government had used its rights as a shareholder to facilitate the success of the offer."*^ ^
IV. THE RE-POLITICIZATION OF ITALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
AFTER 1997
The evidence described above shows how elected politicians used their law making 
powers to pass measures with a view to limit the powers of AGCOM. This can lead one to 
conclude that, in the contest between the UK-style logic and its opponents, the latter had
16; b) esamina la relazione annuale presentata da ciascuna Autorità di cui alia presente 
legge; c) si esprime sui pareri e sulle segnalazioni formulate dalle Autorità e sulle iniziative 
legislative e regolamentari di rilevanza strategica suU’assetto concorrenziale dei mercati e 
sulla tutela dei consumatori e degli utenti. 3. La Commissione non si occupa di singoli casi 
sottoposti a ll’esame delle Autorità e non esprime giudizi tecnici sulle singole questioni. 4. 
Restano ferme le competenze delle Commissioni permanenti delle due Camere, che 
concorrono a ll’attività della Commissione con modalità stabilité dai regolamenti 
parlamentarC).
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See II sole 24 ore, 10.4.2007.
See II sole 24 ore, 18.4.2007
See 11 sole 24 ore, 11.4.1999. For a journalistic account, see D. Giacalone, Razza corsara : i 
mercati mal controllati e la politica in fuga : il caso Telecom e la mala privatizzazione 
(Soveria Mannelli : Rubbettino, 2004).
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prevailed, as it is borne by the changes in the institutional design of AGCOM. Further 
evidence of this can be traced by observing the other ways in which elected politicians have 
intervened in the sector after 1997. Note that the discussion is limited to the formal resources 
available to elected politicians because this can be more easily traced (whereas a review of 
informal relationships would clearly exceed the scope of this work).
It is useful to remark at the outset that elected politicians stopped using law making 
powers to regulate the sector almost completely.
• The works carried out by the 8**’ Senate Standing Committee, a permanent 
committee with powers to review and approve all legislative proposals in the 
field of telecoms, show that, between 2001 and 2006, the only law concerning 
regulation of telecommunications concerned Internet Service Providers’ 
interconnection rates.
• The official directory of legislation supplied by the Parliament for the period 
after 1996 again lists no other legislative measure concerning regulation of 
telecommunication but the law on ISPs, i.e. Law No. 59 of 2002.
Instead of law making powers, elected politicians turned to powers over appointment 
of AGCOM members. With respect to the latter, Thatcher has provided evidence about the 
‘politicisation’ of appointments in Italy through a comparison with IRA appointments in
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See Riepilogo Attività Svolta dalla 8^  Commissione Lavori Pubblici, Comunicazioni (Ufficio 
di Segreteria della 8a Commissione permanente, Aprile 2006), available at 
http://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/commissioni/comm08/Documenti/attivita_XIV.pd 
f.
Law No. 59 of 2002, ‘Disciplina relativa alia fomitura di servizi di accesso ad INTERNET’ 
(GURI n. 86, 12.4.2002).
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other countries/^^ The table below reproduces the information concerning the degree o f  
politicisation of IRA appointments in four countries, Britain, France, Germany and Italy.
Politicisation of appointments 1997-2001
' Britain France , Géritiany , Italy
'
'%  holding or 
>  standing for , 
» public office ^
3% 9% 15% 23%
= % publicly 
affiliated with* 
party
0 46% 36% 77%
The table uses two measures: holding o f office in government or standing for 
elections; and publicly known party affiliation. The results are based on appointments to all 
IRAs in Italy, including the competition authority and the energy authority, besides AGCOM. 
Since data span the period between 1990 and 2001, they cover only the first term of AGCOM 
(which was set up in 1997).
The data shows that Italy is "''the most politicized o f  the four countries''’ and ""almost 
all members o f  AGCOM  ... have clear party political affiliations and a high proportion have 
stood or held public office", whereas ""Britain is the most depoliticised o f  the four countries".
4 7 0
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See Thatcher, ‘Independent Regulatory A gencies and Elected Politicians in E urope’, 47-66. 
Thatcher, Independent regulatory agencies, 52-53.
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The above is confirmed by primary sources: 471
• Since 1997, industry representatives have equipped themselves with a 
department to handle public and regulatory affairs. Their task is no longer to 
seek to establish contact with elected politicians, but to have regular contacts 
with AGCOM commissioners.
• Vodafone has adopted a code of conduct that provides for serious limitations 
on contacts with political parties and similar rules have been adopted by 
Telecom Italia.
• The way in which AGCOM Commissioners carry out their mandate is 
strongly linked to their political affiliation. Regulatory decisions are thus 
turned into a strongly politicized arena, where technical advice is often 
sidestepped by political goals.
• There are indications that the modernization of telecommunications networks 
and the investment needed to deliver New Generation Networks may give to 
political parties an even stronger leverage since they could use both influence 
over AGCOM Commissioners and direct powers through the Minister to 
influence investments decisions by suppliers in ways that match their political 
goals.
The above brings about a confirmation of the earlier findings of the chapter and, at the 
same time, enables some further observations.
Interview, Director of Public and Legal Affairs.
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First of all, the relationships between elected politicians and AGCOM confirm that 
Italy has indeed embarked on a new path. Even in a very politicized environment, there is no 
suggestion of a return to direct control by elected politicians over suppliers. Elected 
politicians recognize their limited means to affect suppliers and use indirect means, such as 
their powers over appointment of AGCOM commissioners.
Second, the way in which elected politicians use their powers in the sector confirms 
that, in the contest between the two logics, a distinct Italian logic has emerged, which is 
indeed based on a limited degree of separation between elected politicians and suppliers. 
Compared to the UK logic of complete de-politicisation, one could describe Italy’s overall 
trajectory as going from elected politicians’ control over suppliers to limited separation. This 
epitomizes change and continuity in Italian telecommunications. On the one hand, there is 
indeed change, since Italy moved from a logic of control to one of separation between elected 
politicians and suppliers. On the other hand, separation is limited, which means that, in 
making choices about new institutions, policy makers have preferred not to break away from 
the past completely. This is discusses further in the conclusion below.
V. CONCLUSION
The findings of the chapter provide evidence of the existence of a new Italian path, 
emerging after the conflicts that accompanied the creation of new institutions, notably 
AGCOM. The logic of this path is based on limited separation between elected politicians 
and suppliers. This can be showed once again through benchmarking with Britain.
238
Table 11 - UK and Italy 1997 -2007
r ;  1997 2007
No. o f suppliers Not prcdcterrmncd Not picdetermined
luilv N o t  p rc d c tc tm i r iL d N o t  p i L d t t c m i m L d
i Ownership UK,, Prîvate/lïbted
ItaK P r iv a t e  l is ted
Pnvatertis^
’ iIVate  l is ted
f Degree of competition
r.
f e ' - -  U K  ,A ^ Competition
Italv C o m p e t i t i o n
Competition
C o m p e t i t i o n
Allocation of regulatory ;   ^ UK ' OFTEL
powers > •
Italy AGCOM
OFCOM'-?
AGCOM/Ministiy
The above table shows that, after a brief convergence, Italian and British 
télécommunications institutions have started to diverge again in a crucial aspect, namely the 
allocation of regulatory powers. The legislative measures of 2001 and 2003 have transferred 
to the Ministry regulatory powers previously granted to AGCOM.
In contrast with Britain, where the Secretary o f State and the IRA have well defined 
areas o f competence and coordinate their actions, the Ministry has been entrusted with the 
very same regulatory powers that belonged to AGCOM, namely licensing in 2001 and 
general and yet unspecified powers in 2003. This shows that regulatory powers in Italy are 
exercised by two bodies concurrently, with very little coordination, as denounced by 
operators and public institutions (including the OECD, the European Commission and the 
Italian Antitrust Authority).
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This already shows that the Italian path is a distinct path from the British one, in spite 
of several similarities. If one tries to understand its logic, the following is worth considering.
• First of all, the government has taken over the role of the regulator and acted 
to set tariffs in pursuance of its economic policies.
• Secondly, elected politicians have been very actively involved in crucial 
episodes concerning the ownership of Telecom Italia, by favouring a suitor or 
discouraging an unwanted buyer through the threat of using regulatory 
powers.
• Thirdly, ACCOM’s independence, already limited due to the rules on the 
appointment of its Commissioners and President, has been further reduced by 
legislative measures and the creation of a post of Secretary General.
• Fourthly, elected politicians have used rules on appointment to fill AGCOM 
posts with individuals with clear party political affilitiation.
Taken together, these aspects show that the Italian path of institutional development 
after 1997 is based on a logic of limited separation between elected politicians and suppliers, 
that stands in contrast with the UK logic. One can thus conclude that, after conflicts over 
institutional choices between proponents of a UK-style logic of rejection of increasing returns 
and those who drew a different lesson from the collapse of increasing returns and wished to 
follow an Italian path, starting from 1997 Italy has steadily embarked on a distinct path where 
the separation between elected politicians and suppliers is limited, leading again the two 
countries along diverging trajectories.
The foregoing provides a more critical reading of the Italian trajectory than can be
appreciated through a snap-shot study focusing exclusively on the reforms that took place in
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1997. Faced with decisive institutional choices after 1992, policymakers had two options, 
namely either to break away completely from the past trajectory of elected officials’ 
involvement with telecommunications providers, or to opt for a compromise solution 
whereby elected officials could retain a degree of control. The two options clearly involved a 
different degree of change relative to the past trajectory as it can be gathered through the 
benchmarking exercise. By choosing an Italian-style logic, the convergence with Britain 
proved short lived for when Italy created AGCOM, it already showed that independent 
agencies’ mandate was the subject of a political fight and was being renegotiated with a view 
to reduce it, not to enlarge it. The subsequent developments show that Italy and Britain have 
resumed their divergent trajectories, since the Italian path is based on a logic of limited 
separation between elected politicians and suppliers.
241
7. Path Dependence and Institutional Reform: Friends or 
Foes?
I. INTRODUCTION
In keeping with the inductive methodology of the thesis, the task of this final chapter 
is to assess the empirical evidence described in the previous chapters and to provide an 
answer to the research question, i.e. whether increasing returns affected institutional reform 
in the case of Italian telecommunications and, if so, how and why. As set out in chapter one, 
the salience of this question stems from the fact that path dependence currently has a limited 
ability to explain ‘off-path’ change and thus it is ill equipped to explain institutional reforms. 
A perhaps simplistic way to portray this limitation is to characterize path dependence and 
institutional reform as foes at the moment. As happens often in real life, the best way to 
maintain the hostility is to refuse to know your enemy. Thus, the thesis aims to provide 
empirical evidence precisely on the role of increasing returns in processes of institutional 
reform.
This chapter presents below the findings of each of the previous chapters with a view 
to show how each contributed to answering the research question and then offers concluding 
overall remarks on the contribution of the thesis to path dependence.
II. THE ROOTS OF THE PATH: ITALIAN AND BRITISH
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INSTITUTIONS BEFORE 1979
Chapter 2 provided a short history of telecommunications institutions before 1979. 
From its inception, the provision of telecommunications services was provided by multiple 
suppliers. A tender that took place in 1925 awarded area licences to five private operators, 
while a sixth licence for inter-area telecommunications was awarded to a Ministerial body, 
ASST, for lack of bidders. In the aftermath of the 1929 economic crisis, the private suppliers
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became indirectly owned by the state through IRI and its sub-holding company STET. The 
number of suppliers was reduced in 1964, when SIP acquired the other area licensees. In any 
event, provision of telecommunications services remained fragmented as, besides ASST, 
there were other two licensees active in the provisions of intercontinental and satellite 
telecommunications services.
This fragmentation had been judged negatively already in 1925, when the Mussolini 
government received an unfavourable advice on the split between different area providers. 
Nevertheless, the split was upheld for political reasons. Thereafter, the split-supplier system 
became progressively untenable from an economic and technological point of view. In 
particular, the survival of ASST appeared devoid of economic or technical reasons. Yet, 
ASST enjoyed backing from political parties and so it managed not only to avoid abolition, 
but to steadily expand its sphere of business, including new services such as data 
transmission.
In contrast to the Italian situation, provision of telecommunications services in Britain 
was entrusted to a single entity, the Post Office. Moreover, and again in contrast to Italy, 
there was no private ownership after 1911, as the Post Office was originally a government 
department and later became a public corporation in 1969. By 1979, therefore, the two 
countries had already almost a century of different histories.
III. THE BENCHMARK COUNTRY: THE UK LOGIC OF SEPARATION
BETWEEN SUPPLIERS AND ELECTED POLITICIANS
Chapter 3 presents the changes in British telecommunications institutions that took
place in 1984 and argues that the trajectory followed by Britain thereafter was inspired by a
stable logic, namely the separation of elected politicians from suppliers. More specifically,
pursuant to the 1984 Telecommunications Act, the sector was gradually open to competition
and, as a consequence, there was no longer a pre-defined number of operators. Moreover,
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regulatory tasks were attributed to Oftel, a newly-established IRA. In the same year, BT was 
privatized through a share offer. These changes brought about a significant break with the 
past and gave to Britain a leadership in regulatory change. In the following years, Britain’s 
institutional trajectory remained stable, thus offering an ideal benchmark against which one 
can assess the development of the Italian path.
To this end, it is also important to take into account the defining elements of the 
British logic, which is based on separation between elected politicians and suppliers. This 
logic has several dimensions. First of all, elected politicians have no ability to set prices. 
Pricing decisions are left to suppliers acting autonomously. Under well-specified 
circumstances, the IRA may have the power to set prices for some services and suppliers. 
Secondly, elected politicians have little ability to affect market structure as they have no 
power to veto change of ownership, entry/exit by firms and/or other sale of assets. If 
provided by law, IRAs and competition authorities can have the power to issue decisions on 
such matters. Thirdly, elected politicians do not interfere with IRA’s powers and 
responsibilities. It is against this benchmark that Italy’s trajectory will be assessed.
IV. THE FAILED REFORMS OF 1979-1992: CONFIRMING PATH
DEPENDENCE
Chapter 4 presents key findings with respect to empirical evidence on increasing 
returns in Italian telecommunications and how they affected the institutional trajectory. The 
chapter lends support to path dependence’s current claims by showing that increasing returns 
led Italy onto a trajectory of bounded change, dominated by a logic based on elected 
politicians’ control over suppliers, i.e. the opposite of the UK logic.
Empirical evidence concerning increasing returns shows that telecommunications
providers and political parties were entangled in a self-reinforcing relationship based on the
‘political’ use of the former resources by the latter, due to the fact, that during this period,
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weak coalition governments exercised powers through political patronage and thus used 
state-controlled companies such as the licensees and ASST to foster their goals. In order to 
do so, political parties appointed ‘loyal’ managers in proportion to their electoral weight and 
then expected managers to carry out their instructions so that they could divide between 
themselves the spoils {"lottizzazione'). Furthermore, elected politicians used their powers 
over tariff approval (for the licensees) and budget (for ASST). The self-reinforcing character 
of the relationship was linked to the fact that investment decisions driven by political goals 
resulted in inefficient choices, which damaged the providers, thus making them even more 
dependent on political parties for fresh funds.
Political parties needed to apportion the resources available between themselves. The 
split-supplier system was highly conducive to such apportionment, by offering several 
opportunities to divide resources between the multiple political parties that formed the 
various coalition governments and between the factions of the leading party, the Christian 
Democrat Party. Each party and faction thus had its own appointees and could draw on them 
to boost its power base. It was common, for instance, for each new Minister of Posts and 
Telecommunications to recruit ASST staff from his/her own electoral district on being 
appointed. The Christian Democrat Party was ‘entitled’ to appoint the top managers at 
STET, SIP and ASST, but the Socialist Party contested its leadership and strove to increase 
its influence. The other parties split between themselves the remaining posts available and 
the resources thereof.
The foregoing shows that the split-supplier system was strongly supported by 
increasing returns, which kept Italy’s trajectory of institutional development on a bounded 
change course, with the split supplier system remaining firmly at the heart of the organization 
of the sector. In particular, during this period there was first a long period of inertia when no
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legislative initiative was proposed in spite of pressures to do so due to the hindrance that the 
system of split-supply represented for a modem telecommunications sector. When EU law 
required separation of regulatory functions from operations in 1987, the bill that was 
proposed in 1989 to wind up ASST envisaged the continuation of the split-supplier system. 
The law that was eventually passed in 1992 to wind up ASST equally permitted several 
suppliers and the plans that were conceived in May 1992 envisaged a three-company 
structure, with ASST being in essence reincarnated in the guise of one of the three licensees.
Chapter 4 thus provides empirical evidence as to the existence of increasing returns in 
Italian telecommunications institutions. It further links these increasing returns to the 
institutional trajectory and argues that increasing returns were responsible for bounded 
change, thus upholding path dependence theory. Through benchmarking with the UK, the 
chapter argues that the two countries were on two diverging trajectories due to the very 
significant differences in formal institutional arrangements. Moreover, the two countries had 
opposing logics of institutional development. Whereas the British logic was based on 
separation between elected politicians and suppliers, in Italy the former enjoyed control over 
the latter and this relationship was made progressively stronger by its self-reinforcing 
character.
V. THE UNEXPECTED REFORMS OF 1992-1997: NEW DYNAMICS OF
INCREASING RETURNS
The fundamental purpose of chapter 5 was to show that increasing returns, i.e. 
increasing returns as observed in the previous chapter, were at the origin of a process of 
rejection by actors, which in turn caused a counter-reaction by other actors affected by the 
loss of power that rejection of increasing returns would have meant for them. The chapter 
shows how these reactions and counter-reactions affected the institutional trajectory, leading 
Italy onto a new path. The findings of the chapter are important because they show a so far
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unnoticed feature of increasing returns relative to institutional development, namely that 
increasing returns may be responsible for ‘off-path’ change through a process of rejection by 
actors.
Indeed, after the Law of 1992, one should have expected the continuation of the split- 
supplier system. Quite to the contrary, in 1993 a CIPE resolution passed under the first 
Amato government called for the unification of all existing providers into Telecom Italia, 
with a view to terminate the process of increasing returns. In 1995, a law was passed to set 
up independent regulatory authorities, including an authority to regulate the 
telecommunications sector, whose fundamental charter was approved in July 1997. Re­
regulation of the sector and new rules on competition were passed in the same year.
Independent regulatory authorities were meant as another device to prevent increasing 
returns to arise and are thus part of the process of rejection of increasing returns. At the same 
time, rejection of increasing returns elicited a counter reaction by other actors whose powers 
were threatened, i.e. ministerial bureaucracies and elected politicians. The latter acted to 
reduce the extent to which independent agencies could take away powers from them. These 
counter reactions emerged in the passage of the laws on independent agencies in 1995 and on 
AGCOM in 1997 and they raise the issue as to the true direction of Italy’s path.
By 1997, Italy and Britain had come to share key institutional arrangements. In both 
countries the number of operators was no longer fixed by law, opening the sector to full 
competition. Moreover, in both countries the incumbent had been privatized. Finally, 
regulatory powers were entrusted to an IRA. However, there were conflicts in Italy as to 
whether new institutions were to follow a UK-style logic of separation between suppliers and 
elected politicians or whether some degree of control over suppliers by elected politicians 
should still remain. Both positions were linked to past increasing returns, which can thus be
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traced as the origin of Italy’s new path. The direction towards which the path was going was 
still unclear, though, due to the aforementioned conflict between two logics. This justifies 
extending the inquiry to the period after 1997.
VI. THE NEW ITALIAN PATH 1997-2007
Chapter 6 shows a steady erosion of ACCOM’s powers to the advantage of the 
Communications Ministry. In particular, regulatory powers previously entrusted to AGCOM, 
notably licensing, were assigned to the Ministry by a law passed in 2001 under a government 
held by Giuliano Amato. This was strongly criticized by operators and by the Italian 
Antitrust Authority, the OECD, and the European Commission. In addition, it was in contrast 
with the 2002 EU framework, which recommended a clear division of tasks and strengthened 
IRAs.
In 2003, new legislation granted to the Ministry new and unspecified regulatory 
powers. During these years, there was a general climate of hostility against IRAs, with the 
energy authority risking abolition and the government stepping in to freeze energy tariffs in 
2002. In a bill adopted in 2007, the government held by Romano Prodi explicitly admitted 
that the IRA had been weakened in the previous years and sought to pass a reform to boost 
their powers. However, in 2006 the same government strongly criticized Telecom Italia for 
its decision to sell off its mobile telephony arm, putting pressure on the chairman to resign. 
In 2007, when foreign carriers started negotiations to acquire control over Telecom Italia, the 
government threatened regulatory action, thus favouring an “Italian” solution. This was not 
the first time the government influenced ownership matters, as in 1999 it had also played an 
important role in the success of a hostile takeover on Telecom Italia. Finally, the chapter 
showed that elected politicians have used rules on appointment to fill AGCOM posts with
248
individuals with clear party political affilitiation, thus making Italy “the most politicised” 
country in terms of relationships between elected politicians and IRAs.
The foregoing shows that, after a temporary convergence with Britain, Italy was on a 
distinctive path. The two countries differed crucially in that the allocation of regulatory 
powers was split between the Ministry and ACCOM. Moreover, elected politicians enjoyed 
a power of appointment that weakened its independence and exercised it to re-politicise the 
sector. The logics of the two countries were therefore different.
While the British logic was based on separation between suppliers and elected 
politicians, in Italy elected politicians enjoyed a considerable degree of control over 
suppliers. Indeed, during the period studied elected politicians in Italy had been able to pass 
price setting measures, to affect ownership decisions and, moreover, to acquire regulatory 
powers, while rules on appointment of ACCOM Commissioners and President made it a 
""mini-Parlamento"\ This distinctive logic marks the Italian path.
VII. CONCLUSION: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE THESIS TO PATH
DEPENDENCE AS A THEORY TO STUDY INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
Taking as its starting point path dependence current shortcomings in dealing with 
institutional change other than ‘bounded change’, the thesis asked whether increasing returns 
affect institutional reform and, if so, how and why. In response to this question, the thesis 
puts forward two findings that represent its contribution to path dependence.
First of all, the thesis provides ‘an anatomy’ of increasing returns by an empirical 
analysis of how increasing returns worked in Italian telecommunications. It shows that 
increasing returns can arise from interactions between different levels, i.e. a sector of the 
economy and national politics. This underscores the importance of carrying out studies of 
path dependence by looking at the links between different levels.
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Secondly, the thesis showed that increasing returns can be responsible for ‘off-path’ 
change. This was made possible in Italy by reactions and counter-reactions by actors. This 
finding has a potential far-reaching impact for path dependence because it answers directly its 
critics. It suggest that increasing returns are a valid explanatory tool for the whole gamut of 
institutional life. However, this demands careful specification of the identity of those to 
whom increasing returns accrue. Sometimes path dependence seems like a face-less 
mechanism that, once set in motion, become unstoppable until a non-specified meteorite-like 
event happens. The thesis argues that there is no need to have recourse to deus ex machina 
explanations. Nevertheless, it is required that a more sustained attention be paid to 
beneficiaries of increasing returns, identifying potential conflicts and following up on their 
development over an extended time-horizon. Increasing returns impact on institutional 
reform may play out for over a decade, as in the Italian case where still in 2007 one is able to 
trace the institutional trajectory to increasing returns dating back to 1992.
These findings are not confined to Italy or telecommunications. The form that 
increasing returns took in Italy through the special link between elected politicians and 
telecommunications providers may be unique. But interactions between different levels 
certainly is not and, moreover, reactions to increasing returns by actors are bound to be 
common in other sectors and countries. Once again, they may not be as forceful as rejection, 
but it would be difficult to believe that actors in other countries or sectors remain completely 
passive spectators in the presence of increasing returns.
Finally, the thesis also contributes to a more balanced view on the implications of 
increasing returns for countries’ ability to reform. Whereas increasing returns have so far 
been conceived exclusively as a factor explaining undesirable lock-in, the thesis shows that 
lock-in can be the breeding ground for reform as past increasing returns are then met with
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rejection and later reform. This shows that institutional change under path dependence does 
not require exogenous shocks, as actors within a path keep the ability to start ‘off-path’ 
change.
251
Appendix
Persons Interviewed
Giuliano Graziosi, STET CEO
Franco Sircana, IRI official
Giuliano Amato, Prime Minister
Francesco Chirichigno, Telecom Italia CEO
Luigi Prosperetti, Senior Economic Advisor and Professor
Maurizio Mensi, ACCOM senior counsel
Bianca Maria Martinelli, Vodafone, Director of Public and Legal Affairs
Giulio Masselli, Vodafone, Head of Spectrum & Mobile Payments, Public and Legal Affairs
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